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ABSTRACT 
Historians have argued that race science and eugenics retreated following their 
discrediting in the wake of the Second World War.  Yet if race science and eugenics 
disappeared, how does one explain their sudden and unexpected reemergence in the form 
of the neohereditarian work of Arthur Jensen, Richard Herrnstein, and Charles Murray?  
This dissertation argues that race science and eugenics did not retreat following their 
discrediting.  Rather, race science and eugenics adapted to changing political and social 
climes, at times entering into states of latency, throughout the twentieth century.  The 
transnational history of mass intelligence testing in the twentieth century demonstrates 
the longevity of race science and eugenics long after their discrediting.  Indeed, the tropes 
of race science and eugenics persist today in the modern I.Q. controversy, as the 
dissertation shows.  By examining the history of mass intelligence testing in multiple 
nations, this dissertation presents narrative of the continuity of race science and eugenics 
throughout the twentieth century.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 2, 2017, protesters at Middlebury College in Vermont carrying signs 
that read “No Eugenics” interrupted an on-campus lecture given by Charles Murray, co-
author of The Bell Curve.  The protesters hurled accusations that Murray was a white 
nationalist, chanting, “racist, sexist, anti-gay, Charles Murray go away!”  The protest 
forced the cancellation of the lecture, eliciting strong reactions from right-wing groups.  
Objectors to the protests decried the death of freedom of speech and the “intolerance” of 
the left.  In an open letter, students protested that the matter was not one of free speech, 
but of scholarly integrity.  The letter, which read, “in this case, there’s not really any 
‘other side,’ only deceptive statistics masking unfounded bigotry,” argued that Murray’s 
research was pseudoscientific and therefore had no place on a university campus.  Murray 
was forced to flee the campus and at least one individual sustained injuries as the protest 
turned riotous.1  The I.Q. controversy consists of the heated debates surrounding several 
key issues in intelligence testing in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: the definition 
and measurement of intelligence, the factors that determine intelligence, intellectual 
differences between groups, and the relation of intelligence to differential fertility.  This 
recent incident underscores the urgency and relevance of the I.Q. controversy in modern 
times.  More than twenty years after its initial publication, The Bell Curve continues to 
stand as representative of the enduring influence of race science and eugenics within this 
broader controversy.  The Middlebury protests reveal critical and enduring themes of the 
I.Q. controversy, including condemnations of racist science, often from the left; 
accusations of the oppressive consensus and intellectual fraudulence of the academic 
1 Katharine Q. Seelye, “Protesters Disrupt Speech by ‘Bell Curve’ Author at Vermont College,” New York 
Times, March 2, 2017.
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establishment, generally from the right; and the persistence of race science despite its 
discrediting by mainstream science.
The Bell Curve, published in 1994 and authored by Charles Murray and Richard 
Herrnstein, revived the I.Q. controversy of the 1970s when it reintroduced the polemical 
claim that differences in black and white students’ I.Q. test scores had a genetic basis.  
Reflecting on The Bell Curve twenty years after its first publication, Murray claimed in a 
2014 interview conducted by the conservative think tank, the American Enterprise 
Institute, “the reaction to ‘The Bell Curve’ exposed a profound corruption of the social 
sciences that has prevailed since the 1960s.  ‘The Bell Curve’ is a relentlessly moderate 
book – both in its use of evidence and in its tone – and yet it was excoriated in 
remarkably personal and vicious ways, sometimes by eminent academicians who knew 
very well they were lying.”  He argued, “the social sciences have been in the grip of a 
political orthodoxy that has had only the most tenuous connection with empirical reality, 
and too many social scientists think that threats to the orthodoxy should be suppressed by 
any means necessary.  Corruption is the only word for it.”  In Murray’s view, corruption, 
however, was not solely responsible for the mainstream scientific community’s outspoken 
defamation of The Bell Curve.  Murray continued, “now that I’ve said that, I’m also 
thinking of all the other social scientists who have come up to me over the years and told 
me what a wonderful book ‘The Bell Curve’ is.  But they never said it publicly.  So 
corruption is one thing that ails the social sciences.  Cowardice is another.”2  
Murray denied that The Bell Curve was ever about race or the genetic basis of 
I.Q.: their work had been misconstrued and misrepresented by its critics who exaggerated 
2 Natalie Goodnow, “‘The Bell Curve’ 20 years later: A Q&A with Charles Murray,” AEIdeas, October 16, 
2014, http://www.aei.org/publication/bell-curve-20-years-later-qa-charles-murray/.
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the book’s emphasis on race and twisted their words on the influence of genetics in the 
development of group and individual intelligence.3  He attributed this libel to the 
corruption and cowardice of the establishment, stating that “fifty years from now, I bet 
those claims about ‘The Bell Curve’ will be used as a textbook case of the hysteria that 
has surrounded the possibility that black-white differences in IQ are genetic.”  
Recounting the passage from the book that concluded, “it seems highly likely to us that 
both genes and the environment have something to do with racial differences,” he stated, 
“that’s it.  The whole thing.  The entire hateful Herrnstein-Murray pseudoscientific racist 
diatribe about the role of genes in creating the black-white IQ difference.”  Murray thus 
portrayed himself and Herrnstein as the victims of the oppressive political orthodoxy of 
the scientific establishment, explaining, “if you say it is likely that there is any genetic 
component to the black-white difference in test scores, the roof crashes in on you.”  Yet, 
Murray countered, “on this score, the roof is about to crash in on those who insist on a 
purely environmental explanation of all sorts of ethnic differences, not just intelligence.  
Since the decoding of the genome, it has been securely established that race is not a 
social construct, evolution continued long after humans left Africa along different paths 
in different parts of the world, and recent evolution involves cognitive as well as 
physiological functioning.”4  This revealing claim casts doubt on Murray’s assertion that 
The Bell Curve was never about race or the genetic basis of intellectual differences 
between groups.
In a subsequent interview with the American Enterprise Institute, Murray asserted, 




at all.  We were in the scientific mainstream.  Every single significant statement we made 
– scientific statement we made – has not only not been refuted; they have been confirmed 
by subsequent research.”5  Murray’s representation of mainstream science on I.Q. recalls 
the claims of neohereditarians of the 1970s, including Richard Herrnstein, William 
Shockley, and Arthur Jensen, who accused the liberal establishment of covering up 
unpleasant scientific truths about race and class differences in intelligence, and of placing 
a gag on dissenters by defaming them publicly.  The corruption Murray describes 
similarly resonates with the claims of hereditarian experts of the 1990s who accused the 
liberal political orthodoxy of silencing researchers for voicing politically incorrect 
scientific truths.  Such accusations of Lyseknoism, so-named after the Soviet program in 
genetics run by Trofim Lysenko that actively promoted disproven scientific theories 
about heredity for political ends, had abounded in the United States since the 1950s and 
served as powerful tools in the hands of hereditarians eager to demonstrate the scientific 
invalidity of their opposition.  
Murray elaborated further that I.Q. had significant policy implications that were 
willfully overlooked by the establishment to the detriment of all of society, again echoing 
the statements of the neohereditarians of the 1970s.  He maintained: “[I.Q.] is an all-
purpose resource that has, because of our economy and the improvements in our 
educational system, allowed people of high-ability who disproportionately earn a lot of 
money, to create a new class in the United States, a class that did not exist 60 years ago.  
A cognitive elite.”  This had significant implications for both society and government 
policy.  For, “unless you take into account all of the effects of that class at the top and a 
5 Charles Murray and James Pethokoukis, “Is this the ‘Coming Apart’ election? A Q&A with Charles 
Murray,” AEIdeas, July 1, 2016, https://www.aei.org/publication/coming-apart-election-qa-with-charles-
murray/.
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class at the bottom that has gotten the short end of the stick in this very valuable general 
resource called intelligence, unless you understand the dynamics of that, you are going to 
pursue solutions in social policy that don’t have a snowball’s chance in hell of working.”6 
Murray’s invocation of the language of resources and capital resonates with that of 
experts from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s who argued that the genetic basis of I.Q. and its 
relationship to the differential fertility of various racial, ethnic, and social groups, was 
largely responsible for declines and stagnation in national levels of intelligence.  It may 
be tempting to disregard Murray and others’ claims about the genetic basis of differences 
in I.Q. test performance as aberrant instances of the manipulation of scientific evidence to 
achieve political ends.  However, to dismiss these voices as aberrations is to overlook the 
longer history and origins of the modern I.Q. controversy.
Beginning with the first modern intelligence test designed in 1905 by French 
psychologist Alfred Binet to identify children in need of remedial education, concern 
over the factors that determined individual intelligence, as well as the factors that 
determined intellectual differences between groups, have abounded in widespread 
temporal and spacial contexts.  Anxieties over levels of national intelligence, and their 
relationship to differential fertility, were often animated by eugenics or race science.  
Before the Second World War this was frequently transparent and explicit.  Yet there was 
a period during the postwar moment when race science and eugenics ostensibly 
disappeared.  This was largely due to the revelation of the horrors of rassenhygiene in 
Nazi Germany, which led to the discrediting of race science and eugenics among 
mainstream scientific communities.  The drafting of the UNESCO statements on race, the 
6 Ibid.
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environmental turn in the field of genetics that pushed back against the hardline 
hereditarian claims of eugenicists, the achievements of the Civil Rights Movement, and 
the institution of government programs designed to create equal opportunities for all 
document steady advances against hereditarian theories of the genetic inferiority of 
certain socioeconomnic classes and racial and ethnic groups over the course of the second 
half of the twentieth century.  Indeed, the discrediting of race science led numerous 
historians to argue that race science retreated.  Similarly, many historians have argued 
that following the Second World War eugenics was dismissed by mainstream science as 
the pseudoscience of a bygone era.7  Yet if race science and eugenics truly disappeared 
after the Second World War, how do we explain their seemingly sudden and strange 
reemergence in the late 1960s and 1970s in the form of the work of Arthur Jensen, 
William Shockley, and Richard Herrnstein?  How do we explain the 1990s publication of 
The Bell Curve?
The long history of the I.Q. controversy reveals the tenacity and adaptability of 
race science and eugenics.  Race science and eugenics never truly retreated, but 
underwent numerous transformations over the course of the twentieth century, at times 
entering into a latent state.  To perceive the published works of Jensen, Shockley, 
Herrnstein, and Murray as aberrations is lose sight of a broader and longer narrative of 
the continuity of race science and eugenics throughout the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first.  The resiliency of race science and eugenics was principally achieved by the 
7 Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United 
Statesvbetween the World Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Nancy Stepan, The Idea of  
Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800-1962 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1982); George W. Stocking Jr., Race, 
Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1968): Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
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ability of race scientists and eugenicists to alter their messages to speak to the particular 
anxieties of diverse geopolitical and temporal contexts, and to speak especially to 
anxieties related to rising and falling levels of national intelligence.  Over the decades, 
experts drew on mass intelligence testing data to argue that national levels of intelligence 
were at times declining or stagnating as a consequence of the differential fertility of 
specific groups.  The wars of the twentieth century were driving forces behind the 
repurposing of individual I.Q. tests as tools of mass testing.  In time of conflict, nations 
began to apply intelligence tests en masse in order to quickly process recruits.  Beginning 
with the United States Army’s first mass application of intelligence tests to new recruits 
in the First World War, intelligence tests were used by experts to quantify national levels 
of intelligence for the first time in history.  This precedent led to the institutionalization of 
mass intelligence testing as a means of determining national levels of intelligence.  
During the interwar period, a series of national surveys followed, generating a wealth of 
data on national levels of intelligence.  Experts drew on these data to make claims that 
national levels of intelligence were declining.  The underlying assumption behind these 
alarmist claims was a genetic basis for individual intelligence.  Intelligence was 
declining, experts argued, due to the greater fertility of innately inferior groups within 
national populations.  These experts hypothesized a negative correlation between fertility 
and intelligence; larger families tended to have lower I.Q.s, while the most intelligent 
among society had the fewest number of children, leading to the degeneration of the 
nation.  This argument effectively targeted lower income and immigrant families who on 
average had larger families during these years, which in turn reinforced the notion that 
the poor and minorities were the least intelligent members of society.  In the United 
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States, this played out primarily in racial terms, while European experts focused on the 
working classes within their nations.  Experts warning of imminent national degeneration 
urged their governments to undertake measures to prevent it.
By the 1950s this narrative shifted as experts redirected their energies toward the 
maximization of intelligence.  The groundbreaking longitudinal studies of the intelligence 
of schoolchildren in Scotland in the 1930s and 1940s, major psychological and 
demographic studies conducted in the United States, and mass intelligence surveys in 
France all indicated that intelligence was not in fact declining as experts had so long 
feared, but possibly even rising, troubling the old narrative of decline.  These surveys, 
and their revelation that intelligence might not be in decline after all, generated a series of 
theoretical explanations for rising levels of intelligence.  Some experts suggested 
assortative mating, or the marriage of like with like, was the root cause of the apparent 
increase.  Others proposed that “test sophistication,” or increasing familiarity with the 
tests, had produced a false elevation in intelligence test scores, and thus false hope as 
well.  Others suggested that populations naturally achieved intellectual stasis, and that 
while differential fertility was not causing a decline, it might be preventing a rise in 
national intelligence.  In light of these surveys, experts advised their nations to invest in 
the intelligence of their citizens.  As nations became increasingly invested in the 
maximization of national intelligence, experts began to resort to the language of human 
capital and resources to justify and support these investments.  I.Q. as human capital, 
experts argued, was necessary for both national and international success, particularly 
during time of war.  This rhetorical shift coincided with the environmental turn in the 
human sciences.  Following the discrediting of eugenics and race science during the 
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Second World War, the human sciences embraced more complex models of intellectual 
development that acknowledged the importance of both environment and genetics, 
leading to the creation of numerous initiatives and programs designed to decrease 
inequality between groups and to maximize individual intellectual potential through 
environmental and educational interventions.
The post-Second World War environmental turn came under attack in the late 
1960s following the apparent failure of the programs designed to bridge inequalities 
between groups, which often neglected to address systemic and institutionalized 
discrimination.  Dissatisfaction with government spending on these initiatives, along with 
the challenges to the social and political status quo presented by the political and legal 
advances achieved by minority rights activists in the 1960s, helped to create an 
environment permissive to the return of hereditarian arguments about the differential 
intelligence of groups.  Following the publication of Jensen’s 1969 article in the Harvard 
Educational Review, which alleged that black students’ were inherently less intelligent 
than their white peers, narratives began to shift once more.  Neohereditarian experts 
argued that educational and environmental interventions were incapable of improving the 
intelligence of certain groups of the population.  These “Jensenists” rejected liberal policy 
interventions in favor of a distinctly neoliberal approach.  
Neohereditarianism emerged at a moment of liberal pessimism about the ability of 
government interventions to effect change.  Rather than urging government intervention 
to exert population control, or attempt to level the playing field through educational 
policy, as their predecessors had at various times done, these individuals argued that 
valuable national resources were being wasted in a futile effort to achieve equality.  
9
Highly critical of Great Society programs intended to eliminate the intelligence test 
performance gaps between racial and socioeconomic groups, neohereditarians argued that 
the apparent failure of these liberal programs provided clear evidence of innateness of 
I.Q.  In Jensen’s own words, “as environmental inequalities are ameliorated, human 
differences in ability and performance will be increasingly due to genetic factors, and the 
greater will be the force of the argument: a meritocratic society will become increasingly 
stratified by biological factors.”8  Neohereditarians worked fervently to demonstrate that 
socioeconomic and racial disparities in intelligence test performance derived not from 
environmental inequalities, but from unequal genetic endowment.  Although 
neohereditarians represented a minority opinion among experts, they proved a powerfully 
influential force in the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s, tapping into broader 
neoliberal discontent with government interventions.  Neohereditarians asserted that their 
counterparts were responsible for hiding or misrepresenting scientific data in order to 
fulfill a flawed political agenda.  They portrayed themselves as the victims of political 
obstructionism and argued that many of their opponents held views similar to their own 
in secret, and remained silent only out of fear of the corrupt establishment.  These 
accusations had reverberating effects, provoking some professional scientific 
organizations to exercise reticence in their responses to neohereditarism in an effort to not 
overstate available scientific knowledge on the issues at hand, lest they lend any 
credibility to neohereditarian claims.
The I.Q. controversy was revived once more in the 1990s with the publication of 
The Bell Curve.  Although the narratives on I.Q. and national intelligence shifted over the 
8 Arthur R. Jensen, “Expanding the Thesis: The I.Q. Controversy,” Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1973, F4.
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decades, race science and eugenics have been continuously implicated in the I.Q. 
controversies of the twentieth century.  Race science and eugenics proved highly 
adaptable to diverse political, social, and national milieus.  The broader history of the I.Q. 
controversy demonstrates the profound plasticity of eugenicists and race scientists in their 
invocation of the rhetoric of human capital, resources, and ability, and their narratives 
predicting the future of national levels of intelligence.  This history bears relevance for 
today as advances are made in the field of genetics, and the possibility of selecting genes 
for high intelligence draw nearer within reach.9  To treat instances of the sudden 
appearances of race science and eugenics as anomalies is to underestimate their 
intransigence and malleability.  The long history of the I.Q. controversy demonstrates the 
persistence of race science and eugenics in many guises, even and especially during the 
moments when they seem to have disappeared.  
For the purpose of this research I define race science as science undergirded by 
racial essentialism and biological determinism, and eugenics as science motivated by 
desires to either improve or prevent the decline of the race.  The aims of race science 
often overlapped with those of eugenics, though at times they were distinct.  In tracing 
the historic roles of both race science and eugenics in the I.Q. controversy, I treat each as 
separate phenomena with often related trajectories.  There are, however, notable 
differences between the two.  First, race takes on multiple and different meanings.  In the 
case of race science, “race” refers to constructed categories that differentiate between 
groups within a population according to ethnicity, skin color, or heritage.  In the case of 
9 John Bohannon, “Why Are Some People So Smart? The Answer Could Span A Generation of 
Superbabies,” Wired Magazine, July 17, 2013, https://www.wired.com/2013/07/genetics-of-iq/. 
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eugenics, race variably refers to the human race or national populations, as well as 
constructed racial categories.  Thus, not all eugenicists were invested in the same 
questions and concerns as race scientists.  Indeed, many European experts were more 
concerned with class differences than racial ones, which minimized the influence of race 
science in European I.Q. controversies relative to their American counterparts.  In the 
United States, both race scientists and eugenicists were most frequently preoccupied with 
constructed racial categories, even when at times the language of socioeconomic 
difference supplanted that of race.  For these reasons, race science proved much more 
intransigent in the United States than in Europe, although this began to change by the end 
of the century as European countries became more concerned with influxes of 
immigrants.  Second, while a number of historical actors self-identified as eugenicists, 
none self-identified as “race scientists.”  For this reason, I reserve identifying individuals 
as eugenicists for those who self-identified as such.  The label of “race scientist” is one 
which I invoke and apply to describe experts whose scientific practices either embodied 
essentialist and biologically deterministic thinking about race, or who were identified as 
race scientists by contemporaries.
Viewed through a transnational lens, the history of intelligence testing emphasizes 
the universality of the continuity of race science and eugenics.  The intelligence testing 
movement, which crossed national borders and transpired in international spaces, sought 
both answers to international dilemmas and solutions tailored to national contexts.  A 
transnational approach traces the growth of a movement that developed beyond the 
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confines of national borders.10  Extant scholarship on the history of intelligence testing 
emphasizes the differences and distinctions between national histories of intelligence 
testing.  By contrast, this dissertation highlights the shared history of intelligence testing 
between different nations and reveals a constant tension between national and 
international concerns.  The leaders of this movement conceived of it as an international 
endeavor with profound international implications, even as they advanced applications 
and solutions primarily adapted to national problems.  This tension between the national 
and the international characterized the intelligence testing movement from its origins in 
the early twentieth century, up through recent history.  National contexts proved 
formative in the precise unfolding of mass intelligence testing, yet each of these discrete 
national contexts shared a set of historical commonalities.  These commonalities included 
anxieties over national levels of national intelligence, the relationship of differential 
fertility to intelligence, and the effects of demographic conditions on intellectual 
development.  The most significant commonality shared among nations, however was the 
persistence of race science and eugenics throughout the I.Q. controversies of the century 
and their ability to adapt to unique political environments, including even those of nations 
with conflicting experiences with eugenics and race science.
In approaching mass intelligence testing from a transnational perspective, the 
dissertation builds on comparative histories of intelligence testing, such as that of John 
Carson, and national histories of intelligence testing, including those of Leila Zenderland 
and William Schneider, to demonstrate how mass intelligence testing helped to perpetuate 
10 In so doing, the dissertation adopts a framework similar to that of Matthew Connelly’s global history 
approach in Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University, 2008).
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race science and eugenics long after their discrediting.11  In so doing, the dissertation 
emphasizes a tension between the national and international in the history of intelligence 
testing.  For instance, intelligence testing experts became preoccupied with 
“internationalizing” tests early in the twentieth century, even while they resorted to 
intelligence testing as a means of resolving national issues.  National histories of 
intelligence have centered on the themes of meritocracy and discrimination, and have 
endeavored to explain how intelligence testing was legitimated as an instrument of 
meritocracy and applied as a tool of discrimination.  In looking beyond the scope of the 
nation, concerns over alleged links between fertility and intelligence emerge as an equally 
vital theme.  Allegations of a relationship between differential fertility and intelligence 
generated anxieties about national levels of intelligence and fueled many of the mass 
intelligence surveys of this century.  Moreover, a transnational perspective highlights the 
considerable similarities in intelligence testing between nations that historians have often 
represented as having drastically different responses to intelligence testing.  This is 
particularly true in the case of France.  In spite of its lukewarm reception of intelligence 
tests in the early twentieth-century, French attitudes began to change during the interwar 
period, and by the Second World War, France boasted the distinction of carrying out the 
largest intellectual survey of schoolchildren in the world.  Although national context did 
produce unique histories of intelligence testing, a transnational approach reveals mass 
intelligence testing as a truly transnational movement that was times in tension with 
national prerogatives.
11 John Carson, The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the French and American 
Republics, 1750-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Elaine E. Castles, Inventing 
Intelligence: How America Came to Worship I.Q. (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012); Leila Zenderland, 
Measuring Minds: Henry Herbert Goddard and the Origins of American Intelligence Testing (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); William H. Schneider, “After Binet: French Intelligence Testing, 1900-
1950,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 28 (April 1992): 111-132.
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The dissertation also seeks to build on the work of scholars of intelligence testing 
by expanding the chronology of this history.  An examination of the long history of the 
I.Q. controversy over the twentieth century reveals a symbiotic relationship between 
population studies, genetics, eugenics, and psychology.  An intelligence testing network 
made up of these professions variably collaborated and competed for control over 
intelligence testing.  The issuance of jurisdictional claims on intelligence served these 
professions in their efforts to assert their authority to address issues of national welfare 
and security related to national intelligence.  At times this contest for control led to inter-
professional conflict.  For instance, the exclusion of physical anthropologists from the 
drafting of the initial UNESCO statement on race, or Arthur Jensen’s lack of background 
in genetics, led to clashes between various human science professions.  At other times, 
collaboration allowed each profession to carve a niche for itself within the I.Q. 
controversy, thereby linking the controversy to fields as diverse as demography, genetics, 
and psychology.  The involvement of each of these professions in major mass intelligence 
surveys and the production of statements on intelligence cemented each profession’s 
claim within the I.Q. controversy.  Multiple professions identified themselves as 
authorities on the use and interpretation of intelligence testing data.  In spite of the 
perpetual inability of experts to settle on a single workable definition of intelligence, or 
even what intelligence tests measured, the professions each sought to establish their 
jurisdiction, rendering this history interdisciplinary.12  
12 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998.)
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An expanded chronology of the I.Q. controversy furthermore helps to reveal the 
ways in which war and international conflict served as primary catalysts in the history of 
mass intelligence testing.  For example, the experimental United States Army group 
intelligence tests of the First World War propelled intelligence testing out of its 
institutional origins.  Originally utilized in institutional settings for individual diagnostic 
purposes, the mass application of intelligence tests on United States Army recruits 
initiated a century of mass applications of intelligence tests with the goal of measuring 
group, rather than individual, intelligence.  Intelligence tests thus became a tool of 
national assessment that was utilized repeatedly over the course of the twentieth century.  
As technological instruments, intelligence tests generated data on the intelligence of 
populations with which experts constructed notions of intellectual averages in a fashion 
similar to other social science survey technologies studied by Sarah Igo.13  The 
establishment of intellectual averages, norms, and national levels of intelligence enabled 
the comparison of intelligence between both national populations and populations within 
nations.  Specifically, mass intelligence testing lent itself to comparisons of intellectual 
averages of socioeconomic and racial groups.  
World war created opportunities for the first mass applications of intelligence tests 
to assess the intelligence of populations.  In turn, world war nurtured fears about national 
degeneration and the decline of critical human resources, as the data from the first mass 
intelligence surveys revealed startling evidence that the unintelligent were reproducing at 
a greater rate than the most intelligent of society.  Beginning in the interwar period, 
psychometricians and population experts started to suggest that decadence of national 
13 Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008).
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levels of intelligence put nations at risk of world war.  During the Cold War, as anxieties 
shifted away from degeneration, experts redirected their energies toward the 
maximization of national intelligence, arguing that the nation’s intelligence was vital to 
winning the war.  Through an expanded chronology, the dissertation highlights this 
tension between intelligence testing and war.  War inspired and provided considerable 
opportunities for mass applications of intelligence tests.  Conversely, experts believed 
elevated levels of national intelligence would function as a bulwark against war.  Mass 
intelligence testing was thus a product of war, even as its promoters viewed intelligence 
as a safeguard against war.  In underscoring this tension, the dissertation seeks to add an 
additional facet to observations made in prior scholarship on the symbiotic relationship 
between war and the professionalization of psychology in the twentieth century.  Not only 
did war present critical opportunities for the expansion of professional jurisdiction, it 
simultaneously had the effect of militarizing notions of intelligence, which became 
evident in discussions of human capital and resources in the postwar era.  The dissertation 
thus endeavors to contribute to the work of historians of the human sciences, in an effort 
to speak to broader discussions of the relationship between war and the 
professionalization of the human sciences in the last century.14
14 James H. Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in 
America, 1929-1969 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Daniel J. Kevles, “Testing the Army’s 
Intelligence: Psychologists and the Military in World War I,” The Journal of American History 55(3)565-
581; Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Science Research during the  
Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and 
Fall of America's Soviet Experts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Joel Isaac. "The Human 
Sciences in Cold War America," The Historical Journal 50:3 (September 2007), 725-746; Audra J. Wolfe. 
"Defending Cold War Science," Berfrois (2013); Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: 
Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
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The history of mass intelligence testing highlights above all else the adaptability 
and longevity of race science and eugenics throughout the twentieth century.  The 
dissertation argues against the claims of extant scholarship that race science retreated 
after the Second World War.15  In so doing it builds on the progress made by historians of 
science, such as Alexandra Minna Stern and Nathaniel Comfort, who have demonstrated 
the longevity of eugenics into the late twentieth century.16  It contributes as well as the 
work of scholars Perrin Slecer, Tracy Teslow, and Jenny Reardon, who have 
demonstrated the perpetuation of race science long after its discrediting by mainstream 
science.17  Far from retreating, race science underwent numerous transformations over the 
twentieth century in accord with the political and social climate of the times.  For 
instance, at the beginning of the century and leading up to the Second World War, experts 
warned of the degenerative effects of differential fertility on national levels of 
intelligence; drawing on the language of resources, these experts predicted a future 
embroiled in international conflict and national decadence.  Yet by the end of the Second 
World War, as longitudinal intelligence testing studies provided evidence that national 
levels of intelligence were not in fact in decline, experts turned to the language of human 
capital to advocate for policies that would maximize national levels of intelligence.  In 
the 1970s, following the publication of the work of Jensen, Shockley, and Herrnstein, 
15 Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United 
Statesvbetween the World Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Nancy Stepan, The Idea of  
Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800-1962 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1982); George W. Stocking Jr., Race, 
Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1968).
16 Alexandra Minna Stern, Telling Genes: The Story of Genetic Counseling in America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press); Nathaniel Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection: How Genes Became the 
Heart of American Medicine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).
17 Tracy Teslow, Constructing Race: The Science of Bodies and Cultures in American Anthropology (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 228, 305, 312, 350; Perrin Selcer, “Beyond the Cephalic Index: 
Negotiating Politics to Produce UNESCO’s Scientific Statements on Race,” Current Anthropology (April 
2012): S173-S175; Jenny Reardon, Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in an Age of Genomics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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experts claimed that interventions designed to maximize the intelligence of certain racial 
and socioeconomic groups were doomed to fail, reflecting neoliberal disenchantment 
with the failure of liberal policies directed at the maximization of intelligence.  Thus were 
eugenicists and race scientists able to alter and adapt their message over time.
The connection that early intelligence testing experts forged between differential 
fertility and intelligence proved a crucial and enduring trope in the hands of eugenicists 
and race scientists.  Concerns about differential fertility helped to fuel anxieties about 
national levels of intelligence throughout the twentieth century.  Experts variably 
identified socioeconomic status and race as the source of harmful fertility differentials.  
Studies on the influence of family size on I.Q. seemed to demonstrate that as families 
increased in size, individual intelligence decreased.  This alleged correlation between 
family size and I.Q. motivated experts’ appeals for government population planning or 
reproductive control over the most prolific, and least intelligent, members of society.  
Political and social context determined whether these members were identified by race or 
socioeconomic status.  European experts focused predominantly on socioeconomic 
differences, while American experts focused predominantly on race.  However, in the 
wake of changing attitudes toward racial discrimination in the United States after the 
Second World War, socioeconomic differences became more frequently invoked than 
racial difference.  This changed in the 1970s, when experts in the United States returned 
to race as a mode of differentiation upon the seeming reappearance of race science in the 
form of Jensen, Shockley, and Murray.  
In addition to rhetorical adaptiveness, race scientists attempted to recreate 
historical memory through narrative.  Eugenics similarly reinvented itself in the postwar 
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years.  Following the Second World War, the American Eugenics Society attempted to 
restyle itself by utilizing the history of eugenics as a foil for the new eugenics, which they 
professed would redress all of the errors of past eugenicists.  These new eugenicists 
fashioned themselves as applying eugenics in a time in which the science was finally 
sufficiently advanced to implement eugenic policies.  The society even changed its name 
to the American Society of Social Biology, further distancing itself from an unsavory 
past.  At times, experts adopted the language of their opposition to project an outward 
image that belied eugenic or racist tendencies.  This study thus builds on the work of 
Edmund Ramsden and others to show how race scientists and eugenicists utilized history 
and memory to reconstruct exonerating or exculpating narratives, by demonstrating the 
importance of rhetoric and the language of human capital and resources in the 
perpetuation of race science.18  
In tracing the prolongation of eugenics past its discrediting, the dissertation also 
underscores the universality of this phenomenon, in spite of the uniqueness of national 
histories of eugenics.  Historians have often emphasized the different trajectories of 
eugenics within distinct national contexts.  Eugenics in the Great Britain often 
concentrated on class differences.  In France, as in much of Latin America, eugenicists 
focused on child and maternal hygiene in the form of the practices of puériculture and 
homicultura.  In Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, eugenics helped to fuel the 
establishment of a welfare state.  In the United States, early twentieth-century eugenicists 
focused on the twin threats of feeblemindednes and racial degeneration.  Some nations 
pursued “positive” eugenics, which included pro-natalist, educational, or welfare 
18 Edmund Ramsden, “Confronting the Stigma of Eugenics: Genetics, Demography and the Problems of 
Population,” Social Studies of Science 39(6) (December 2009): 853-884.
20
measures.  Others pursued “negative” eugenics through institutionalization, immigration 
restriction, sterilization and marriage restriction laws.  In addition to these national 
distinctions, important regional differences existed within nations as well.19  In spite of 
these significant national differences, the I.Q. controversy reveals equally important 
similarities. Nations that participated in the transnational intelligence testing movement 
did not abandon national concerns, yet countries with as diverse histories of eugenics as 
the United States, Great Britain, France, and Sweden found common ground and concern 
on the subject of national levels of intelligence, demonstrating the great reach and staying 
power of the eugenic and racist tropes of I.Q. controversy.
The dissertation finally introduces the language of human capital into 
historiographical conversations about meritocracy in the I.Q. controversies of the 
twentieth century to further develop historical understanding of the ability of race science 
to adapt to changing political contexts, including that of the rise of neoliberalism from the 
1970s.  Building on recent work of scholars, including Daniel Rodgers and Thomas 
Borstelmann, the dissertation explores how the language of human capital, resources, and 
abilities was invoked by race scientists and eugenicists to leverage arguments against 
19 Garland E. Allen, "The Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, 1910-1940." Osiris 2 (1986): 
225-64; Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine, The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the 
Uses of Human Heredity, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Edward J. Larson, Sex, 
Race, and Science: Eugenics in the Deep South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Paul A. 
Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles : Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck V. Bell (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Pauline M. H. Mazumdar, Eugenics, Human Genetics, and Human 
Failings: The Eugenics Society, Its Sources and Its Critics in Britain (New York: Routledge, 1992); 
Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Mark B. Adams, The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in 
Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia, Monographs on the History and Philosophy of Biology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990); Angus McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997); Nils Roll-Hansen and Gunnar Broberg, Eugenics and the 
Welfare State: Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 1996); Nancy Leys Stepan, ‘The Hour of Eugenics:’ Race, Gender, and Nation in 
Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
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Great Society liberalism.20  It furthermore adds an exploration of the role of race 
scientists and eugenicists in neoliberal attacks on Great Society policy efforts to reduce 
inequalities.  It thus builds on the work of scholars including Alice O’Connor and Daniel 
Geary to show an additional dimension by which Great Society programs were subject to 
neoliberal criticism by race scientists and eugenicists invested in demonstrating these 
programs’ futility from the perspective of scientific research on I.Q.21  
In investigating the struggles between the human science professions for 
authority, the dissertation offers new insights into the relationship between politics and 
the human sciences in the twentieth century and examines the complex role of objectivity 
in the human sciences.  It builds on the recent work on politics and knowledge-
production in the professions to highlight the role of ideology in the human sciences over 
the course of the century and its role in enabling the perpetuation of race science and 
eugenics.22  Although mainstream science had largely distanced itself from race science 
and eugenic theories by the close of the Second World War, efforts to debunk race science 
in the postwar era were continuously encumbered by tactical efforts to avoid accusations 
of misrepresenting of scientific knowledge to avoid unpleasant truths about social and 
racial inequality.  Many postwar scientists and organizations therefore habitually erred on 
the side of reservation and caution, for fear of either being branded as Lysenkoists or 
20 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Thomas Borstelmann, 
The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013).
21 Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century 
U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Daniel Geary, Beyond Civil Rights: The 
Moynihan Report and its Legacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
22 Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012); Andrew Jewett, Science, Democracy, and the American University: From 
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ideologues.  Race scientists exploited this cautiousness to rhetorical and strategic 
advantage.  Expert efforts to place science above the influence of politics therefore often 
inadvertently helped to perpetuate I.Q. controversies.  Likewise, ideological attacks on 
race science, in their attempts to reveal the errors and falsehoods of race science, at times 
themselves contained errors, as was the case with The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen Jay 
Gould’s rebuke of Jensen, Murray, and Shockley.  Both shoddily constructed scientific 
attacks and ideological recusals on the part of mainstream science created a climate of 
permissiveness that enabled race science proponents to persist and even usurp the 
language of mainstream science originally deployed to combat race science.  This 
research thus contributes to the literature on objectivity and advocacy in the human 
sciences in the United States, extending this debate beyond domestic borders by 
incorporating the transnational dimensions of tensions between objectivity and advocacy 
in the human sciences.23
A transnational history of mass intelligence testing demonstrates the resiliency of 
race science and eugenics across space, borders, and time.  Although explicitly eugenic or 
racist science is increasingly rare, the racist and classist assumptions embedded in the 
construct of I.Q. remain.  Throughout many shifts in language, rhetoric, and narrative, the 
history of intelligence testing has been fraught with these discriminatory assumptions that 
have proved so intransigent as to be inseparable from the notion of I.Q. itself.  
23 Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Mary O. Furner, Advocacy & Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 
1865-1905 (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1975); Thomas Haskell, The Emergence of Professional 
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Deconstructing I.Q. historically reveals that it is all but impossible to separate I.Q. and 
intelligence testing from the histories of race science and eugenics.  This history is 
increasingly relevant in light of the future possibilities presented by genetics.   
1918, the year the first Army group tests were administered to United States 
recruits during the First World War, marks the beginning of the I.Q. controversy.  The 
Army experiment in testing thrust intelligence testing and I.Q. far beyond their intended 
scope into the realm of mass intelligence testing.  This experiment bore tremendous 
consequences for debates on the definition and measurement of intelligence, the factors 
contributing to intelligence, and group differences in intelligence and their relationship to 
differential fertility.  This single event marks the beginning of narrative of the 
prolongnation of race science and eugenics on the tails of the expansion of group testing 




Declining Levels of National Intelligence and the Specter of Differential Fertility
In 1918, the Los Angeles Times informed its readers that all Army recruits 
mustered for service at the nearby Camp Kearny were to undergo group intelligence 
testing.  The Army intelligence tests promised to revolutionize the preparation and 
placement of new recruits by dividing and ranking them according to their innate 
intellectual abilities.  The article explained, “intelligence can be measured, like wool or 
cotton goods.  The government is now testing the mental efficiency of all men in the 
army with the idea of putting them in five classes, as to intelligence.  The purpose is to 
pick out the mentally superior, not necessarily educated, to aid in appointments to 
responsible positions.”  This marked a considerable development in intelligence testing, 
for “while gauging mentalities was formerly done individually, the new scheme permits 
several hundred to be examined and rated at one time, thus effecting a saving to the 
government estimated at several million dollars.”24  During the First World War, the 
invention of methods in group testing propelled I.Q. tests out of their individual, 
diagnostic, and institutional origins, initiating a trend in mass intelligence testing in the 
twentieth century.  The United States Army experiment in group intelligence tests marked 
the opening of a new frontier in intelligence testing and a novel way of applying 
intelligence tests to assess the intelligence of whole populations.  These first mass 
applications of intelligence tests ultimately led experts to attempt to assess national levels 
of intelligence, and to conclude that national intelligence was declining as a result of the 
differential fertility of the least intelligent members of the nation.  A transnational 
24 “Kearny Soldiers Given Test for Intelligence: Efficient Method of Classing Fighting Men Placed in 
Operation,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1918, II1.
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approach to this history brings to light the universality of the perceived connection 
between intelligence and differential fertility among nations with otherwise distinct 
histories of intelligence testing, and underscores the role of war as a catalyst within this 
shared history.  This early twentieth-century assumption of the relationship between 
differential fertility and intelligence would prove instrumental in perpetuating race 
science and eugenics late into the twenty-first century.
Fueled in part by the momentum achieved during the war, applications of 
intelligence testing expanded greatly during the interwar years.  Group intelligence 
testing studies investigated alleged correlations between intelligence and family size that 
corroborated eugenic concerns that the least intelligent were reproducing at rates that 
were lowering national levels of intelligence.  Hitherto undefinable and unmeasurable, 
national levels of intelligence suddenly emerged as a subject of great interest to 
psychologists, population experts, and nations alike following the unprecedented 
availability of data on the intelligence of populations.  Race and class permeated the 
developing anxieties about the relationship between differential fertility and intelligence.  
Intelligence testing experts, many of whom openly embraced eugenics or race science, 
argued that intelligence was highly heritable.  According to this logic, if the least 
intelligent of the population were the most fecund, national intellectual degeneration 
would result.  As group intelligence testing expanded, experts increasingly discussed and 
understood national intelligence as a matter of national security.  The threat of declining 
national intelligence posed a liability in a world ravaged by war.  New applications of 
intelligence testing, as well as new fears about the intellectual quality of the population at 
large, thus helped to introduce new and often militaristic and nationalistic modes of 
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thinking about intelligence that would shape the social and political implications of I.Q. 
throughout the twentieth century. 
A transnational approach to the history of group intelligence testing beginning 
with the United States Army intelligence tests builds on the histories of intelligence 
testing, race science, and eugenics presented by Leila Zenderland, John Carson, Daniel 
Kevles and others by complicating claims of national exceptionalism within these 
narratives.  Zenderland’s research has emphasized the role of intelligence testing in 
perpetuating anxieties about national intellectual degeneration.25  Carson and Kevles have 
likewise affirmed the significance of the United States Army tests in legitimating 
intelligence testing in the United States.26  Carson’s work has further demonstrated that 
national context contributed to the widely distinct paths of intelligence testing in France 
and the United States, which failed to achieve great popularity in the former and assumed 
a significant supporting role in sustaining racism and the myth of meritocracy in the 
latter.27  These national and comparative studies of intelligence testing emphasize the 
uniqueness of intelligence testing in the United States and other national contexts.  A 
transnational approach to the history of intelligence testing during the interwar period, 
however, challenges narratives of national exceptionalism and highlights a series of 
dynamic tensions otherwise masked by national context.  The first of these is a tension 
between the national and the international.  Early intelligence testers were primarily 
preoccupied with concern over national levels of intelligence.  Yet, moving into the 
25 Leila Zenderland, Measuring Minds: Henry Herbert Goddard and the Origins of American Intelligence 
Testing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 8.
26 John Carson, The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the French and American 
Republics, 1750-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), chapter 6; Daniel J. Kevles, “Testing 
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55(3) (1968): 565-581.
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interwar years, these same experts sought to “internationalize” tests so that they could be 
applied among diverse populations across the world.  A transnational perspective 
underscores the shared history of intelligence testing across national borders, even while 
national distinctions persisted.  It furthermore recognizes the role played by private 
foundations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation, in the 
transnational funding and direction of state research on group intelligence.  There exists 
as well a tension between intelligence testing as a product of and bulwark against war.  
As demographic experts identified population problems as the root cause of war, they 
forged a connection between declining levels of intelligence and a nation’s vulnerability 
to war.  The antidote to war, in this case, was the elevation of national levels of 
intelligence as a method of both preventing war and ensuring a strong national defense 
should war prove unavoidable.  Finally, a transnational approach to the history of mass 
intelligence testing highlights the centrality of concerns about differential fertility, 
bridging the history of intelligence testing with the histories of population studies, race 
science, and eugenics.
This chapter examines the history of the application of psychometric tests as tools 
of population assessment during the First World War and traces the resounding impact of 
the war on national applications of intelligence tests during the interwar period.   Group 
intelligence testing data endorsed experts’ predictions of national decadence, stoking 
anxieties about the relationship of differential fertility to intelligence.  This data 
supported extant eugenic arguments that the feebleminded, criminals, immigrants, and 
races of lesser stock threatened nations with intellectual degeneration.  Eugenicists seized 
upon group intelligence testing data to support arguments for population control in an 
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effort to revive eugenics’ diminishing relevance and popularity during the interwar years. 
This alleged relationship between differential fertility and intelligence, which helped to 
extend the existence of race science and eugenics, would largely define the history of 
intelligence testing in the twentieth century from the First World War.  
When the United States entered into the First World War on April 6, 1917, 
American psychologists were quick to establish a role for psychometrics in the war 
effort.28  Mobilization on a hitherto unprecedented scale flooded the Army with more 
recruits than it could efficiently process, with the Army expanding from 200,000 to 3.5 
million in fewer than two years.29  Under the direction of the president of the American 
Psychological Society Robert Mearns Yerkes, psychologists mustered to measure the 
intelligence of the United States Army.  The Army Alpha and Beta Tests were the first 
mass applications of modern I.Q. tests.  The first intelligence test, authored by French 
psychologist Alfred Binet in 1904, had been intended as a diagnostic tool of individual 
assessment to be used in educational settings.30  The Army testing experiment propelled 
intelligence tests far beyond their intended application.  The wartime experiment 
introduced the first group tests, which proved central to the expansion of mass 
intelligence testing.  Group tests, unlike individual tests that required expert 
administration and scoring, could be administered to large numbers of people at once and 
could be scored rapidly.  The Army tests were the first significant trial of the developing 
28 For a complete history of the U.S. Army intelligence testing experiment, see: Carson, The Measure of 
Merit; Zenderland, Measuring Minds; Kevles, “Testing the Army’s Intelligence: Psychologists and the 
Military in World War I.”
29 Carson, The Measure of Merit, 200-201; Zenderland, Measuring Minds, 281.
30 Zenderland, Measuring Minds, 2.
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field of intelligence testing, and the first amassing of data on the intelligence of a large 
population.  At its peak, the Army tested 10,000 recruits per day.31  By the war’s end, the 
Army had tested over 1.75 million recruits.32  The First World War presented an unique 
opportunity to apply intelligence tests to a large population with the express intent of 
ranking and categorizing individuals according to I.Q.  The wartime testing experiment 
propelled the nascent testing movement forward out of its institutional settings and 
relative obscurity toward assessing the intelligence of whole populations.  
It took two years for experts to process the wartime testing data.  The National 
Academy of Sciences published the findings, which indicated a stunningly low level of 
the intelligence of recruits.33  The average mental age of the Army recruits was a mere 
thirteen years, which skirted the dividing line between normal and subnormal 
intelligence.34  Eugenicists were quick to draw on the Army testing data to support 
theories of racial degeneration and the decline of national intelligence.  An article in the 
New York Times mourned the results, reporting, “now for the first time we have positive 
data as to the mental equipment and to a less degree as to the moral equipment of the 
American public – the public to which we have turned over the destiny of the nation 
under a virtually universal suffrage.”35  Not all Americans were of inferior intelligence, 
yet those of superior intelligence were far outnumbered.  According to eugenic experts, 
the high intellect of the educated class was significantly outweighed by the lesser 
intelligence of the masses.  Indeed, the New York Times reported, “Professor Terman 
31 Carson, The Measure of Merit, 197.
32 Carson, The Measure of Merit, 199; Zenderland, Measuring Minds, 288.
33 Robert M. Yerkes, “Psychological Examining in the United States Army,” National Academy of 
Sciences Memoir XV (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921).
34 Zenderland, Measuring Minds, 288-289.
35 John Corbin, “American Civilization on the Brink,” New York Times, June 12, 1921, 40.
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thinks that the average intelligence of the population is decreasing and that the number of 
geniuses in the future is destined to be comparatively few.  He accounts for this fact by 
quoting statistics showing the intellectually superior to be slower in reproduction even 
than the socially incompetent.”36  Such demographic projections tapped into growing 
fears that if intelligence tests truly measured something innate, national trends in 
intelligence might prove damning and irreversible.  Critically, these projections identified 
a relationship between intelligence and differential fertility in the configuration of 
national levels of intelligence.  
The Army testing results were seen as a confirmation of widely-shared 
assumptions about intelligence: the socioeconomically advantaged scored the highest, 
while blacks and immigrants scored the lowest.37  Regardless of the often unequal and 
unideal conditions under which recruits were examined, the Army testing experiment led 
experts and much of the American state and people to believe that their fear that national 
intelligence was declining had been validated.  Photos taken of the testing of recruits, 
which allude to the inequitable circumstances of examination, reveal that black and 
immigrant recruits were regularly tested in cramped quarters, forced to sit on the floor, 
while examiners paced between them (see images 1 and 2).  Yet, in spite of these unequal 
conditions under which the tests were administered, in the words of one expert, “the 
Army mental tests give us an opportunity for a national inventory of our own mental 
capacity.”38  The United States Army testing experiment helped to established a 
relationship between national levels of intelligence and the impact of specific groups 
within the population on overall intelligence.  The Army tests thus paved the way for 
36 “Thinks Intelligence of Race is Decreasing,” New York Times, December 25, 1922, 2.
37 Zenderland, Measuring Minds, 289.
38 Carl C. Brigham, A Study of American Intelligence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1923), xx.
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Image 1: Group Examinations in a Hospital Ward, Camp Lee, October 1917
Robert Mearns Yerkes, ed., Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences XV: 
Psychological Examining in the United States Army (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 90.
Image 2: Group Examination Alpha being taken by Black Recruits
Robert Mearns Yerkes, ed., Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences XV: 
Psychological Examining in the United States Army (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 91.
experts to identify a link between differential fertility and intelligence that would 
underpin the I.Q. controversies of the century. 
The National Research Council continued the work of assessing the intelligence 
of the nation as a whole and of subsets of the population within it.  The wartime testing 
department found its new home within the National Research Council where many 
experts involved in the development and application of the Army intelligence tests 
pursued new testing projects designed to assess the intelligence of the American people – 
and international peoples – at large.  The new focus on population drove the council’s 
research on intelligence testing, as did the new desire to produce intellectual inventories 
of groups within the population.  The National Research Council, with considerable 
financial assistance from private foundations, spearheaded the major intelligence testing 
studies in the United States in the years following the Second World War, creating a 
Committee on National Intelligence Tests to oversee national intelligence testing and to 
serve as an informational clearinghouse on existing intelligence tests.39  
Formed in 1919 as the School Scale Board, the Committee on National 
Intelligence Tests, included wartime testing veterans Melvin Haggerty, Lewis M. Terman, 
Edward L. Thorndike, and Guy Whipple, with Yerkes serving as chair.40  Yerkes, the 
committee’s driving force, ultimately left in 1921 for professional reasons, leaving it in 
the hands of Whipple.41  In 1923, the committee disbanded for a short period, retaining 
39 “Committee on National Intelligence Tests Evolution,” Folder: Committee on National Intelligence 
Tests: Activities Summary, 1921-1932, Series: Division of Anthropology and Psychology, 1919-
1939,National Academy of Sciences (NAS).
40 “Committee on National Intelligence Tests Evolution,” Folder: Committee on National Intelligence 
Tests: Activities Summary, 1921-1932, Series: Division of Anthropology and Psychology, 1919-1939, 
NAS.
41 Robert M. Yerkes to Abraham Flexner, April 23, 1921, Folder: 7206, Box: 700, Series 1.3, FA058, 
General Education Board (GEB), Rockefeller Archives Center(RAC).
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Whipple as director, before its reappointment in 1927 to “give prestige (by use of their 
names) to the tests” and to undertake necessary revisions before finally dissolving in 
1932.42  Entering into a contract with the World Book Company, the committee began the 
work of devising a national intelligence test for use beyond the military.43  Moving 
beyond the identification of the intellectually subnormal, the committee was particularly 
interested in the potential of intelligence tests to identify the intellectually gifted, which 
the committee viewed as national resources.44  As Terman expressed in an appeal to the 
National Research Council for funding of his research at Stanford University, “the most 
important resources of the nation are its intellectual resources, and methods of 
discovering, conserving, and developing these resources offer unlimited possibilities of 
fruitful research.”  Indeed, Terman suggested that “to discover and develop a single 
individual of exceptional intellectual ability may be of greater importance than to prevent 
the birth of a thousand feeble-minded.”45  This stark shift away from preoccupation with 
degeneration toward investing positively in maximizing the potential of gifted individuals 
transpired in tandem with intelligence testing experts’ new recognition of intelligence as a 
kind of national resource.
With the identification of the nation’s intellectual resources as its guiding 
sentiment, the Committee on National Intelligence Tests commenced broad surveys of the 
42 “Committee on National Intelligence Tests Evolution,” Folder: Committee on National Intelligence 
Tests: Activities Summary, 1921-1932, Series: Division of Anthropology and Psychology, 1919-1939, 
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intelligence of American children.  Joining forces with private foundations, most notably 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board, the National Committee on 
Intelligence Tests conducted the first surveys of the intelligence of schoolchildren in the 
United States.  This venture marked the fruition of a longstanding desire by the leading 
intelligence testing experts to expand the use of intelligence tests beyond their original 
and intended diagnostic role in institutional settings.  Indeed, Yerkes and Terman had first 
approached the General Education Board in an unsuccessful appeal for support of 
intelligence surveys of schoolchildren before the war.  The war helped demonstrate the 
potential of intelligence testing on a national scale.  Yerkes had alluded to this potential 
during the war when he wrote to Abraham Flexner, a personal friend and Secretary of the 
General Education Board, “I very much wish that you might drop in on us some time to 
visit and to find out just what psychology is doing for our military organizations.”46  The 
success of the Army intelligence testing, and the feeling that “it would be very 
advantageous to the whole movement of mental testing if this adaptation could be made 
carefully, systematically, under the auspices of some institution or organization with 
prestige,” influenced the National Research Council’s decision to approach the General 
Education Board for financial support for research into the intelligence of American 
schoolchildren at the war’s end.47  The demonstrated ability of intelligence tests to 
measure the resource of national intelligence proved convincing and earned the National 
Research Council the General Education Board’s support.
46 Robert M. Yerkes to Abraham Flexner, January 8, 1918, Folder: 7206, Box: 700, Series 1.3, FA058, 
GEB, RAC.
47 Guy M. Whipple, “The National Intelligence Tests,” Journal of Educational Research 4(1) (June 1, 
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In 1919, Yerkes organized the Committee on the Preparation of Intelligence Tests 
for Elementary Schools with the assistance of a grant of $25,000 from the General 
Education Board for “financing the preparation of mental measurements for school 
children.”  The committee included Haggerty, Terman, Thorndike, and Whipple, with 
Yerkes acting as committee chair.48  The initial grant from the General Education Board 
was fully spent in the preparation of the tests, after which point the committee financed 
its activities and revisions principally from the royalties from the sale of the tests.49  With 
the funds received from the General Education Board, the committee set to work devising 
twenty different tests they “desired to try out thoroughly.”  The tests not only assessed the 
intelligence of the test-takers, but also requested that students provide key demographic 
information.  The tests required students to provide information regarding the nationality 
of their parents and to state their race, which allowed the committee to aggregate data on 
the intelligence of students according to race and immigrant status.50  As was true of the 
Army tests, the content of the tests was considerably skewed in favor of children born in 
the United States who grew up speaking English and would have been introduced to 
advanced vocabulary and historical and cultural references.  For instance, one question on 
the tests required students to answer, “the British armies in France were led by: Haig, 
Jellico, Joffre, or Pershing?”  Another asked for the definition of “sudorific.”  The tests 
were designed with the intention of “compar[ing] the child with the average child of his 
48 Memorandum from Robert M. Yerkes to Dr. Kellogg, October 31, 1919, Folder: Committee on 
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Psychology, 1919-1939, NAS; Memorandum for Dr. Barrows, February 4, 1936, Folder: Finance: Funds, 
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age in general intelligence.”51  However, the data collected on the race and parentage of 
the students implied comparison between racial and immigrant groups as well, and 
required informational or learned knowledge unrelated to the innate intellectual skills that 
the tests professed to measure.  Thus the earliest group tests were created with the express 
intent of disaggregating the intellect of discrete socioeconomic and racial groups within 
the nation, as well as measuring aggregate national levels of intelligence.
In the early 1920s, the leftover wartime supply of intelligence testers enabled 
rapid and large-scale expansion of group intelligence testing.  These professionals often 
had graduate training in the fields of education and psychology, and many had received 
instruction in administering group intelligence tests from the United States Army during 
the war.52  By the end of its first year, the Committee on the Preparation of Intelligence 
Tests for Elementary Schools had tested over five thousand children with twenty different 
tests.53  The tests varied in their structure and questions, and were chosen among those 
already in existence with the goal of identifying the most accurate scales of intelligence.54 
The immediate postwar years were identified a “peculiarly opportune time” to affect 
large-scale examinations of the intelligence of schoolchildren.  As noted in a General 
Education Board memorandum: “A very large number of psychologists and those skilled 
in conducting educational tests and measurements was mobilized for war service.  Those 
men are now being demobilized.... Never before has it been possible to secure such 
competent men to such an advantage, and doubtless the opportunity will never again be 
51 Robert M. Yerkes, “Report to the Chairman of the General Education Board, 61 Broadway, New York 
City, on the work of the committee for the preparation of a group scale for the measurement of intelligence 
in pupils of elementary schools [1919],” Folder: 3224; Box: 308: Series 1.3, FA058, GEB, RAC, 2.
52 Kevles, “Testing the Army’s Intelligence,” 572.
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1919,” Folder: 3224, Box: 308, Series 1.3, FA058, GEB, RAC.
54 Ibid, 1-2.
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so favorable.”55  With such a large force of trained and experienced intelligence testing 
experts at hand, the committee conducted surveys of schoolchildren in tandem with the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s own investigations in Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland, 
Indiana, Delaware, and New York, experimenting with various intelligence tests in order 
to identify the most effective scales in the years immediately following the war.56  
This testing venture marked the beginning of the fruition of hopes for in-depth, 
extensive inventories of the intellect of populations and subgroups within those 
populations.  While the General Education Board aspired primarily to report on 
educational conditions in order to recommend legislative and policy changes, intelligence 
testing experts viewed the surveys as a means to assess national intelligence and its 
variations among racial and socioeconomic groups.57  Each of the tests administered 
required students to list their “nationality” and race, which enabled the collection of data 
on discrete ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups.58  Indeed, Yerkes had proposed a 
survey of city schoolchildren to Flexner as early as 1917 with the express intent of 
identifying intellectual differences between classes.  His intention was to “discover the 
mental status, intellectual and affective, and the proportions of various grades of 
intelligence and affective types in a given community,” and “to place on record accurate 
data concerning several thousand school children which might later be used in connection 
with inquiries into the social and economic status of the individuals.”  Yerkes particularly 
55 “Virginia Survey,” Folder: 1767, Box: 188, Series 1.3, FA058, GEB, RAC.
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hoped to accrue “social data” on “important environmental influences and family 
history.”59  His plans for a survey inspired by the desire to assess populations’ intelligence 
presaged the extensive longitudinal studies on the relation of I.Q. to class, environment, 
and psychological characteristics that would dominate the field of intelligence testing in 
the 1930s and 1940.  The work of the committee greatly impacted the course of early 
testing of schoolchildren in the United States.  Within just a few years of the release of 
the Army exams, they were administered to thousands of American schoolchildren, 
introducing a culture of standardized testing into the United States system of education.60  
The work of the committee had no less significant of an impact elsewhere in the 
world.  In 1926, Professor Luis Miro Quesada of the University of San Marcos in Lima, 
Peru translated the National Intelligence Test into Spanish.  The National Research 
Council was “gratified to learn of the extension of these tests in their application in a 
second language and hopes that their use in Spanish form will be found helpful in the 
same way in which it is believed that these tests have served a useful purpose in the 
schools of the United States.”61  When Quesada traveled to the United States for a 
meeting of the Pan-American Union, he visited the National Research Council to discuss 
the “possibility of making an arrangement for printing the tests and for thus making his 
translation available in other Spanish-speaking countries.”62  The early American group 
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testing movement thus exerted considerable influence internationally, and a culture of 
standardized testing in education took root at this time in many nations across the globe.  
In these early years following the First World War, the National Research Council 
conducted another major and unprecedented foray into intelligence testing when it began 
an investigation into the relationship between I.Q. and other traits through the work of its 
Committee on Scientific Problems of Human Migration.  The committee members 
included psychologists Carl C. Brigham, Raymond Dodge, Walter V. Bingham, and C.S. 
Yoakum.63  This committee sought “the internationalizing or universalizing of methods of 
mental measurement” at the same time that the United States turned to a policy of 
immigration restriction through a quota system based on national origins.64  
Acknowledging the need “to proceed wisely and justly, [and] attempt to see the world-
situation clearly and without individual, national, or racial bias,” Yerkes outlined two 
goals for the committee: first, the improvement of the instruments of measuring human 
intellect, and second, the thorough investigation of the phenomena of differential fertility 
and race-mixture.65  Yerkes’s desire for “well considered and wisely planned investigation 
of the differential birth-rate in the United States, especially in relation to immigration and 
the stability of population,” was intimately related to the measurement of national 
intelligence.66  At a Conference on Human Migration hosted by the committee in 1922, 
one participant averred, “the relative scarcity of high mental ability [in the United States] 
and the relative abundance of muscular power and manual skill may be accounted for in 
63 “Report of the Committee on Scientific Problems of Human Migration, National Research Council, July 
1, 1923, Prepared for Director of Russell Sage Foundation,” Folder: 629, Box: 58, Laura Spelman 
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many different ways.  One reason may be that there is a higher birth rate among the 
people of low mentality than among those of high mentality.”67  This concern was driven 
in no small part by the differential performance of racial and socioeconomic groups on 
intelligence tests, and the subsequently alleged negative correlation between greater 
fertility and test performance.  According to demographic experts, those groups more 
prone to poor performance on intelligence tests, which historians contribute to language 
or cultural barriers, as well as unequal educational opportunities and conditions of testing, 
experienced higher rates of fertility in comparison to the rest of the United States 
population.  These same experts shared the concerns expressed by intelligence testing 
experts, like Terman, that the most intelligent were reproducing at a much slower rate 
than the least.  This led to an assumption that specific socioeconomic and racial groups, 
who were believed to be innately less intelligent, were contributing to the intellectual 
degeneration of the nation.  The Conference on Human Migration and the work of the 
Committee on Scientific Problems of Human Migration were among the first efforts of 
intelligence testing experts to understand the issue of intelligence among and between 
populations.  Their endeavor to conduct comparative studies of intelligence between 
races, socioeconomic groups, and nations directed the National Research Council’s 
experts toward the problem of the relationship of intelligence to differential fertility.  
One solution was the creation of international intelligence tests.  
“Internationalized” intelligence tests could be applied to assess intelligence between 
nations and racial groups in addition to measuring the intelligence of groups within 
nations.  They also held the promise of resolving the question of the relationship between 
67 “Proceedings Conference on Human Migration, Arranged by the Committee on Scientific Problems of 
Immigration, Division of Anthropology and Psychology, National Research Council, November 18, 1922,” 
Folder: 629, Box: 58, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, RAC, 6.
41
differential fertility and intelligence.  Thus the goal of creating an “internationalized” 
intelligence test was viewed by experts as a key to improving understanding of the 
influence of patterns of differential fertility on national intelligence.  Soon after the 
committee’s establishment, “an individual verbal scale written around universal situations 
and easily translatable into numerous languages” was reportedly “well advanced.”68  The 
express goal of the internationalization of intelligence testing was to “extend the 
applicability of methods of mental measurement that they shall be suitable for a 
comparative study of ethnic groups.”69  The work of the committee was dependent on the 
fiscal support of private foundations.  Once again, the primary donor to the National 
Research Council’s committee was a branch of the Rockefeller Foundation, which 
viewed intelligence testing as an integral component of its broader campaign for the 
improvement of education.  In 1923, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation awarded 
a grant of $60,000 to the Committee on Scientific Problems of Human Migration.  The 
committee additionally received grants in the sum of $10,000 from the Russell Sage 
Foundation between 1922 and 1923.70  In 1925, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Foundation awarded a subsequent grant of $25,000 to further the work of the 
committee.71  The committee’s activities were dependent on the continued generosity of 
private foundations that viewed their subsidization of these studies as an extension of 
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their humanitarian philanthropic missions and as an extension of their missions to 
improve education.  This model of partnership between states and foundations was 
characteristic of surveys of national intelligence in the twentieth century.  At times state-
led intelligence testing ventures more clearly reflected the prerogatives of the private 
foundations that funded them.  At other times, the opposite held true, demonstrating a 
sometimes tension between the two.  Occasionally, foundations even used the face of the 
state to cloak their activities from clear view, offering financial assistance with the 
guarantee of non-disclosure.  This practice of states depending upon foundations for 
financial support of research into national intelligence significantly impacted the progress 
and direction of the intelligence testing surveys that helped fuel the I.Q. controversies of 
this century.  At times this relationship would allow foundations and states to pursue joint 
research agendas in a symbiotic fashion.  At others, it would enable foundations to 
promote their own unique research agendas through state agencies, sometimes even 
dictating or manipulating the agendas of state agencies.    
In spite of at-times conflicting agendas, the work of private foundations did much 
to “internationalize” intelligence testing, beginning in the interwar period.  Indeed, the 
internationalization of intelligence testing in the years following the First World War 
would not have been possible without the contributions of private foundations, which 
largely operated through state institutions like the National Council on Research.  Beyond 
their funding of the research projects of government committees, foundations were 
largely responsible for enabling international exchanges.  The Rockefeller Foundation in 
particular offered instrumental grants to psychologists in Europe, such as 
psychometrician Andre Rey of the Institut des sciences de l’education in Geneva, a 
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student of French psychologist Jean Piaget.  Rey traveled to both England and the United 
States on Rockefeller funds, and was one of many to augment the exposure of Europeans 
and Latin Americans to the psychometric practices and theories of the United States and 
Britain, then the two leading nations of intelligence testing movement.72  The unique 
marriage of private and state interest had a profound impact on the history of modern 
intelligence testing.  For instance, numerous foundations viewed their funding of 
international intelligence testing endeavors as a part of their missions to promote world 
peace and to prevent the recurrence of war and international conflict.  Indeed, in the years 
following the Great War, intelligence testing experts increasingly perceived a connection 
between declining levels of national intelligence and international conflict.  Declining or 
low levels of national intelligence were theorized to predispose nations to enter into war 
and to place nations at a disadvantage when at war.  The proceedings of the First World 
Population Conference helped to cement further this proposed link between national 
intelligence and war, and to encourage additional investigation into the relationship 
between differential fertility and I.Q. as a result.
The First World Population Conference, held in Geneva in 1927, reinforced 
anxieties about differential fertility and intelligence in relation to war and international 
conflict.  The conference drew population experts, Malthusians, proponents of the birth 
control movement, and other human science experts from across the globe.  Following 
the First World War, experts began perceive a direct and causal link between population 
problems and the problems of international peace and war.  The problem of differential 
72 Robert Havighurst, “Visit to the Institut des Sciences de l'Education, Geneva, July 13-14, 1936,” Folder: 
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fertility and its relationship to intelligence featured centrally in the conference’s 
enumerations of world population problems.  The conference aspired to consider 
objectively and scientifically the bearing of population questions on international 
problems and affairs with the goal of preventing subsequent world wars.  War and 
international conflict were regularly invoked in expert appeals to control and regulate 
populations, both nationally and internationally.73  In the years following the Great War, 
eugenicists continued to warn of imminent population degeneration, the birth control 
movement gained international recognition and notoriety under Margaret Sanger’s 
leadership, and measures to sterilize the intellectually or physically unfit passed in many 
nations, at times as an integral component of state welfare programs.74  The newly 
perceived connection between war and population problems undergirded the goals and 
proceedings of the conference.
The population experts who organized the conference were candid in their 
intention of avoiding all traces of politics and ideology at the conference, and including 
objective scientific ideas.  In part this reflected the professionalization of demography 
and the desire of demographers to distance their profession from ideological or in-
objective science.  The interwar years were critical for the professionalization of 
demography.  Prior to this era, population experts had most commonly identified 
professionally as biologists, sociologists and economists.  With the establishment of 
professional organizations and conferences for demographers, demography matured into 
a distinct field of inquiry.  Yet while their profession grew increasingly relevant to 
73 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception:The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge: The 
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policymakers, population experts endeavored to distinguish their profession from 
politics.75  Indeed, anxieties about ideological science proved a constant theme in the I.Q. 
controversies of the century, with accusations of ideologically-inflected science driving 
much of the tension between opponents.  The organizers of the World Population 
Conference in Rome thus aspired to promote professional collaboration to resolve the 
relationship between intelligence, population problems, and world war, while maintaining 
a clear distance from the taint of politics and ideologically-motivated science.
The United States government, through the National Research Council, sought to 
establish an early role for itself in addressing international population problems while 
remaining wary of the dangers of propaganda and political entrapments.  One year prior 
to the conference, the National Research Council had moved that “an International Union 
for the scientific Study of population is desirable, and that the Council in the future would 
be inclined to received favorably detailed proposals for the organization of such a Union, 
and the relationships of such an organization to the International Research Council.”76  
The desire for such a union to study populations from an international perspective 
extended to many of the organizers of the World Population Conference, including 
private foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation, which once again played a crucial 
role in financing the conference.  Through his connection to Beardsley Ruml, the director 
of fellowships of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, Henry Pratt Fairchild 
was able to ascertain the interest of the fund in supporting such an endeavor.  Having 
gauged the fund’s amenability to a request for aid, the National Research Council moved 
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to request financial support “for the purpose of studying the population question from an 
international point of view and for taking steps toward the formation of a permanent 
International Union on Population.”77  Like many experts at the time, the National 
Research Council believed an international union on population had the potential to 
resolve population problems that could jeopardize world stability.
Concerns about the intrusion of ideology kept the conference organizers, 
participants, and funders wary.  For instance, Ruml confided in Vernon Kellogg that the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund would be willing to fund the National 
Research Council’s participation in the conference only if “its scientific character and 
freedom from propaganda could be guaranteed by some body that they felt responsible,” 
even as he affirmed the Fund’s officers’  great interest in the “population question,” and 
eagerness to fund such an enterprise.78  The Fund ultimately awarded the sum of $10,000 
to the National Research Council to participate in the conference, requesting “no public 
announcement were made of this gift, other than that which is made by you in your 
regular annual report.”79  Considerable anxiety over the objectivity of the proposed 
conference abounded in all quarters.  However, the organizers prioritized the goal of 
maintaining “a high plane of objectivity” above all others, largely out of the hope that a 
scientific international union equipped to tackle ongoing population issues might be 
established at the conference.  Objectivity entailed an avoidance of the influence of 
ideology and politics, as well as the eschewal of “controversial questions” that might 
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derail scientific debate.80  Raymond Pearl assured Kellogg that the conference was “to be 
a purely scientific matter.”  The purely scientific nature of the conference was all but 
ensured by the participation of “all the leading people in England and the continental 
countries in this field.”81  However, while the conference proceedings downplayed the 
extremist nature of the claims of ideologues, it did not dismiss them.
In spite of the conference organizers’ determination to remain objective, the 
conference endorsed a more composed version of the alarmist views of eugenicists.  The 
proceedings of the conference led to the consensus that differential fertility was a 
demonstrated phenomenon, which would only prove detrimental to the state of nations 
and world affairs if (as the majority of experts on intelligence then believed) intelligence 
was an innate and heritable trait.  The official report, authored by Executive Secretary of 
the National Research Council Committee on Sex Problems Earl Zinn concluded: “the 
consideration of the question of differential fertility, and the evident temper of the 
conference to interpret the facts somewhat less pessimistically than many eugenists, was 
significant.”  While “reports from various countries indicated clearly that in almost all 
civilized nations different classes are multiplying at different rates,” and “the intellectual 
classes are reproducing themselves the least rapidly,” there was not necessarily cause for 
immediate alarm or concern.  For though “the facts of differential birth rate were not 
disputed,” the conference was inconclusive in its interpretation of the data.  The proper 
interpretation of the phenomenon of differential fertility hinged on the question of 
“whether there is any hereditary difference in the average physical or mental endowments 
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of the various classes.”82  On this point, opinions voiced at the conference varied, yet few 
were optimistic.  Many assumed differing degrees of inequality in the natural 
endowments of the various classes on the basis of eugenic evidence of the links between 
pauperism, criminality, and degeneracy, and race and class.  Eugenics in the United States 
during this period was predicated on largely racist and classist theories, which were 
generally informed by a hardline approach to the inheritance of traits.  These traits were 
innate and immutable, unable to be overcome by cultural or environmental forces.83  With 
the rise of immigration in particular, many eugenic experts warned that more fecund 
immigrants of lesser stock threatened to replace middle class Anglo Saxon stock.  The 
leading consensus of the conference was the belief that “while the situation was not so 
hopeless as some eugenists would have us believe, still it could not under any 
circumstance be considered a favorable condition, and the tendency if unchecked would 
be constantly to lower the quality of human stock.”84  The threat of differential fertility to 
national levels of intelligence was thus associated with identifying racial and class 
differences as innate and inferior, which proved instrumental to the perpetuation of race 
science and eugenics through the twentieth century.
In spite of the lack of firm resolution on the bearing of differential fertility on 
national levels of intelligence, it was agreed that “an auspicious beginning has been 
made” in the international investigation of world population problems and potential.  
However, its organizers recognized that it was only the beginning.  Zinn concluded in his 
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report to the National Research Council: “The success of this new movement for the 
scientific study of population will depend in large measure on the wisdom of the 
committee appointed to effect an organization, and prepare plans.  The task of further 
organizing the work rests with a group of representative scientists.”  Zinn urged the 
utmost support and consideration, asserting, “they should have every encouragement and 
aid in their efforts to deal effectively with what is considered by many persons to be the 
most urgent problem confronting mankind – the problem of quantity and quality of 
population.”85  In both private correspondence and public statements, the National 
Research Council considered the conference productive.  Pearl confessed his confidence 
to Kellogg that “it was a great success, and we succeeded in taking the first step towards 
the formation of a permanent International Union.”86  To the Executive Board of the 
National Research Council, Pearl attested that it was “generally agreed by everybody that 
the conference was a great success,” having convened “a more distinguished and 
competent group of men interested in various aspects of the population problem than had 
ever been assembled in any place.”87  In 1928, following the conclusion of the World 
Population Conference, the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of 
Population Problems was established with the assistance of the Milbank Memorial Fund, 
a private American foundation invested in population research.88  The International Union 
took up the task of resolving population problems through international cooperation 
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following the World Population Conference, and continued inquiries into the relationship 
between differential fertility and intelligence into the 1950s when a subsequent world 
conference assembled to discuss the population problems of the post-World War Two era. 
Following the First World War, experts, states, and foundations came to view 
population as a peculiar kind of threat to international peace if left unregulated.  
Populations that expanded too rapidly, or reproduced the most unfit classes at 
disproportionate rates risked not only their nation’s security, but also the stability of 
world affairs.  This was true of both nations and their colonial holdings.  Experts 
increasingly connected investigations and inventories of national intelligence with studies 
of differential fertility in the context of a hyperawareness to the causes and consequences 
of war.  Degenerate populations could predispose nations to war, and war could in turn 
decimate populations.  War had expanded the use of intelligence tests, and in 
consequence, experts and states came to understand intelligence as a vital resource and 
bulwark against war.  As a result, expert anxieties about the relationship between national 
levels of intelligence and predilection to war would animate much of the dialogue 
surrounding intelligence surveys through the Cold War years.  Entering into the 1930s, 
the precipitous increase of nationalism in Europe transpired in tandem with rising 
concern about national levels of intelligence.  Against this backdrop, the Scottish Council 
for Research in Education embarked upon the first comprehensive national survey of 
intelligence. 
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In 1932, the Scottish Council for Research in Education undertook the 
examination of the intelligence of schoolchildren in an effort to determine whether 
national levels of intelligence in Scotland were in decline.  The first major national 
investigation of the intelligence of an entire section of a civilian population, the survey 
functioned as the model for subsequent surveys conducted in England, France, and 
elsewhere in the years immediately following the Second World War.  Fear of intellectual 
decadence compelled the first Scottish Mental Survey.  “Exaggerated statements 
respecting the number of mental defectives in the school community” since the First 
World War, and “generalisations of an alarmist nature... regarding the increase of mental 
deficiency in the population as a whole” motivated the council’s decision to embark on 
the first comprehensive national assessment of schoolchildren.89  At the core of the 
council’s concerns about declining levels of intelligence in Scotland was the fear that 
differential fertility was driving decline.  These experts hypothesized that a negative 
correlation between family size and individual intelligence was leading to national 
degeneration.
Intelligence testing studies investigating the question of the relationship between 
family size, differential fertility, and intelligence dated from the years following the First 
World War, and smaller scale investigations of the relationship between family size and 
intelligence conducted in the United States, Scotland, and England all corroborated 
concerns about national decline.  The Scottish Mental Survey was lead by British 
psychologist Godfrey Thomson, who began research into the relationship between 
89 Scottish Council for Research in Education, The Intelligence of Scottish Children: A National Survey of 
an Age-Group (London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1933), 4-5.
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individual intelligence and family size in the 1920s.90  In 1925 and 1926, Thomson, along 
with British educational psychologist H.E.G. Sutherland, conducted a study of Scottish 
schoolchildren in the Isle of Wight out of the “fear that our present social conditions are 
tending to breed intelligence out of the race.”91  Building on Godfrey’s previous research, 
which hypothesized a correlation between I.Q. and occupational status, and the research 
of E.J. Bradford, Karl Pearson, and Lewis Terman, Godfrey and Sutherland tested the 
intelligence of 1,924 children.  A total 840 students were given a group test in 1925 and 
1,084 were tested in 1926.  The children tested hailed from three separate schools, and 
the tests varied between the two years.92  The Isle of Wight study concluded that while 
“there is no clear proof of any correlation between intelligence and position in family... 
there is a correlation of about -.2 between intelligence and size of family,” indicating a 
slight negative correlation between intelligence and larger families that was in their 
interpretation statistically significant.  This finding, they pointed out, corroborated too the 
findings of J.C. Chapman and D.M. Wiggins in the United States.93
Observed differential fertility patterns led experts to connect the hypothesized 
negative correlation between intelligence and family size to socioeconomic status, 
defined by parental occupation.  Contemporary studies hypothesizing a connection 
between parental occupation and children’s I.Q.s abounded.  These studies generally 
observed a correlation between occupational class and family size.94  The professional 
90 Godfrey Thomson, “Occasional Papers on Eugenics, Number Three, The Trend in National Intelligence, 
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classes, whose children scored highest on intelligence tests, tended to also have the 
smallest families, whereas the least-skilled working classes, whose children 
underperformed on the tests, had the largest families.  The degree of correlation 
suggested by these studies varied.  One British study suggested a negative correlation 
coefficient of -.25 between family size and intelligence.95  In the United States, Terman’s 
research indicated a negative correlation coefficient of -.271.96  Chapman and Wiggins 
found a negative correlation coefficient of -.33.97  Sutherland and Thomson projected the 
most conservative estimate with a negative correlation coefficient of -.15.98  These studies 
contributed to building expert anxiety about the impact of differential fertility on the 
intelligence of nations.  Effectively, concerns about differential fertility and its negative 
impact on the intelligence of individuals from large families drew disproportionate 
attention to working class families, who on average had more children than their middle 
and upper class counterparts.  The Scottish Mental Survey sought to provide a 
preliminary answer to the question of whether differential fertility between social classes 
was provoking a decline in national intelligence in Scotland.
Thomson, a professor of education and director of the Moray House Teacher 
Training College at the University of Edinburgh, was the driving force behind the 
Scottish Mental Survey.99  Thomson had actively researched the connection between 
family size and intelligence since the end of the First World War, and in his capacity as 
director of Moray House had gained experience in the preparation of mental tests.  Under 
Journal of Educational Psychology 15 (1924), 559.
95 E.J. Bradford, “Can Present Scholastic Standards be Maintained?” Forum of Education 3 (1925), 186.
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Thomson’s direction, the Scottish Council for Research in Education elected to test all 
Scottish schoolchildren born in 1921 to “obtain data about the whole distribution of the 
intelligence of Scottish pupils from one end of the scale to the other.”100  It collected the 
students’ names, sex, school or county name, date of birth, and grade in school.101  On the 
day of the examinations, all students born in 1921 were given the group test.102  These 
students were tested using a Moray House Test (No. 12) devised by Thomson, which had 
been recently applied to a group of English schoolchildren in Halifax.103  The group test, 
which “consisted of two pages of picture items and five pages of verbal items,” was 
administered communally.104  These group intelligence tests were adapted from individual 
intelligence tests so that they might be proctored to large groups of test-takers at once 
without the resource-costly one-on-one administration of individual I.Q. tests.  Experts 
generally designed group tests in multiple-choice format to expedite their grading, which 
meant that group tests offered a less detailed and nuanced clinical view of individual 
intelligence but enabled easy scoring and comparison between individual test-takers.  
Unlike individual tests, group intelligence tests, like the Moray House Test and the Army 
intelligence tests, could be readily administered to large numbers of testers, and were 
graded on scales that required conversion in order to calculate I.Q.  
For the purposes of conversion, and to serve as a control, an individual test was 
given to a random sample of approximately 1,000 children.  Under the direction of D. 
Kennedy-Fraser, this random control group of “a thousand pupils were tested individually 







June 1921, or as near thereto as possible.”105  This random sample became known as the 
“Binet One Thousand.”  Yet this group was not a wholly representative sample.  While 
the group test was given to all children born in 1921, including those who were already 
“ascertained mental defectives,” no children with pre-identified mental deficiencies were 
included among the Binet One Thousand.  The committee based this decision on the 
desire to obtain a truly representative cross-section of “normal” schoolchildren, separate 
from those already identified as mental defectives.  They therefore determined that “the 
six children below 70 I.Q. in the unadjusted distribution of individual test scores are 
really unascertained ‘mental defectives.’”  In spite of the council’s rationale, the 
intentional exclusion of “mental defectives” provoked outside criticism of the survey.106  
Local educators proctored the tests and the survey was successful largely due to 
the cooperation of the local education authorities.  The Scottish Council for Research in 
Education determined that, due to limited funds and time, “the testers had to be chosen 
from a group who were already trained, and who were further able and willing to give 
some of their spare time gratuitously to the work.”  Each examiner was “personally 
recommended by the Committee, and included training college lecturers, directors of 
education, school psychologists, school medical officers, teachers, and students in 
training, all of whom had special training in mental testing.”  In addition to the 
examiners’ previous experience and training, meetings convened in Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, “at which general instructions as to procedure were given by the Chairman and 
areas of testing were allocated.”107  This was done largely to ensure uniformity in the 





exams were strict, with assistance only to be provided to “obvious blunderers who need a 
special eye on them... Otherwise no assistance is to be given, and no questions whatever 
are to be answered.”108  Prior to proctoring the official examination, examiners were 
instructed “to familiarise the pupils with what was to be required of them” with “the 
usual procedure of setting a preliminary practice test, not to be evaluated in the 
results.”109  In this way, the committee hoped to give the students equal exposure to the 
format of the exams and prevent biases in the exam scores.  
Depending on the conversion calculation used, the Scottish Mental Survey 
showed the average I.Q. of Scottish boys to be “very close to 100, and not less than 99,” 
the exact midpoint of the range for normal or average intelligence.  While there was some 
indication among the survey data that the average I.Q. of Scottish girls among the age 
group might be somewhat lower, the committee determined that it did “not think there is 
any proof of a significant difference between boys and girls in average I.Q.”110  Yet in 
spite of the relative gender equality of the scores, the council reported, “there seems, 
however, fairly definite proof that the intelligence quotients of the boys are more widely 
scattered than those of the girls.”111  A more dismaying observation was the differentiation 
in the scores of Scottish children on the Moray House Test compared with those of 
English children, who outperformed their Scottish peers by several I.Q. points.  The 
council maintained, “we are naturally inclined to hope that the poorer performances in 
Scotland at all levels of ability are sufficiently explained by the less intense motivation in 






previous experience of such tests, or of coaching for them.  Equally naturally, however, 
the Secretary to the Halifax Education Committee is not inclined to admit that this 
explanation is adequate.”112  Because the 1,278 children tested in Halifax were not tested 
with the express intention of drawing a true comparison between English and Scottish 
students, the council ultimately considered the data to be“insufficient to enable a valid 
comparison to be made.”113  The reluctance of the council to accept the difference in the 
scores of English and Scottish students highlights ongoing tension between efforts to 
universalize intelligence tests, and anxieties over the comparative intelligence of nations.  
In total, 87,498 Scottish eleven-year-olds were tested using the group test.  In its final 
report, the council concluded that, “despite the many difficulties associated with a nation-
wide undertaking, the Committee’s ambitious attempt to test a complete cross-section of 
the community was entirely successful.”114  The survey was deemed successful, not only 
for the fact of its accomplishment, but also in its unprecedented provision of data on 
levels of national intelligence.  Hitherto, Scottish psychometricians had only been able to 
draw conclusions from literature and research based from foreign studies on 
intelligence.115   
Yet the Scottish Mental Survey was strongly informed by foreign influences.  The 
survey was directly inspired by the wartime testing of United States Army recruits.  
Indeed, this wartime trial of group intelligence tests proved the possibility and potential 
of group assessments.  The council attributed the evolution of group testing to the United 






few months the intelligence of almost 2,000,000 army recruits,” leading to the invention 
of the first group tests that served as models for the rest of the world.  Furthermore, 
although nominally a national survey, it was an inherently transnational enterprise that 
underscores the perpetual tension between national and international forces in the history 
of mass intelligence testing.  While the Scottish Council for Research in Education 
conducted the survey, the Carnegie Corporation of America funded both the expenses of 
the survey and the printing of the final report.116  The Carnegie Corporation had a vested 
interest in the production of the survey and was an influential force in its implementation. 
The Carnegie Corporation’s International Examination Inquiry Committee of the 
Research Council intended “to use the data of this Survey in connection with their 
investigations.”117  The International Examination Inquiry Committee  formed in the early 
1930s, and included members from the United States, England, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, and Scotland.  Notable members of the International Examination 
Committee included intelligence testing experts Charles G. Spearman, Edward 
Thorndike, and Godfrey Thomson.118  The committee’s work centered on the scientific 
investigation of education and the expansion of secondary education through 
international research and inquiry.119  Thus while the national survey was conducted by 
the Scottish government in name, in practice it was largely influenced by a foreign 
foundation with a transnational membership.  The confluence of the national and 
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international in the Scottish mental survey would prove a theme in the national surveys of 
intelligence that followed it.  
Although the survey was hailed as a success, it was unable either to substantiate 
or dismiss fears of national declines in intelligence.  The council determined that a second 
mental survey should be conducted, no less than twenty-five years from the first study, 
with the hopes of achieving a true assessment of the trend in national levels of 
intelligence.120  Until that time, anxieties about national levels of intelligence in Scotland 
and elsewhere persisted.  Concerns about the possible relationship of the differential 
birthrate to levels of intelligence were further fueled by the fear of international conflict 
in the late interwar period.  Eugenic experts capitalized off of these concerns to promote 
their own relevance as the threat of a second world war loomed.
 
In the late interwar period, a wealth of alarmist literature projected not only 
national intellectual decline, but international turmoil and war as well.  Much of this 
eugenic literature demanded or implored state action to control or take measures to 
influence population quantity and quality.  In one expert’s estimation, “satisfactory data 
for population studies can only be collected by State action armed with compulsory 
powers over a whole population,” and that “one of the principle aims of population 
studies” should be to provide the state with data that would enable state efforts to “control 
fertility.”121  Leading up to the Second World War, the desire to ameliorate the effects of 
120 Scottish Council for Research in Education, The Trend of Scottish Intelligence: A Comparison of the 
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differential fertility through population control measures was predominately restricted to 
experts in the United States, England, and Scotland, though by the war’s end the question 
of the relationship of differential fertility to intelligence would become a global issue of 
concern to major international organizations like the United Nations.  Pessimistic 
projections during these years helped to ensure the endurance of the eugenics movement, 
which was diminishing in both relevance and credibility in much of the world by this 
time.  In a bid for popular and political influence, these experts ominously predicted not 
merely intellectual decline, but world war triggered by unmitigated population problems.  
Experts on intelligence testing and population in the late interwar period were 
overwhelmingly negative in their outlook, in spite of a continued dearth of hard data 
indicating declines in national intelligence.  Even studies that produced data leading to 
more optimistic assessments of national levels of intelligence were received 
pessimistically in many quarters.  For example, research on “test sophistication” fed into 
fears that even data implying possible increases in group intelligence might be skewed by 
the growing experience of test-takers with intelligence tests.  One such study on 
intelligence test-takers by English psychologist Philip E. Vernon identified a considerable 
increase in I.Q. from the first to second test taken.  He concluded, “if the same effect 
occurred in persons of average intelligence it would correspond to a rise of at least 8 
points in intelligence quotient. ...the results indicate alarming possibilities of derangement 
of the norms for superior-adult tests.”122  Therefore, as more individuals gained greater 
experience in test-taking, the data from surveys might be compromised by experience and 
not show true gains or even stasis, in spite of the fact that experts continued to maintain 
122 Philip E. Vernon, “Intelligence Test Sophistication,” British Journal of Education Psychology 8 (1938): 
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that intelligence tests tested innate ability and not learned knowledge or abilities.  Such 
theories fed into the dark outlook of the vocal majority of eugenic experts, including the 
American Eugenics Society.
The American Eugenics Society eagerly took up the issue of the intellectual 
quality of the United States population in an effort to assert eugenics’ continued 
importance.  It included among its membership at this time prominent experts on 
intelligence and population, such as Frederick Osborn, who would exert considerable 
influence on the future of mass intelligence testing.  Eugenics had been slipping in 
relevance and influence since its broad acceptance in the 1920s.  By the 1930s, the 
broader scientific community began to scrutinize more closely the activities, scientific 
practices, and provocative claims made by prominent eugenicists.  Geneticists and 
anthropologists in particular criticized the remarks and activities of early eugenicists, 
labeling them racist, anti-Semitic, and scientistic.  The political maneuvering of once 
prominent eugenicists like Harry H. Laughlin, Charles B. Davenport, and Madison Grant 
further suggested to critics that eugenics was a primarily political, rather than scientific, 
endeavor, increasingly detached from the progress of science.123  As genetics 
professionalized, geneticists distanced themselves from eugenics, even as they continued 
many of the practices and techniques deployed by eugenicists in their emerging role as 
genetic counselors.124  Likewise, demographers worked to distance their field from its 
early ties to the field of eugenics as they continued to professionalize.125  
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The eugenics movement, however, proved remarkably resilient in its ability to 
modify and adapt to surroundings.  From the 1930s to the 1950s, eugenics – or reform 
eugenics – underwent considerable changes.  Under the post-World War Two leadership 
of Frederick Osborn, the American Eugenics Society would disavow the errors of its 
predecessors and create a new identity for itself through its new focus on population 
genetics.126  This adaptability proved crucial to the movement’s geographic and temporal 
expansion.  Confronted with its own diminishing relevance, the American Eugenics 
Society aligned itself with the birth control movement in the 1930s, moving beyond its 
historic focus on preventing immigration and the institutionalization and sterilization of 
the feeble-minded.127  The society seized upon the opportunity presented by fears of 
national decline to argue that “eugenics should receive new impetus” due to the “recent 
studies in psychology and in the field of population, [which] make it clear that many of 
the changes which are desirable from the point of view of eugenics are no less desirable 
for the improvement of our social environment and the retention of the best of our 
cultural inheritance.”128  Eugenics would provide a path to rational state population 
planning.  Dismissing the notion that eugenics sought “to breed genius or specialized 
types,” the society suggested that “a few basic qualities are almost universally regarded 
as highly desirable,” including “intelligence, good health, relative immunity from 
physical and mental disease, and certain qualities of character ...courage and self-control, 
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kindness and tolerance, initiative, self-reliance, honesty, and a spirit of cooperation.” 129  
These general qualities should be universally desired by all, and eugenics offered a means 
to achieve them among the population.  The society proposed a more genteel and 
permissive approach to population policy, compared with its former controversial policy 
suggestions which included the sterilization and colonization of the “unfit.”  In contrast to 
such harsh measures of intervention and control, “the practical policies now being 
proposed by eugenists would leave the question of size of family in the hands of parents, 
as at present, but would give them a more intelligent and less restricted choice” through 
genetic counselling.130  In addition, it was hoped that the state might do more to 
encourage responsible and intelligent parents – who might feel it necessary to restrict 
their family size due to concerns about the scarcity of resources – to have more children 
than they might otherwise.131
 Anxiety about the degenerative danger posed by war undergirded the American 
Eugenics Society’s revitalized mission to enact population control measures.  War and 
international conflict were antagonistic to the progress of civilization.  The society 
argued, “war is a threat to the hope for orderly eugenic advance.... the American Eugenics 
Society will continue to emphasize the dysgenic aspects of war, and the drastic measures 
which might be necessary to preserve the qualities of our people during a prolonged and 
devastating conflict.”  Indeed, the society maintained that eugenicists would “cooperate 
in every possible way with existing agencies to develop means of preventing war.”132  
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One means by which the society proposed to prevent war was through further “research 
by psychologists and others on the reasons why families differ in size, and on the effect 
of physical and cultural environments on sex, marriage, children, and family life.”133  If 
degenerative conditions of national intelligence predisposed nations to war as numerous 
experts hypothesized, then eugenic measures could reverse general intelligence trends 
and prevent war.  Or, in the case that war should prove inevitable, higher national 
intelligence would place nations at a competitive advantage.  Through such research, the 
society hoped to promote policies that might reverse the perceived downward trends in 
intelligence that were believed by numerous population experts and psychologists to have 
been caused by the differential fertility of the least intelligent classes.   
Voices outside of the United States corroborated concerns about national 
intelligence and the threat of war.  British psychologist and psychometrician Raymond B. 
Cattell in his 1937 publication, “The Fight for our National Intelligence,” encouraged 
these very fears.  Not only did Cattell assert that England must defend itself against the 
degenerative effects of differential fertility on the nation’s overall intelligence, he claimed 
that, if left unchecked, this downward trend would set England and many other European 
nations on the path to world war.  He ominously argued that population problems 
inherently heightened the risk of international conflict, and population control was the 
ultimate preventative measure to both safeguard against war and ensure the nation’s 
success in war, should it prove unpreventable.  Though “not so easily dramatized as 
political reaction or war,” Cattell explained, “the approach, foreseen by scientists of a 
generation ago, of a grave decline in the level of national intelligence” threatened the 
133 Ibid, 20.
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progress of western civilization.  Conquering “this enemy is the special task of the 
twentieth century.”134  Indeed, according to Cattell, “the decline of average I.Q. is the 
most serious threat to national security.”135  This perceived decline in intelligence was 
therefore an urgent and extreme threat to the nation itself.    
Both the quantity and the quality of population mattered greatly in Cattell’s 
representation.  Whereas “a nation may achieve success in the arts of peace only by the 
possession of a sufficient body of able and enterprising citizens, it may use for purposes 
of war a mentally lower grade.... Mussolini made an army out of his unemployables, or, 
at least, his unemployed.”  Thus dictators might more readily convince unintelligent 
nations to rise up and attack their neighbors.  Cattell warned that, “the temptation to such 
a solution must exist wherever an undue birth rate has been encouraged in a low-grade 
population,” implying that an increase in the number of people of lesser intelligence 
would prod England in the direction of restlessness and warmongering.136  Cattell alluded 
to the data accrued from intelligence surveys conducted in the United States to support 
his claim that “the most stable and quietly progressive countries of Europe are those 
which... [are] the highest in average intelligence.”137  Not only would an intelligent 
population ensure peace, it would also ensure the advance of civilization, for the 
“expansion of a population at a low level of mental capacity is the surest single factor 
leading to war; for even a rat will fight fiercely, but only a man can be counted on to 
construct a civilisation.”  This pattern, Cattell maintained, could be traced throughout 
history.  For “every relapse of intelligence foreshadows in history a regression to the 
134 Raymond B. Cattell, The Fight for Our National Intelligence (London: P.S. King & Son, Ltd., 1937), 1.




more primitive machinery of evolution which is war.”138  Thus, Cattell argued for the 
inevitability of war, should the trend in the national decline of intelligence remain 
unchecked.  And should the national decline in intelligence not be put to rest by political 
measures, “the machine-guns of an enemy will stop it for us.  But the flower of the nation 
will go down with it.”139  
According to Cattell, a decrease in population quality inclined nations to war, 
whereas increasing the quality of the population had an ameliorative effect against 
impulses toward international aggression.  However, should the worst occur and the 
nation be forced to enter into war, the nature of modern warfare ensured the victory of the 
most intelligent people because it placed greater demands on the innovation and intellect 
of its combatants and military officials.  “in a war of tanks, submarines and large fleets of 
aeroplanes, victory to the nation with the larger percentage of high I.Q.'s is even more 
certain, for the men fit to handle these instruments successfully are not found every 
day.”140  Cattell thus advocated for greater optimization of the national “biological 
reserves of intelligence” through methods of identification and selection, such as those 
utilized by the United States Army during the First World War.141  Cattell left England 
soon after his publication in 1937 to join Columbia University, later joining the faculties 
at Clark University and then Harvard.  He would also serve as a psychological consultant 
to the United States Army during the Second World War.  For Cattell and many other 
psychologists engaged in the question of the relation of differential fertility to intelligence 






profound than analogy.  These experts perceived direct and causal links between war and 
national declines in intelligence, and “by any long-distance view of national security, 
reckless folly could go no further.”142  
The Army intelligence testing experiment and the subsequent efforts to measure 
national levels of intelligence were invoked by eugenicists and race scientists to 
substantiate eugenic fears about declining levels of national intelligence as a result of 
differential fertility.  The early twentieth-century argument that national intellectual 
decadence was the result of the greater fertility of the least intelligent, coupled with a 
belief in the innateness of intelligence, would continue to define the positions of 
eugenicists and race scientists in the I.Q. controversies of this century.  These 
controversies, which variably identified racial minorities and the poorest classes as the 
least intelligent groups, would ultimately help to perpetuate race science and eugenics 
late into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries by prolonging the anxieties these experts 
professed.  Though race science and eugenics would at times be supplanted and undergo 
significant transformations over these decades that enabled their endurance, they 
continued to be a force within studies on differential fertility and intelligence, discussions 
of intelligence as a national resource, and alarm about national intellectual decline.  
War continued to act as a catalyst in the expansion of group intelligence testing 
and national surveys, and ultimately therefore of race science and eugenics as well.  
Numerous nations would follow the model set by the United States and submit their 
militaries to group intelligence testing during the Second World War in order to identify 
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their best assets for various skilled combat roles.  A series of larger and more expansive 
national surveys of intelligence would follow the Second World War in a continued quest 
to determine definitively whether national levels of intelligence were in fact in decline, 
and whether that decline was indeed a result of differential fertility.  Against the backdrop 
of world war and international conflict, intelligence testing experts further conceived of 
intelligence as a vital national resource that had the potential to tip the scales in favor of 
war or peace.  As the world entered once again into war in 1939, the use of group 
intelligence tests expanded, even as eugenics and race science were gradually supplanted 
with new rhetoric.  This new rhetoric perpetuated their designs but effectively 
circumvented their controversy following the revelation of the horrors of Nazi 
rassenhygiene.   
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CHAPTER TWO
Mass Intelligence Testing in the Wake of the Second World War
During the Second World War, race science came under attack.  An article in The 
Chicago Defender on the research of Allison Davis, a black professor of education at the 
University of Chicago, observed the irony that “while we are fighting a war in an attempt 
to unravel world problems, scientists and scholars continue quietly in their work of 
increasing misconceptions which periodically lead to violence.  Most notorious of these 
misconceptions – that some human beings are innately inferior to others – gave rise to the 
Nazi ‘superman’ philosophy, and is used by Americans to justify the persecution of the 
Negro.”  There was hope, however, that change was imminent.  Davis’s research, “aimed 
at the undermining of this ridiculous and dangerous misconception of races,” promised to 
mount a “large-scale attack upon currently used intelligence tests which seemingly 
support the ‘inferior race’ notion.”143  Indeed, Davis and others made considerable strides 
in elaborating upon the exclusionary qualities of intelligence tests during these years.  
Mainstream scientific consensus did reject the precepts of race science and eugenics, 
embracing more complex understandings of the formation of individual intelligence and 
disavowing discriminatory and racist science.  Yet race science did not disappear from 
intelligence testing.  Paradoxically, the very war that called attention to the grave abuses 
committed in the name of race science in Nazi Germany and elsewhere helped to further 
mass intelligence testing, anxieties about national intellectual decline, and ultimately race 
science itself.
143 Jacqueline Lopez, “U. of C. Project to Devise IQ Test Fair to All Groups,” The Chicago Defender, July 
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The Second World War and the horrors of the Holocaust rendered the already 
disreputable eugenics and race science intolerable within liberal democratic societies.  
The tragic display of crimes against humanity under the Third Reich helped lead to their 
discrediting.  Yet contrary to the claims of historians including Elazar Barkan, Nancy 
Stepan and others, race science did not retreat during these years.144  Eugenics underwent 
considerable changes, particularly in the wake of accusations that United States 
sterilization law and eugenic research had informed Nazi Germany’s “Final Solution” and 
unethical scientific experimentation on humans during the war.  Intelligence testing 
experts endeavored to distance themselves and their disciplines from both eugenics and 
race science as a result.  Demographers, geneticists, and psychologists styled their 
professions as critical of the premises of race science and eugenics, even as these 
professions continued to reproduce eugenic practices and ideas, revealing a tension 
within the human sciences between eugenic origins and overt attempts on the part of 
these professions to distance themselves from those origins.145  Rhetorical shifts helped to 
facilitate the survival of eugenics and race science.  First, the language of race was 
largely supplanted by the language of class, often acting as a proxy for discussion of 
differences between racial groups.  Second, the tropes of eugenics and race science that 
had driven intelligence testing controversies to date persisted in spite of the discrediting 
of the theories underlying them.  These tropes, which included allegations of national 
intellectual decadence wrought by the effects of differential fertility, continued to animate 
144 Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United  
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Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800-1962 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1982); George W. Stocking Jr., Race, 
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the major research on group intelligence testing during this period.  Finally, those 
individuals and organizations that had most prominently supported eugenics and race 
science in intelligence testing research continued to guide many of the wartime and 
postwar investigations on intelligence.  These entities restyled themselves at times, or 
concealed their involvement at others.  In this way they utilized new rhetorical shifts in 
order to perpetuate the goals and designs of race science and eugenics while avoiding 
their polemics.  
The Second World War further legitimated intelligence testing as a tool of 
assessment.  Following the example of the United States Army in the First World War, 
whose wartime testing experiment was perceived by experts internationally as a tactical 
success, many European nations employed intelligence tests on an unprecedented scale to 
prepare their armed forces for combat.  Even as intelligence testing was perceived by 
experts as a tool to mitigate the threats of war and international conflict, war continued to 
prove crucial to the expansion of the intelligence testing movement.  In the years 
immediately following the Second World War, the mass intelligence testing achieved 
widespread international acceptance, although it met with challenges as well.  The work 
of experts like Davis called the fairness and efficacy of the tests into question, and a 
review of the transnational history of mass intelligence testing after the Second World 
War highlights ongoing tensions between national and international concerns.  While 
mass intelligence testing surveys were conducted by national agencies, they were often 
funded by complex transnational networks and their results were frequently extrapolated 
to promote international as well as national policy solutions.  Such a review furthermore 
calls national exceptionalism into question by revealing strong similarities between 
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Western nations’ concerns regarding the relationship between differential fertility and 
intelligence, and national intellectual decline.  Even countries with divergent early 
histories of intelligence testing, like the United States and France, shared more 
similarities than dissimilarities in their resort to mass intelligence tests in the postwar 
years.  Numerous Western nations embarked on missions to survey their overall levels of 
intelligence through mass intelligence testing after the war.  These surveys were driven 
by fear of declining levels of intelligence and consequential fear for the future of world 
peace.  As these surveys were carried out, another significant rhetorical shift in 
intelligence testing parlance occurred.  Intelligence as “le capital humain” was 
progressively understood by experts as a kind of national resource.  The depletion of this 
resource would necessarily place nations at a disadvantage in international conflict and 
endanger not only national security, but would portend world war.
The results of these national surveys all gestured toward the anxieties initially 
professed by eugenicists and race scientists in the years leading up to the war: principally, 
that national levels of intelligence were declining as a result of differential fertility.  
Although the original rhetoric of eugenics and race science fell away during these years, 
the tropes of eugenics and race science remained, and the rhetorical shifts that occurred 
during these years helped to further the goals of race scientists and eugenicists in new 
language.  These factors enabled the survival of race science and eugenics through these 
years, even as they outwardly appeared to indicate retreat.  
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“Conscripts called up for selective service will get a serious shock, unless the War 
Department wakes up, when they take tests to determine the military service for which 
they are best fitted,” the Los Angeles Times reported on the eve of the United States entry 
into the Second World War.  Once again the United States Army turned to intelligence 
tests to help sort recruits for service.  According to the article, “one theory is that the 
brass hats in the War Department want to fill up the infantry first and figure the test will 
show few draftees are qualified for any other duty.”146  As in the First World War, military 
officials resorted to intelligence tests to rapidly sort recruits, selecting the most intelligent 
to serve in special roles and as officers, sending the least intelligent to the front lines.  
When world war broke out for the second time in 1939, numerous combatant nations 
turned to intelligence testing to marshal their intellectual resources to win the war.  
Learning from the experience of the United States Army in the First World War, European 
nations integrated intellectual assessments into their mobilization for combat for the first 
time.  Germany began this process of integrating intelligence testing into its armies early 
on, serving as partial motivation for Allied nations to similarly engage in intelligence 
testing programs.  Great Britain and France as well turned to intelligence testing to assess 
and select troops for various appointments within their armed forces. 
The British Armed Forces turned to intelligence tests for personnel selection and 
recruit training for the first time in its history during the war.  As reported in the 
newspapers, “an intelligence test – only here they call it a selection test – will be 
instituted soon in this country and every man called to the armed forces will undergo it 
with his medical examination.”147  Referencing the American testing experiment in the 
146 “Conscripts to Face Tough ‘Intelligence Tests,’” Los Angeles Times, September 29, 1940.
147 H.J.J. Sargent, “British I.Q. Tests,” The Sun, September 28, 1941.
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Great War, in which “the American Army applied a series of tests to about 2,000,000 men 
with very good results,” British military officials determined that “with compulsory 
service and almost universal mechanization of land forces, selection became of vital 
importance,” necessitating a more routinized and scientific approach to sorting recruits.148 
A white paper issued by the Select Committee on National Expenditure specifically 
recommended intelligence tests for officer selection.  In the committee’s view, “the 
present system leads to waste of both money and man-power, and should be revised in 
accordance with modern medical and psychological experience” as “little attention has 
been paid to the importance of filling the most highly specialized branches of the Army 
with recruits of the right type.”149  The incorporation of intelligence tests would ensure 
both efficiency and expediency in the processing of recruits, in addition to guaranteeing 
the selection of the most intelligent recruits for special service.  The need for talented 
recruits was heightened due to the changing tactical nature of modernized warfare.  The 
brightest British men were required for service, “since valuable weapons and equipment 
are wasted if put in the hands of unintelligent, and therefore unskillful, users.”150  
Moreover, in contrast to their German enemies who had already integrated a system of 
intelligence testing into their military, the British Armed Forces were far behind.  The 
article lamented, “very extensive research has been carried out by the Germans, who have 
put the results to the fullest practical use both in the posting of men and in the selection of 
officers.”151  With the realization that both allies and enemies had surpassed them in the 
utilization of military intelligence testing, the British Armed Forces rapidly pursued 
development of their own military testing program.
148 Ibid.




Psychologist Philip E. Vernon spearheaded the British military testing experiment. 
Vernon had spent considerable time studying psychometrics in the United States on a 
fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation.  During his time in the United States he had 
collaborated with psychologist Gordon Allport to devise the Allport-Vernon Study of 
Values, though his work also demonstrated the influence of British psychologist Charles 
G. Spearman’s work on “general intelligence.”  In the First World War, psychometric 
testing had played no role in the British Armed Forces, and did not assume a role until the 
second year of the Second World War.152  By the war’s end however, the British Armed 
Forces had made considerable strides in the institutionalization of a system of military 
intelligence testing.  Vernon boasted that the “scope of personnel selection” in the British 
Armed Forces at the war’s completion as “quite comparable with those described by 
American psychologists” and, compared to the United States Armed Forces, “at least as 
large a proportion of the population as in America has passed through psychological 
selection procedure.”153  The United States Armed Forces had set the gold standard for 
military intelligence testing and, in Vernon’s view, the British Armed Forces matched that 
standard by the war’s end.
Between the army and the navy, thirty-five varieties of tests were implemented, a 
significant leap from Britain’s total lack of psychometric assessment in the First World 
War.154  Like the original United States Army exams, many of these were group 
examinations, rather than individual tests, designed to be administered to large numbers 
of test-takers simultaneously and scored quickly.  Although group tests lacked the nuance 
152 Philip E. Vernon, “Research on Personnel Selection in the Royal Navy and British Armed Forces” 
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and subtlety of individual tests, the results of which required expert interpretation, Vernon 
was confident that “evidence in the Services suggests that... the intelligence of 
adolescents and adults can be measured as effectively by a battery of suitable group tests 
as by an individual scale.”  As group tests in general required less time and fewer 
resources to administer, and were able to provide “useful predictions of capacity for 
almost any Service job,” they were among the most commonly utilized.  Similar to the 
original United States Army group intelligence tests, the group intelligence tests 
employed by the Royal Navy and Army delivered a “grade,” rather than an I.Q. score.  
Indeed, many of the tests employed by the Royal Navy and Army were adaptations of 
tests created in the United States.  For example, the Royal Navy and Army employed the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, created by United States psychologist David Wechsler 
in 1939, as an individual test.155  However, the British adaptations differed in 
considerably in format.  Answers to test questions were not standardized by a multiple 
choice answer format, but by free response, a decision motivated by the general lack of 
multiple-choice tests in the British education system.  This pronounced cultural 
difference in testing highlights one of many important national differences that persisted 
in spite of the efforts of intelligence testing experts to internationalize testing during the 
interwar years.  In consequence, assessment in the British Armed Forces demanded 
considerably more time and judgment than in the United States Armed Forces.156  
At the start of the war, the Admiralty Senior Psychologist’s Department and the 
War Office Directorate for the Selection of Personnel consisted of only twenty senior 
psychometric experts, and expanded considerably over the course of the war to employ 
155 Philip E. Vernon, “Recent Developments in the Measurement of Intelligence” British Medical Bulletin 
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over 2,000 psychometric technicians.157  The new existence of an unprecedented cohort of 
professional British psychometric examiners with military experience markedly altered 
perceptions on the use and desirability of psychometric assessment in British society 
broadly speaking.  The experience helped to professionalize a new class of intelligence 
testing experts within Britain.  In Vernon’s own words, “it is the boast of British 
vocational psychologists that they know more about the validity of their tests or other 
selection techniques than do doctors or teachers or any of the innumerable organisations 
which conduct scholastic, professional or trade examinations.”158  Follow-up studies after 
the war confirmed that psychological testing had improved the placement of recruits, as 
shown by increases in recruits’ successful completion of training for specialized roles.159  
These achievements helped to instill “a readiness to consult psychologists in the early 
stages of planning instruction or of producing training devices, which would have been 
unthinkable five years ago.”160  This zeal for widely employing intelligence tests in new 
contexts extended beyond Britain to other European nations.  
Through their own wartime experiences, the French shared this eagerness to apply 
intelligence tests in new contexts.  During the Second World War, the French Armed 
Forces also turned to the example set by the United States in the First World War.  
Although not as comprehensively as their British counterparts, the French military 
engaged in the psychometric testing of recruits in the navy and air force for the first time 
in its history.  Under the direction of psychiatrist Angélo Hesnard, the navy undertook the 






strictly to technical aptitudes” to assist in identifying potential helmsmen, radio operators, 
and gunners.161  Hesnard acknowledged that the field of psychometric selection for 
aptitudes most appropriate to naval service, while still “significantly new,” was “full of 
promise.”  One such promise was the identification of “the capital element of ability to 
serve one’s country in combat: not referring so much to that immeasurable moral value 
that fosters a patriotic ideal of sacrifice, but of the more concrete value that is the aptitude 
for calm and opportune action, an innate value that is difficult to measure.”162  It was this 
particular innate “capital” that the Marine “tests d’intelligence” aspired to measure.  
Although experts had hitherto referred to intelligence as a vital national resource, the 
French were among the first to identify this particular resource as a form of human 
capital.163  The Armée de l’Air also engaged in research in collaboration with the Service 
National de la recherche appliquée (National Service for Applied Research) at the 
suggestion of French psychologist Henri Laugier, of a battery of tests, including one of 
“intelligence générale” along the lines of Spearman’s “general intelligence,” to assist in 
identifying recruits to serve as pilots.164  The French Armed Forces’ intelligence testing 
projects thus received influence from other nations’ models, most particularly those of the 
United States and Britain.
161 Angélo Hesnard, “Les Applications de la Psychotechnique à la Marine,” Cote: 520 AP/14, Bobine: 39 
2/3, Archives Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (AN), 2-3. (Translated by author from the original 
French:...c'est-à-dire du classement professionnel limité aux strictes aptitudes techniques.)
162 Hesnard, “Les Applications de la psychotechnique à la Marine,” Cote: 520 AP/14, Bobine: 39 2/3, AN, 
13. (Translated by author from the original French:... le problème de la sélection des aptitudes dans la 
Marine par les méthodes psychotechniques est vaste nouveau et plein de promesses… l'élément capital de 
l'aptitude à servir le Pays pendant le combat: je ne parle pas tant de ce ressort moral incommensurable 
que donne le'idéal patriotique de sacrifice personnel, qu de cette valeur plus concrète qu'est l'aptitude à 
l'action calme et à la décision opportune; valeur biologique bien difficilement mesurable...)
163 Hesnard’s invocation of the term “human capital” is the earliest instance of discussion of intelligence 
as a form of human capital I have discovered over the course of my research.
164 Henri Piéron, “Rapport: Sélection et classement psychotechnique du personnel navigant,” January 19, 
1940, Cote: 520 AP/14, Bobine: 39 2/3, AN, 1- 2.
79
Although the birthplace of the modern intelligence test, mainstream French 
psychology had rejected psychotechnique in favor of a system of technocratic testing.  
Rather than testing for intelligence, the French turned to educational and civil service 
exams that tested knowledge, skills, and abilities to permit professional and educational 
advances.165  However, contrary to the dominant narrative that intelligence testing never 
gained traction in France, interest among a small cohort of French psychologists initiated 
a niche movement during the interwar years that came to fruition during the Second 
World War.166  Mainstream French psychology did not warmly embrace psychometric 
testing until the postwar period, yet even though the first mass intelligence tests were not 
proctored in France until after the Second World War, French connections to 
psychologists in the United States and Great Britain indicate an intelligence testing 
movement in France that dates much earlier.  These psychometricians were highly 
transnational in their intellectual formation, many having spent considerable time in 
England and the United States, and their correspondence and exchange with their peers 
abroad greatly influenced the trajectory of intelligence testing in the Second World War 
and the years to follow by promoting an expansion of Anglo-American applications of 
intelligence testing throughout Western Europe.  
This network was vast.  For instance, French psychologist Henri Piéron 
corresponded with numerous leaders of intelligence testing movements abroad, including 
Cyril Burt in England and Louis Thurstone in the United States, and encouraged the 
translation of contemporary French intelligence tests into other languages, such as 
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Republics, 1750-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 65-68.
166 Carson, The Measure of Merit; William H. Schneider, “After Binet: French Intelligence Testing, 1900-
1950,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 28 (April 1992): 111-132.
80
Portuguese, in the hopes of aiding research in intelligence testing abroad.167  French 
psychologist, Henri Wallon, too, engaged a broad international correspondence with 
leaders of intelligence testing movements.  Wallon also compiled a collection of 
intelligence tests from the United States and translated several, in particular the Dearborn, 
into French.168  This influence traveled in both directions.  French psychology students 
actively pursued academic exchanges with United States universities, such as with 
University of Chicago, which housed Louis Thurstone’s psychological laboratory, and 
were eagerly welcomed by these institutions.169  Piéron himself was even inducted in the 
United States National Academy of Sciences in 1949.170  Private foundations in the 
United States likewise played a powerful role in these exchanges through researcher 
fellowships.  Otto Klineberg jokingly confided to Piéron at one point that he was a 
“slave” of the Rockefeller Foundation, sent whither he was granted funding.171  Piéron’s 
connections at Harvard, Princeton, Brown, Stanford, and other universities tied him 
closely to developments in United States psychometry.172  During the Second World War, 
these connections and experiences served him in his capacity as a consultant on 
psychotechnique to the Bureau Scientifique de l'Armée.173  Indeed, Piéron expressed his 
admiration for the “truly remarkable” war effort of United States psychologists, whose 
role expanded considerably during the Second World War.174  
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Piéron and his wife Margéurite closely followed the United States intelligence 
testing movement from the early interwar years, with Piéron translating the Terman-
Merrill intelligence test into French.175  They additionally devised their own French 
versions of many popular United States intelligence tests, which were utilized by the 
Institut national d’orientation professionnelle (National Institute of Professional 
Development).176  From the United States, numerous students traveled to France to study 
with French psychometricians like the Piérons from the early twentieth century.  These 
exchanges challenge the idea that national context proved the most formative context for 
the history of intelligence testing in France or elsewhere.  It furthermore shows the 
existence of a truly transnational collaboration that proved an equally formative influence 
on the trajectory of intelligence testing in France.  These exchanges provided the setting 
for a truly transnational network and movement in mass intelligence testing that 
transpired across multiple and diverse national contexts, and challenge the notion of 
United States exceptionalism in the history of mass intelligence testing.  The war helped 
to further these exchanges, as more nations developed complex systems of testing into 
their armed forces.
The Second World War was a watershed as well for the implementation of mass 
intelligence testing into the United States military.  Much more so than during the First 
World War, intelligence testing became centrally integrated into the war effort, both 
before and after the United States entry into combat.  In preparation for war, the National 
Research Council established a Committee on Selection and Training of Air Pilots and a 
Committee on the Selection and Training of Personnel, and in 1940, a Personnel Testing 
175 Félix Cesselin to Henri Piéron, December 21, 1951, Cote: 520 AP/4, Bobine: 14 ½, AN.
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Section was instituted within the War Plans and Training Officer of the Adjutant 
General’s Office.  In 1943, the National Research Council established the Committee on 
Classification of Military Personnel Advisory, which set to work devising the Army 
General Classification Test, which replaced the intelligence tests in use the First World 
War.177  The Army General Classification Test was a modified I.Q. test that was designed 
to measure both natural intellectual endowment and learned knowledge, or “general 
learning ability.”   All Army recruits sat for this exam and by the war’s end the Army 
General Classifcation Test was administered to over nine million recruits.178   Military 
psychologists also introduced the Navy General Classification Test for naval recruits and 
developed a naval program that would exempt exceptional recruits from combatant 
service, sending them to college instead.179  In the Air Force, military psychometricians 
played an even more profound role in the Aviation Psychology Program with the 
administration of the new Aviation Cadet Qualifying Exam, which was among the most 
selective of the military’s exams.180  In 1950, the United States military established the 
general Armed Forces Qualification Test, which would remain in use until the 
institutionalization of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, introduced in 
1968 and still in use to this day.181  Historians have noted the central role that psychology 
played in the selection and training of recruits and personnel during the Second World 
War; however, in addition to providing critical military support, this wartime testing 
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experience also contributed to the transnational shift toward the embrace of mass 
intelligence testing outside of the armed forces.182
Intelligence testing in the Second World War reinforced expert concerns about the 
relationship between differential fertility and declining levels of intelligence.  The 
wartime testing experience provided an expanse of new testing data and a battery of new 
tests with which to approach these fears, and experts often drew conflicting conclusions 
from them.  British psychologist Raymond B. Cattell, having moved to the United States 
in 1937, served as a consultant on intelligence testing to the United States government 
during the war, and thereafter continued the research he had begun in England on the 
relationship between family size and intelligence.  In the process of this work, he also 
continued to preach on the inevitable catastrophic decline in national levels of 
intelligence.183  Others, such as American psychologist Read Tuddenham, assumed a 
more positive perspective.  Tuddenham proposed that the wartime data “suggests that the 
future may not be as black as the eugenicists would have us believe.”  Whereas 
eugenicists had predicted overall decline, according to Tuddenham, the testing data from 
the war “indicate at least for that fraction of the population selected for military service, 
that performance on a group test of the kind usually described as measuring ‘general 
learning ability’ or ‘verbal intelligence’ has markedly increased from World War I to 
World War II.”  This finding seemed to contradict the theories of experts who “have 
contended that the mean I.Q. of the population is declining at the rate of three or four 
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points per generation” as a result of an inverse relationship of family size to 
intelligence.184  
Even such optimists, however, were reluctant to dismiss concerns about the 
relationship of intelligence to differential fertility.  Tuddenham’s conclusion was, he 
admitted, complicated by significant differences in samples between the world wars.  
While “the members of the armed forces constitute by far the largest and most 
representative sample of the general population ever subjected to psychometric 
procedures,” the World War I sample was considerably less representative.  United States 
citizens benefited from greater education, better nutrition and overall fitness, and greater 
familiarity with tests at the time of the Second World War compared to their earlier 
counterparts, which could explain their elevated scores.185  The fact that the samples only 
included men eligible for enlistment, however, appeared to be less of a concern.  Thus, 
although Tuddenham expressed doubt about alarmist assertions that “national I.Q. is 
dropping at a rapid rate,” he conceded, “one cannot rule out the possibility of a decline in 
the purely native component of intellectual performance were it possible to measure it.”186 
While experts were undecided on how best to interpret newly available data, intelligence 
testing in the postwar years enjoyed much broader acceptance and usage than ever 
before.187  The expansion and opening of higher education with the passage of the 
Serviceman’s Readjustment Act in 1944, entailed an even greater expansion of the 
intelligence testing industry and a developing culture of standardized testing as well.  
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The Second World War generated considerable momentum for the intelligence 
testing movement, and once again invigorated efforts to assess the intelligence of nations. 
A series of national surveys burgeoned across the Western world in the years immediately 
following the Second World War in nations such as the United States, England, Scotland, 
and France.  As during the interwar years, psychometricians spearheaded assessments of 
national populations, framing their concerns in terms national crises, even as they 
engaged in internationalizing projects and rhetoric.  These conflicting impulses reflect an 
ongoing tension between national and international prerogatives within the global 
community of intelligence testing experts.  Experts within these nations desperately 
sought answers and policy solutions to redress fears that national levels of intelligence 
were sharply declining as a result of differential birthrates while also seeking the 
internationalization of intelligence tests.  Yet even as the language of race science and 
eugenics fell away from much of this discourse, the tropes of race science and eugenics 
remained.  In the years leading up to and following the Second World War, human 
scientists and the public increasingly viewed eugenics and race science as fringe or 
extremist ideologies.188  However, eugenicists and race scientists successfully managed to 
resurrect the specter of national intellectual decline as a result of differential fertility 
again and again, in spite of a perpetual lack of evidence demonstrating that this was the 
case.  This particular trope, and the inability of experts to eradicate it or even recognize it 
as the creation of eugenicists and race scientists, contributed to the survival of race 
science and eugenics.  Thus even when the rhetoric of race science and eugenics was 
supplanted, its tropes perpetuated their designs and alarmist fears.
188 Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1895), chapter 11.
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These fears worked their way into the popular press as well.  In the United States, 
the New York Times reported to its readership that “population experts have discovered a 
possibility that the intelligence of the American people is declining.”  According to an 
expert from the Population Reference Bureau, the article read, “the most alarming threat 
to intelligence is the pattern of human reproduction.”  Unless checked, differential 
fertility was poised to lower the intelligence of the nation.  Drawing on United States 
Census data, this expert explained that “parents with the least mental and financial ability 
to raise children produce twice as many children as parents of the highest intelligence and 
income.”  Birth control programs were the only means proposed by which government 
might intervene to reverse the decline in intelligence.189  Concerns were so widespread 
that letters to editors from the general public poured in to newspaper offices, projecting 
the decline of national intelligence.  One G.C. Miller, who wrote to the editor of The 
Baltimore Sun, reported on fertility statistics according to I.Q., informing the editor that 
individuals with I.Q.s ranging between 60 and 80 had an average of 4.13 children, 
compared to geniuses, who had a mere 2.35.190  Similar fears were reported in the papers 
in Britain and France as well.  The institutionalization of mass intelligence testing in 
diverse national contexts helped to fuel the anxieties of experts, governments, and publics 
alike that nations were in states of intellectual decline, even as the sources of these fears 
became increasingly discredited by mainstream science.
In part, this was because national intelligence had become a matter of national 
security.  This conviction, sustained and encouraged by the Second World War, cleared 
the path for a transnational mass intelligence testing movement that would 
189 “U.S. Intelligence Seen on Decline: Some Educational Leaders Agree to Hypothesis Based on 
Reproduction Pattern,” New York Times, July 20, 1947, 15.
190 G.C. Miller, “Sees Decline in Intelligence,” The Sun, June 13, 1950, 14.
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unintentionally help to perpetuate race science and eugenics.  Psychology had progressed 
considerably from early eugenic arguments that genetics exclusively governed innate 
intelligence, and mass intelligence testing in the postwar period breathed new life into the 
debate on the role of environment in the development of general intelligence.  Experts 
developed increasingly nuanced theories of the origins of intelligence, moving away from 
earlier eugenic theories that intelligence was strictly governed by genetics, toward more 
fluid understandings of the relationship between heredity and environment.  By the time 
of the Second World War, few experts believed that intelligence was derived strictly from 
heredity or environment.  Rather, experts began to debate the degree to which heredity 
and environment were responsible for the development of intelligence, and how these 
factors related to one another.191  In the United States, England, Scotland, and France, 
psychometricians reexamined the influence of environment in the context of mass 
intelligence testing surveys.  
Although it was accompanied by the belief that equal conditions might eliminate 
differences between groups, the turn toward environmental influences in the development 
of intelligence was not necessarily a wholly progressive development.  Indeed, the 
eugenic and race science theories, which had undergirded hereditarian theories on 
intelligence, adapted to new surroundings.  Couching difference in environmental 
language, especially that of class, often masked racist views in new rhetoric, thus 
avoiding the stigma of race science.  Indeed, class became the most common proxy for 
race in this context.  This research did not necessarily give way to gentler or more 
generous beliefs regarding the development of intelligence.  It did however increase 
191 Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment 
Controversy, 1900-1941 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), 224-265.
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general confidence in the ability of early education and welfare interventions by social 
and government agencies to affect overall or individual intelligence, and introduced new 
language to describe and identify intellectual differences between individuals and groups. 
When intervention fell short of expectations, most often due to their inability to recognize 
and dismantle systemic inequalities, they eventually would be invoked as evidence by 
race scientists and eugenicists of the true inequalities between groups.  Thus though the 
terms of the I.Q. controversy had largely shifted by this point in time, old prejudices and 
the trope of the dilemma of the relationship between differential fertility and intelligence 
remained, as did the as yet unsubstantiated claim that national levels of intelligence were 
declining.  This helped to perpetuate the designs of race scientists and eugenicists even 
after their discrediting.
Following the cessation of hostilities, a series of intensive studies on intelligence 
spearheaded by population research institutions, private foundations, and universities 
sought to gather data that could answer conclusively whether the level of intelligence in 
the United States was declining, and if so, why.  Among these studies numbered those 
funded by the Milbank Memorial Fund, Allison Davis’s work on culturally-equalized 
intelligence tests, and Lewis Terman’s work on genius.  Commensurate with recent shift 
in thinking about the cultivation of intelligence, these studies endeavored to identify the 
foundations of individual intellectual ability in order to better understand trends in group 
and national intelligence.  Representing conflicting views, these researchers hoped to 
gain insight into the respective roles of social and demographic factors, environmental 
factors, cultural factors, and genetic factors in the formation of individual intelligence so 
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as to generate recommendations as to what states could do to prevent the decline of 
intelligence or promote its increase.  Though tempting to view these studies as a break 
from eugenics and race science, which none of these studies openly endorsed, they 
nevertheless helped to further interest in differential fertility and declining levels of 
intelligence and ensured the continued relevance of this relationship.  Thus although 
many experts invested in intelligence testing research at this time had abandoned or 
rejected race science and eugenic theories, in many instances they continued to embrace 
the very themes that had animated those theories in decades prior. 
The Milbank Memorial Fund directed studies that were among those to carry on 
most clearly the themes in intelligence testing research that were characteristic of race 
science and eugenics.  The Fund led the landmark Indianapolis Study.  Formally called 
the Study of Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility, this study represented 
the first major demographic investigation of factors influencing individual intelligence in 
the United States.192  Established in 1905, the Fund was predominantly invested in 
demographic and population research in the years leading up to and following the Second 
World War.  In 1936, it established the Office of Population Research at Princeton 
University under the directorship of demographer Frank Notestein.  At the time of the 
Indianapolis Study, the Office of Population Research was and would continue to be a 
central institution of the population studies movement in the United States well into the 
1960s.193  Founded at a time during which eugenics was still accepted in many quarters, 
the Fund in particular continued to be animated by the concerns authored by past 
192 Clyde V. Kiser, “The Indianapolis Fertility Study-An Example of Planned Observational Research,” 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 17(4) (Winter 1953-1954): 496.
193 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2008), 106.
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eugenicists.  Principally, it produced research leading to the conclusion that differential 
fertility did indeed pose considerable risk to the population.  The Indianapolis Study’s 
primary contribution was what it claimed as proof of the existence of significant fertility 
differentials between social classes, as well as proof that these differentials derived from 
psychological factors, including intelligence. 
Work began on the Indianapolis Study in 1938 when, with financial backing from 
the Carnegie Institute of Washington, the Milbank Memorial Fund formed the Committee 
on the Study of Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility.  Demographers 
Frank Lorimer, Clyde Kiser, Frederick Osborn, and Notestein, who would later serve as 
experts for various United Nations and UNESCO projects, numbered among the 
members of the committee.194  The study focused on the fertility and reproductive 
patterns of a narrow subset of the population, which the committee took as a 
representative sample of the United States.  The committee restricted the study to “native-
white Protestant couples that were married during 1927-29, with neither spouse 
previously married, with husband under 40 and wife under 30 at the time of marriage, 
with residence in a large city most of the time since marriage, and with both husband and 
wife having a complete grammar school education.”195  Based on its ready supply of 
couples meeting this description, the committee selected Indianapolis as the site of the 
study.  In total, the committee surveyed 2,589 couples, interviewing 1,977 of those.196  
The surveys and interviews were structured to discover how couples planned the number 
and spacing of pregnancies, as well as how psychological, economic, or social factors 
motivated their decisions.  The study enlisted psychologists to assist with interviews, 




however, it did so imperfectly.  A key criticism of the study was its inability to measure in 
a sophisticated manner the correlation between particular psychological factors and 
fertility practices, which undercut the validity of the connections the study intended to 
draw.197  The major contribution of the study was the affirmation of differential rates of 
fertility between socioeconomic groups measured by monthly rental costs.  Couples of 
lower socioeconomic status tended to have more children, even though this led to greater 
feelings of economic insecurity.  The principal finding was that “in all cases fertility 
tended to be inversely related to socio-economic status except at the highest rental and 
educational levels.”198  Experts attributed this inverse relationship to the “factor of 
differential preference and effectiveness of contraceptive practice,” implying that couples 
in the lower socioeconomic brackets both preferred to have more children and had less 
dependable access to contraception.199  In their view, this finding bore considerable 
consequences for the nation’s intelligence should I.Q. be proven to have a strong genetic 
basis, since this group routinely underperformed on intelligence tests.  
In the years following the Second World War, the Fund prioritized studies of 
socioeconomic differences in fertility, contraception, social and psychological factors 
influencing fertility, and world population issues.200  Soon after its publication of the 
Indianapolis Study, the Fund made additional progress in confirming a correlation 
between performance on the Otis Intelligence Test and desired fertility.201  The most 
intelligent (as measured by scores on the test) were the most likely to bear their 
197  Ibid, 500.
198 Ibid, 505.
199 Ibid, 506.
200 “The Fund's Work in Population Problems, 1928-1950,” Folder: 340, Box: 22, Accession 1, Series 1, 
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predetermined number of children.  The converse of this observation suggested that the 
least intelligent were less capable of achieving the desired number of children, which 
could lead to the birth of many more children to less intelligent parents.  Experts 
affiliated with the Fund, such as Frederick Osborn, particularly encouraged other 
organizations invested in demographic research, like the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Population Council, to also investigate of the connection between psychological traits and 
family size both in the United States and abroad.202  Private foundations also played a 
considerable role in exporting United States population research.  For instance, John D. 
Rockefeller III organized the Population Council in 1952 with the express intention of 
training demographic experts who would serve as ambassadors of population control to 
developing nations.  The Ford Foundation too joined forces with the Population Council 
to help institute family planning measures in the developing world, demonstrating the 
considerable reach of the influence of this research beyond national borders.203  
Demographers increasingly viewed intelligence, socioeconomic status, and fertility as 
interconnected as a result of this research.  Massive statistical surveys investigating the 
relationship between these factors, like the Indianapolis Study, were at this time 
generating an unprecedented amount of data on the relation between fertility and 
psychological factors in populations that was then utilized by analysts proposing policy 
solutions to population problems in both the United States and the world.  The United 
States was a major international leader in the collection and dispersion of demographic 
information and population studies.204  Following the Second World War, the United 
States population lobby played a critical role in integrating family planning policies into 
202 Ibid.
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both domestic and international policies.  Domestically, population experts perceived a 
relationship between population control and the diffusion of crime, poverty, and 
environmental concerns.205  This thinking likewise informed United States population 
experts’ views of global population issues.  Yet not all research at the time supported 
arguments purporting that socioeconomic status, family size, or other demographic 
factors influenced the development of individual native intelligence.  The work of experts 
like Allison Davis and Lewis Terman challenged the notion – albeit from very different 
perspectives – that demographic factors determined intelligence or that they could 
provoke a true decline in national intelligence.
Allison Davis’s research on culturally-equalized intelligence tests challenged the 
argument that apparent trends of socioeconomic disparities in I.Q. were a reflection of 
innate intellectual inequalities.  Davis, a black professor of Education, conducted his 
longitudinal study on intelligence tests at the University of Chicago with the support of 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board.  Although he has only received 
brief mention in histories of intelligence testing, Davis’s research illuminated the ways in 
which race science was at work in the intelligence testing establishment.206  Davis 
implicated intelligence tests in perpetuating discriminatory beliefs in the intellectual 
inequality between socioeconomic groups.  Significantly, he avoided the subject of race 
in his publications, focusing instead on the ways in which intelligence tests discriminated 
against social classes.  Even as he attacked the intelligence testing establishment for its 
eugenic vestiges, his research reflected the broader rhetorical shift away from framing 
intellectual differences in terms of race toward framing those differences in terms of 
205 Critchlow, Intended Consequences, 4-5.
206 Lemann, The Big Test, 66.
94
class, which often served as a proxy for eugenicists and race scientists to discuss race 
during these years.  Though he did not challenge the premise of intelligence tests as 
measures of intellectual ability, or offer resistance to the idea that genetics determined 
intelligence, Davis argued that the symbols and cultural basis of those tests in use 
perpetuated discrimination against children from working class backgrounds.  These 
symbols placed middle class children at an advantage, placed working class children at a 
disadvantage, and therefore produced skewed data on the distribution of I.Q. within 
populations and between groups.  In consequence, Davis argued, biases in the tests 
resulted in the tremendous loss of national human resources.  If the tests remained 
unaltered, these resources would be forever lost.  
The remedy for this loss of resources was the creation of tests that were equally 
accessible to all.  Davis’s research on culturally-equalized intelligence tests received 
funding from the General Education Board for six years, beginning in 1944, when he 
submitted a proposal “for the development and standardization of a verbal test of general 
intelligence which will measure and offer a means of comparing the abilities of children 
of all socio-economic levels.”207  In his proposal, Davis asserted that the use of tests that 
privileged middle class symbols and cultural knowledge was detrimental to the nation as 
well as the futures of individuals in the lower socioeconomic strata.  He identified the 
tests’ wide acceptance “as primary measurements of innate ability” as one of the greatest 
problems facing intelligence testing.  In general, experts believed that intelligence tests, 
though imperfect instruments, were adequate in their assessment of innate intelligence.  
This misconception was responsible for “causing incalculably severe educational loss in 
207 Flora M. Rind to Ralph W. Tyler, November 15, 1944, Folder: 5289, Box: 496, Series 1.3, FA058, 
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the public schools.”208  This loss was caused by a faultiness in the tests’ construction; they 
failed to adjust for the differences wrought on individual intelligence by environmental 
factors, particularly cultural differences across social classes.  As long as the tests 
remained inaccessible to non-middle class children, the belief that the tests gave an 
accurate measure of innate intelligence would result in continued failure to recognize the 
innate intellectual ability of poor and working class children.  Davis’s proposed solution 
was the creation of new tests that utilized language and cultural symbols that were 
equally accessible across class divides.  This, Davis concluded, would finally allow the 
tests to measure accurately innate intelligence and ensure the maximization of national 
intellectual resources.209
Davis premised his research on the conviction that it was impossible to generate a 
truly culture-free test.  Therefore, he suggested, a “general test of intelligence” should 
draw only upon “general culture” to which all members of a given nation had access.  He 
concluded, “the basic flaw in all available verbal tests of general intelligence may be 
overcome by including only those items which imply experience which is part of both the 
middleclass and lowerclass cultures, that is, part of the general American culture.”210  
Rather than attempting the impossible goal of a culture-free test, Davis proposed to create 
culturally equal tests of intelligence.  His study was guided by three objectives: testing 
children across socioeconomic levels; assessment of trends in “problem-solving 
behavior” across socioeconomic classes; and construction of culturally-equalized exams 
208 Allison Davis, “Proposal for the Development and Standardization of a Verbal Test of General 
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that could accurately detect an individual’s innate intellectual abilities regardless of 
socioeconomic status.  Although Davis couched his study in terms of socioeconomic 
difference, this language served as a placeholder for racial difference as well.  For its 
preliminary samples, the study examined intelligence test results of black children from 
Gary, Indiana and white children from Rockford, Illinois, across different ages and 
socioeconomic levels.211  Thus although race was not addressed directly, it was taken into 
consideration in the process of sample selection.  This initial comparative study yielded 
two significant findings expressed in socioeconomic terms.  First, that there was no 
evidence of lower class children’s inability to solve all kinds of intellectual problems.  
Second, that “the primary handicap of the lower-class children in responding to the 
present tests is the symbols.”212  As many as 74 percent of words appearing in ten 
standard intelligence tests “were significantly less familiar to lower-class pupils.”213  
When more accessible words were used in place of the unfamiliar ones, students across 
socioeconomic levels performed equally well.214  Analogies also proved far less 
accessible to lower-class children compared to their middle class peers.215  Davis set out 
to produce a series of tests that drew on general experiences and were capable of 
identifying innate ability in all individuals, regardless of socioeconomic background.  In 
this way, he believed culturally-equalized tests would “salvage a great deal of potential 
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ability, which is now lost to American civilization,” by identifying the intellectually-
gifted from all socioeconomic backgrounds.216
Davis’s research attracted national as well as international attention.  In the years 
to come, UNESCO would solicit his insights on problems of national intelligence.  In the 
United States, educators in particular favored his research.  His public appearances and 
speeches, such as his presentation on “Education and the Conservation of Human 
Resources” at the American Association of School Administrators, earned him the respect 
and affirmation of those in education who had similarly questioned extant test-based 
evidence of the intellectual inferiority of children from lower socioeconomic levels.217  
Although most who wrote to Davis referred to doubts about socioeconomic differences in 
intelligence, some shared that their doubts also extended to claims about the intellectual 
inferiority of racial groups.  One educator confided in Davis: “I have always been a bit 
skeptical of most of the so-called intelligence examinations.  This skepticism was greatly 
increased during my period in the United States Indian Service when I discovered that 
Indian children appeared always to rate so much lower by these tests than white children, 
whose intellectual capacity I would have rated no higher...”218  Thus while race was often 
not explicitly acknowledged in research at this time, it was often implied or just beneath 
the surface.  The experiences of educators across the United States bore out the 
conclusions of Davis’s study, which pushed back against intelligence testing experts’ 
concerns about the detrimental impact of differential fertility on national levels of 
intelligence.  However, while his results were well accepted among educators, they were 
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less positively received among intelligence testing experts in the United States who 
continued to ponder the relationship of differential fertility to intelligence and the 
negative correlation between family size and intelligence suggested by other research.
While Davis’s research challenged the status quo in some ways, in other ways it 
did not.  Davis never explicitly attacked the notion that intelligence was genetically 
determined.  Although he was critical of Lewis Terman’s studies on “gifted” children, 
which he believed “entrenched belief that these tests are in fact measures of hereditary 
ability, across social strata” as well as the “belief that the I.Q. is an index of ‘gift,’ of 
innate ability,” Davis did not reject the notion that intelligence was heritable.219  Rather, 
he identified what he perceived as an absence of convincing “evidence that lower-class 
groups contain a larger proportion of genetically inferior individuals than do other social 
strata,” maintaining that “no geneticist, of any national or international standing, 
furthermore, will venture even the opinion that lower-class groups are genetically 
inferior.”220  In the years following the Second World War, this reluctance to openly 
attribute differences in intelligence test performance across class lines to genetic 
inferiority was shared by almost all participants in the intelligence debate.  The revelation 
of the horrors of Nazi rassenhygiene prompted scientists in the United States and Europe 
to distance themselves from strictly hereditarian theses and both race science and 
eugenics, which fell under heavy scrutiny during these years.  While race science and 
eugenics were hardly reputable in the interwar period, reform eugenicists had achieved 
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considerable success in distancing their science from their delegitimized predecessors.221  
Following the Second World War, even reform eugenics became highly suspect.  For 
instance, when University of Chicago psychologist, Ernest A. Haggard presented the 
results of Davis’s study at the Invitational Conference on Testing Problems sponsored by 
the Educational Testing Service, October 29, 1949, in New York, he asserted only that 
“the intelligence test scores are, in themselves, irrelevant data so far as any proof or 
disproof of genetic theories are concerned.”  Haggard simply stated, “the burden of proof 
for demonstrating that the upper socio-economic groups inherit a complex of gene 
characteristics which are tied to superior mental ability, and lower socio-economic groups 
inherit inferior genetic structures, rests on the shoulders of those who interpret differences 
in mental test scores as being due to differential inheritance.”222  This rhetorical refusal to 
disavow old eugenic ideas became a normative tactic for proponents of hereditarian 
theories during these years.
Nevertheless, experts invested in perpetuating the use of standard intelligence 
tests were highly adverse to Davis’s criticisms of bias in intelligence tests.  His critics 
challenged his work on the basis of what they described as a sophomoric understanding 
of the genetic factors determining I.Q. and an overemphasis on cultural factors.  Terman 
in particular challenged Davis’s assertions that intelligence tests failed to measure 
accurately the intellectual capacity of children from all socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Terman drew upon his own research on genius as evidence against claims of the 
inefficacy of standard intelligence tests, arguing that his geniuses came from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds, which “tells you how little truth there is in the statements by 
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some educators and others to the effect that I.Q.'s are invalid and meaningless.”223  
Terman resolutely denied that it was “undemocratic to try to develop every pupil to the 
maximum of his potentialities.”  Indeed, he declared, “we have been too much swayed by 
the all-American feeling for the fellow at the foot.  We have too long taken as our motto 
that if we look out for the hindmost, the foremost will take care of himself.”224  Terman 
thus argued for the need to seek out talent and develop it, rather than focus national 
attention on catching up the less gifted.  Other experts, including Alan Gregg, chairman 
of a Harvard committee on psychology and medicine, were critical of Davis’s privileging 
of social factors over that of genetic factors.  Gregg protested, “we grossly underestimate 
the importance of hereditary factors in human behavior as well as in human medicine... 
Medicine and psychology share a neglect of genetics which is perhaps best described by 
saying that they seem to think that heredity is a study of one's uncontrollable ancestors 
whereas it is one of the few fields that offers any dependable control over one's 
descendants.”225  Thus, though Davis’s critics stopped short of declaring socioeconomic 
disparities in intelligence test performance were a direct result of genetic differences, they 
were quick to accuse him of overly simplifying the genetic basis of I.Q.
Throughout his studies, Davis maintained that intelligence tests that privileged 
exclusionary symbols were harmful to democracy and the nation; as they stood, he 
asserted that the tests were in fact depriving the nation of crucial human resources.  By 
passing over such talent, the United States was failing to bring its citizens to their full 
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potential, and much talent was lost early on schools.  In a preliminary report, Davis’s 
study argued that, “the standard tests, fail to tap many aspects of intelligence.  Both the 
tests and the schools are caught in a circular process.  They define only certain kinds of 
activities as “intelligent,” namely those activities which are highly valued in middle-class 
academic culture.  Then the schools, supported by the test-results, conclude that only 
those pupils who rank high on this special, limited range of activities are “intelligent.”  
This is a circular process of in-grown education, which costs our nation and our 
industries a tremendous loss, through the failure of the schools to uncover and train many 
other kinds of ability in all our children.”226  Davis adopted the increasingly prevalent 
language of the capitalization of human resources, in addition to the rhetoric of 
socioeconomic difference in place of that of race.  Davis’s choice of language highlights a 
significant rhetorical shift in modes of thought about intelligence as a kind of national 
resource that can be traced to the earliest instance of mass intelligence testing.  This shift 
and new mode of thinking about the cultivation of intellectual talent transpired alongside 
the spread of mass intelligence testing and anxieties about national intellectual decline.  
In the decade following the Second World War, when repeat surveys of intelligence 
started to indicate that intelligence was increasing, rather than decreasing, the language of 
human resources and capital would feature prominently in the transition toward anxieties 
about failing to maximize national intelligence.  
Davis’s research is also representative of the crucial ways in which class dialogue 
increasingly supplanted race dialogue in debates about intelligence tests after the Second 
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World War.  This shift was provoked in part by the extreme unpopularity of eugenics and 
racial profiling following the Second World War.  Critical conversation about race is 
conspicuously absent from Davis’s research materials and reports, with the emphasis of 
his interpretation placed squarely on discussion of socioeconomic difference.  It is 
possible this was a conscious conflict-avoidance tactic on Davis’s part, yet it also 
reflected a broader change among intelligence testing experts’ parlance.  In choosing the 
language of socioeconomic difference over racial difference, Davis drew upon a more 
neutral language to convince Americans and the world of the faultiness of standard 
intelligence tests in measuring true ability, the diversity of intellectual capabilities across 
diverse groups of people, and the loss of talent caused by limitations of the tests.  
However, this broader change in dialogue from race to class represented not the absence 
of race science thinking, but rather its creative refashioning.  Socioeconomic difference 
often served as a proxy for racial difference during these years, which enabled race 
science to lurk in new and differentiated language.  Although the emphasis of the debates 
on intelligence testing during these years began a gradual shift away from concerns about 
degeneration toward anxieties about maximization, race science and eugenics were able 
to adapt through such rhetorical shifts during this time of their disrepute.
Davis’s and others’ anxiety over loss of talent and intellectual resources was 
shared by multiple Western nations and, in the case of Scotland, prompted a preemptive 
re-visitation of the intelligence of Scottish school children.  The 1932 Scottish mental 
survey, though a landmark investigation of the group intelligence of a representative 
subset of an entire population, had fallen short of producing definitive conclusions as to 
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the source of the apparent relationship between intelligence and family size.  It had also 
failed to resolve the fears that national intelligence was declining due to differential 
fertility.  This first survey laid the groundwork for the second Scottish mental survey, 
which was carried out in the context of continued expert allegations of national 
intellectual decline following the Second World War.  The widespread anxiety that 
national levels of intelligence were declining in the years leading up to the Second World 
War was once again voiced by experts with renewed urgency.  A second national survey 
of intelligence promised to either validate or allay concerns about national levels of 
intelligence by enabling experts to track change or stasis over time.  The proposal for the 
second survey came from J.A. Fraser Roberts, a British medical geneticist, through Sir 
Alexander Carr-Saunders, Chairman of the Population Investigation Committee, “in view 
of the presumed decline of national intelligence by reason of the differential birthrate.”227  
Although nominally a national, state-run survey of intelligence, the second Scottish 
mental survey was in fact funded and spearheaded by organizations and individuals with 
strong ties to eugenics.  Thus, while eugenics was at this time widely discredited, it also 
maintained a strong and clear presence in intelligence testing by operating behind the 
facade of state-led studies like the 1947 Scottish mental survey.
While both Scottish mental surveys were nominally conducted by the Scottish 
Council for Research in Education, they were planned, arranged, and funded by 
organizations with designs and agendas foreign to those of the council.  As in the first 
Scottish mental survey, the second was financed by private foundations.  Among these 
outside interests was the British Population Investigation Committee, which was founded 
227 Scottish Council for Research in Education, The Trend of Scottish Intelligence: A Comparison of the 
1947 and 1932 Surveys of the Intelligence of Eleven-Year-Old Pupils (London: University of London Press, 
Ltd, 1949), 2.
104
in 1936 through an initiative of the British Eugenics Society to investigate “the problems 
of population.”  During the Second World War, the committee halted its activities and did 
not resume them until late 1944, after its merger with the Royal Commission on 
Population.  British biologist and demographer Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders served as 
Chairman of the committee from its foundation.  Although British in name, the 
committee enjoyed a vast network of international connections.  Initial funding for the 
activities of the committee came from the English Eugenics Society, as well as from the 
Carnegie Corporation of New York.228  The committee also enjoyed connections to the 
United Nations Population Commission and actively solicited financial support from the 
English Eugenics Society as well as private foundations outside of Great Britain, such as 
the Rockefeller Foundation.229  Beginning in 1947, the committee also represented Britain 
in the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems.230   As 
was true of the first Scottish mental survey, the second survey was a similarly 
transnational enterprise, in spite of its national scope.  Although the survey was funded by 
the British Population Investigation Committee, the committee was itself the beneficiary 
of transnational financial support.
The Population Investigation Committee assumed responsibility for the financing 
of the entire 1947 survey; however, funding for the survey came from the English 
Eugenics Society and the Nuffield Foundation.231  Committee member and sociologist 
David Glass urged Carr-Saunders’ proposal to fund the second Scottish mental survey, 
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confiding in him, “my own feeling is that, so far as studies of the relationship between 
fertility and intelligence are concerned, we could hardly spend our funds to greater 
advantage than by sponsoring and subsidising a repeat inquiry in Scotland.”232  With this 
purpose, the Population Investigation Committee approached the Nuffield Foundation, 
established by Lord Nuffield in 1943 to fund research in the interest of public welfare, to 
support the Scottish Mental Survey in the hopes that it might “bear directly upon the 
question of formulating correct qualitative population policies.”233  The second Scottish 
mental survey provided an opportunity to accomplish just that.  In funding the survey, the 
interests of the Population Investigation Committee were represented in the survey’s 
design.  For example, the decision to collect much more expansive information on the 
schoolchildren’s home lives, medical and sociological histories, was solely done “to 
achieve the aims of the Population Investigation Committee.”234  One of these aims was 
to provide data to the ongoing British Royal Commission on Population, which was 
responsible for authoring policy suggestions to population problems in Great Britain.235  
Thus, while the survey was conducted by the Scottish government, in practice it was 
supported and directed by the agendas of expressly eugenic agencies.  
While eagerly welcomed by eugenic organizations, the timeliness of a second 
survey was subjected to debate.  Some experts believed too little time had passed since 
the first survey to accurately chart change over time.  Although the survey’s committee 
recognized that “the shortness of the interval” between the first survey and the second 
might pose some difficulty in interpreting the data, they determined “no objection could 
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be sustained against the statistical reliability of the survey on that ground.”236  Thus, even 
if the interval was unideal, the results of a second survey would nevertheless be a valid 
representation of the current state of intelligence.  The other primary concern regarding 
the timing of the survey was the possibility that the interruption of education and the 
evacuation of children during the Second World War had disproportionately 
disadvantaged Scottish children born in 1936, compared with the previous survey’s 
cohort, born in 1921.  This concern was ultimately dismissed as the committee concluded 
that the children in the first survey had suffered comparably as a result of the Great 
Depression, and therefore had experienced similar hardships in terms of both stability and 
schooling.237  In spite of these concerns about the timeliness of retesting, the committee 
justified the second survey on the basis of the increasing urgency of worries regarding the 
status of national intelligence, and the need for additional data.
The second Scottish mental survey committee members included notable survey 
veteran Godfrey Thomson, as well as several contemporary leaders of the British group 
intelligence testing movement, James Maxwell, J.A. Fraser Roberts, who contributed 
considerable psychometric military experience, and noted sociologist David V. Glass.  In 
the preface to the published findings of the second survey, Thomson declared that the 
survey was conducted “in the hope that it might throw light on the causes of a remarkable 
quantitative social fact, namely, that the results of intelligence tests show that the average 
score of members of large families is less than that of members of smaller families.”  
Thomson expressed the fear shared by many that such a demographic trend “might be 
leading to a steady fall in the national intelligence, if its cause is that intelligent parents 
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are limiting their families.”  If, however, the underlying cause of the negative impact of 
family size on intelligence was in fact environmental, Thomson suggested that it was “a 
duty to discover this and to strengthen the hand of social reformers.”  He concluded that 
the results of the survey would “convince any reader that the negative association 
between size of family and average intelligence score, whatever its cause, is 
undeniable.”238  Moreover, Thomson maintained that this association was evident across 
both occupation and class lines.  In spite of interwar research and analysis of the results 
of the first Scottish mental survey, the dilemma of whether large families “are large 
because they are unintelligent, or unintelligent because they are large,” persisted.239  
In total, 75,451 students were administered a group test during the Second 
Scottish mental survey, and basic sociological data was collected from all of the students 
who took the group intelligence test as well (see image 3).240  The committee decided to 
additionally select a sample of approximately 10 percent of survey participants from 
which to collect a more detailed sociological and medical history.  This data was 
collected through interviews conducted during home visits by trained professionals.  This 
sample, known as the “thirty-six day sample,” was selected randomly by date of birth.241  
Those chosen were born on the first, second and third days of each month in 1936; from 
this group, another sample of children born on the first of each month, known as the “six 
day sample,” was selected.242  These two samples were given the Terman-Merrill 
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included 7,000 children and the “six day sample” 1,200.244  In a presentation before the 
English Eugenics Society, Thomson witnessed that “steep descent of average score in the 
group test with larger and larger families was fully confirmed” in both samples.245  
However, “in spite of this apparent multiplication of the less intelligent, there was no 
evidence, in the average scores of all children in 1947 compared with 1932, of any 
general decline of intelligence.”246  Thus, the survey data failed to confirm fears that 
national intelligence was declining.  In fact, to the chagrin of the surveyors, it appeared to 
demonstrate an overall increase in the intelligence of the participants.  This “apparent 
paradox” did not dismiss Thomson’s “uneasy fear that environmental improvement may 
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be only masking a hidden selection going on behind, a steady selection which might in 
the long run defeat any temporary environmental improvement.”247
Contrary to expectations, the data thus presented an optimistic picture of the state 
and direction of national intelligence in Scotland.  The survey found, “in 1947 as 
compared with 1932, not only no fall in the average score, on the self-same test, of a 
Scottish year group of eleven-year-olds but an increase – quite a substantial increase from 
about 34.5 to about 36.7 points in a test with a maximum of 76 points.”248  This overall 
rise in average test score was statistically significant and could not be dismissed as 
aberrant or an anomaly.  There were also notable changes observed in the correlation 
between gender and gains in the group test scores.  Girls’ scores improved more than 
their male peers, with the girls beginning “during the war years to draw ahead of boys.”  
The surveyors, however, were reluctant to embrace this observation, concluding this was 
“possibly be due to the war, which perhaps disturbed boys in their devotion to studies 
more than it did girls.”  They also suggested that “perhaps girls, more docile and obedient 
than boys (I am told!) have acquired more ‘test-sophistication.’”249  On the individual 
tests, however, the boys continued to outperform their female classmates, which shed 
some doubt on the reliability of group tests in assessing intelligence relative to individual 
tests.  Thomson acknowledged that “one reaction to all this may be, indeed has been in 
the case of one of our number, a disparagement of all intelligence tests, or at least of 
group intelligence tests... This, I myself feel, would be unfortunate, and I believe it to be 
untrue.”  Referencing his thirty years of experience, Thomson assured readers of the final 
report that “few can be more fully aware of their dangers and pitfalls than I am.  They 
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are, of course, like all human instruments, far from infallible: but they are less fallible 
than most other methods of estimating human ability.”250  In spite of their shortcomings, 
Thomson staunchly defended his instruments and his faith in their efficacy, brushing 
aside the evidence of disparities between group and individual tests.
Even though the second Scottish mental survey was generally hailed by experts as 
a success, the Scottish Council for Research in Education concluded, “the full value of 
the results of the 1947 survey will not, in fact, be extracted until a further survey is 
carried out.”251  The evidence at hand, though sufficient to ward off fears of an immediate 
decline in national intelligence, was insufficient to dismiss these fears entirely.  The 
survey’s inconclusiveness was variably interpreted.  While some experts’ concerns were 
assuaged, others remained skeptical.  Among these were experts hesitant to let go of the 
specter of national decline that had for so long guided research on group intelligence.  For 
others, the data appeared conclusive enough to move beyond fears of decline toward 
interest in the possibility of elevating national intelligence.  These experts began to 
propose that nations divert their attention toward the maximization of intelligence, rather 
than the prevention national decline.  Yet regardless of their interpretations, experts 
agreed that more information was necessary.  Moreover, experts almost universally 
affirmed the importance of breaking down impediments to intellectual development.  The 
final report affirmed, “it is of the utmost importance to society to know what happens to 
individuals with varying degrees of intelligence, and how far obstacles to the full 





research was necessary to ensure that any and all such “obstacles” to intelligence be 
removed in order to take full advantage of human intellectual potential.
Expert debate on the interpretation of the data highlights ongoing tension between 
hereditarian and environmental approaches to understanding the development and 
limitations of individual intelligence.  Although the survey data suggested that 
environment played a considerable role in the formation of intelligence, a number of 
experts remained wary of underestimating the role of genetics.  In a draft of the published 
report, Thomson acknowledged, “undoubtedly this [survey] strengthens the 
environmental side of the argument,” whether environmental influence presented in the 
form of test-sophistication or the impact of family and home environment.253  Thomson, 
however, was not prepared to embrace an environmentalist approach in place of a genetic 
one.  He warned that such conclusions were “obviously highly speculative, even more so 
than the speculation that a genetic loss is actually going on and is merely being masked 
by environmental causes which can only be temporary and must be defeated in the long 
run by persistent selection.”  In Thomson’s opinion, it was too early to say.  Thus the only 
responsible course was to “suspend judgment.”254  In a preemptive response to his critics 
he assured, “it must not be imagined that, as one friendly critic has put it, ‘you have 
hoped for a fall in average score, and now that you have instead found a rise, you are 
trying to explain it away.’”  Denying such a notion, he warned “we must remember that 
‘if fears were liars, hopes may be dupes.’”  Thomson counseled against being “deceived 
in our strengthened hope that national intelligence is not falling.”  The prudent course 
required considering “every possible explanation which may leave open the possibility 
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that adverse selection is still going on behind a facade of temporary improvement.”255  
Indeed, in correspondence, the committee members were scornful of what they perceived 
as naive efforts to imagine away a decline.  One surveyor ruthlessly criticized British 
geneticist Lionel Penrose’s “‘theoretical scheme’ for enjoying a differential birth rate with 
no loss of intelligence,” which in his viewed seemed “almost a classical demonstration of 
special pleading.”256  The intransigence of these old eugenic anxieties reflect that while 
eugenics and race science were now relegated to a more circumspect role in intelligence 
testing, they remained a powerful force in the imaginations of experts unable to 
relinquish fears of intellectual degeneration in spite of evidence that disproved decline.
In order to resolve definitively whether intelligence was declining, and whether 
this decline was prompted by fertility differentials, additional surveys of similar scale 
were necessary.  In a report on the progress of the survey to Carr-Saunders, Glass 
affirmed, “it is of the greatest importance to set a precedent for repeated intelligence 
surveys, and there is every reason to believe that the 1947 inquiry will make a substantial 
contribution to our knowledge of the factors bearing upon the relationship between 
fertility and intelligence.”257  The survey had largely achieved these aims.  In spite of 
experts’ reluctance to accept it, the survey data demonstrated the possibility that national 
levels of intelligence were not in fact declining, but might even be on the rise.  This 
profound and unanticipated finding gestured to the possibility of maximizing national 
intelligence, which would largely animate research and conservations about human 
capital in the postwar years.  The second Scottish mental surveyors hoped to establish a 
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“precedent” through their “initiation of the first of a series of repeat surveys which, in the 
long run, would clarify the relationship between measured intelligence and other factors, 
and which, when properly interpreted in the light of detailed analysis, might make it 
possible ultimately to draw a curve of the course of intelligence over time.”258  In this 
respect as well, the survey was deemed a success.  Although much less systematic and 
smaller in scale, an English intelligence survey was conducted in this general time as 
well.  Under W.G. Emmett, Moray House tested 31,728 and 28,505 from different school 
districts at an interval of ten years.259  Within a few years, France would also conduct a 
national survey, similar to the Scottish and English surveys, yet on a much greater scale.  
Beyond the Scottish mental survey’s influence on surveys to come, the findings of the 
survey were crucial in the drafting and reception of the report of the British Royal 
Commission on Population, which was released the year following the survey’s report.260
The first major national study of population, the 1949 Royal Commission on 
Population investigated alleged connections between family size and intelligence, and the 
subsequent effects on population.  The Royal Commission on Population was instituted to 
generate data to support the development of population policies in Great Britain.  The 
final report of the commission was well received in Britain and abroad, with United 
States demographer Frank Notestein hailing it as “a remarkable document that should 
greatly facilitate the discussion of population policy in Britain and attract worldwide 
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interest.”261  The United States public learned of the commission in a special enclosure to 
the New York Times.  London correspondent Clifton Daniel shared, “as a result of 
population trends Britain is in danger of a decline in her productive power and military 
potential and the innate intelligence of her people.”262  Although the second Scottish 
mental survey had begun to shed doubt on allegations of decline, the survey data was still 
new and insufficient to reverse decline narratives.  Similar to other studies that 
emphasized declining national levels of intelligence, the commission attributed the threat 
of population decline to the eugenic trope of differential fertility: “in the difference 
between the birthrates of the better educated and more intelligent classes and of lower 
social groups there is a tendency toward lowering the level of the nations (sic) innate 
intelligence.”263  The report signaled a future for government intervention in demographic 
planning, presenting such planning as rational, universally beneficial for all, and desirable 
for the preservation of human resources.
The commission enlisted the assistance of the English Eugenics Society, which 
undertook research into the question of the relationship of differential fertility and 
intelligence on behalf of the commission.  In its final memorandum to the commission, 
the society advised that intelligence – defined as “inborn, general, intellectual ability” – 
was almost certainly declining as a result of differential fertility.  This decline was 
attributed to evidence “that there is in this country a negative correlation between innate 
intelligence and size of family.”264  Psychometrician Cyril Burt – who would achieve 
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notoriety in future years following allegations that he fabricated the results of his research 
on the genetic basis of intelligence in twins – delivered the society’s findings to the 
commission.  According to the evidence at hand, Burt relayed, though the decline in 
national intelligence did not appear dire, “it seems almost certain that there is in this 
country a negative correlation between innate intelligence and size of family, and that the 
size of the correlation (about - 0.20) is large enough to demand urgent practical 
attention.”  The projected decrease in overall intelligence amounted to a loss of 2.0 I.Q. 
points per generation from the national average.265  However, the situation could yet 
become more dire.  Burt warned, “if the rate assumed continues, then in little over 50 
years the number of pupils of ‘scholarship’ ability would be approximately halved and the 
number of feebleminded almost doubled.”266  Burt’s alarmist interpretation of the 
surveyed data invoked the eugenic trope of imminent national decadence as well as old 
eugenic remedies.  The Chicago Tribune reported on Burt’s warnings, describing what he 
termed “a distant prospect of a galloping plunge to intellectual bankruptcy,” the remedy 
for which was “more intelligent parents contributing enough to the next generation to 
balance the quota added by parents at the other end of the scale.”267  In addition to 
policies that would promote the fertility of the most intelligent, the need for additional 
information was paramount, for “as a nation we should know our resources in mind-
power as accurately as we do in man-power, iron or coal.”268  Burt’s invocation of the 
rhetoric of resources mirrored that of his transnational peers.  Burt’s “resources in mind-
power,” Allison Davis’s “human resources,” and French demographer Alain Girard’s 
“humain capital” signaled a change in the rhetoric drawn on to address crises in 
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intelligence testing.  During these years, intelligence was increasingly framed by experts 
as a national resource in its own right.  
Expert stylization of intelligence as a resource abounded leading up to, during, 
and after the Second World War.  Its increase was to be desired, just as its decline was to 
be feared.  As Thomson testified, “it is true that there is a reservoir of insufficiently 
trained or utilized intelligence.... No one can say how much high intelligence we need in 
our society, but surely there is good reason to think that we could profitably use all that 
we have now got.  If so, it follows that a decline in national intelligence is a national 
loss.”269  This held true whatever the factors that governed individual intelligence.  
Regardless of “whether the decline calculated form the differential birthrate be genetic or 
environmental, it is in either case a serious matter for the nation.”270  Government 
intervention was warranted for this reason alone.  In his memorandum to the Royal 
Commission on Population, Thomson attributed the alleged decline in national 
intelligence in part to “the later marriages of intelligent people, their restraint in 
producing fewer children, and the inheritance of their intelligence by their offspring.”271  
However, in regard to the question of the consequences for national levels of intelligence, 
“much of course depends on the relative influences of nature and nurture in determining 
intelligence.”  On this matter, Thomson conveyed skepticism and indecision.  However, 
he insisted,“if intelligent and ambitious parents were assured that their children even if 
numerous would certainly have every chance to reach what they considered a desirable 
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position in life, they might, and I think they would, have larger families.”272  As such, he 
advocated for incentives to ensure that such people did not feel the need for conservatism 
in their family planning.  In response to Thomson’s predictions, J.A. Fraser Roberts 
submitted a post script to the memorandum, stating, “in light of the Scottish Survey, fears 
of an immediate catastrophic fall in intelligence as measured, due to differential fertility, 
may be set aside.”  Even so, “it is clear that important problems remain, and it is highly 
desirable that they should be intensively studied.”273  This sentiment was shared by 
experts outside of Great Britain, particularly in the United States and France.  Following 
the examples of the Scottish and English surveys of intelligence, for the first time in its 
history France also began to investigate these questions vigorously, executing its first 
national survey of French intelligence in the year following the survey conducted by the 
Royal Commission on Population.  
As early as 1929, French psychologists had proposed surveys of schoolchildren 
using United States intelligence tests and scoring systems.274  Yet professional support for 
mass intelligence testing in France did not achieve a quorum until the Second World War. 
The French return to intelligence testing began during the Popular Front, when 
psychologists Henri Wallon and Georges Dumas, and psychiatrist Georges Heuyer set out 
to study the level of mental deficiency among French children in 1936.  Under the Vichy 
regime, this work was continued by the Fondation Française pour l’étude des problèmes 
humaines (French Foundation for the Study of Human Problems), instituted in 1941 and 
272 Papers of the Royal Commission on Population, Volume V, 41.
273 Ibid, 45.
274 Jean-Maurice Lahy to Henri Piéron, March 11, 1929, Cote: 520 AP/6, Bobine: 17 2/3, AN.
118
directed by physician Alexis Carrell, who applied his forty years of experience in the 
United States.275  The Institut national d’études démographiques (National Institute of 
Demographic Studies), which carried out the first successful mass intelligence testing 
surveys in France in 1950 and 1954, was established by the provisional government of 
Charles de Gaulle within the department of public health in 1945, replacing the Fondation 
Française pour l’étude des problèmes humaines.276
Following the Second World War, French psychotechnique enjoyed greater reach 
and professionalization than ever before.  This was related in part to the greater expansion 
of the use of psychometrics in the war mobilization effort, as well as the increasing 
internationalization of mass intelligence testing and studies into perceived connections 
between national intelligence and differential fertility.  Psychometrics in France enjoyed 
increasing relevance and legitimacy, which was evidenced by the professionalization of 
psychometricians and the formation of professional psychometric associations, such as 
the Association professionnelle des Psychotéchniques diplômés (Professional Association 
of Certified Psychometry,) founded in 1947.277  The National Institute of Demographic 
Studies represented the merger of population studies and psychometrics in France.  It 
drew together a diverse cohort including noted psychiatrist Georges Heuyer, 
demographer Alfred Sauvy, sociologist Jean Stoetzel, geneticist Jean Sutter, and 
psychologists Henri and Margéruite Peiron among others.  
The French national survey of intelligence surpassed all others before it in its 
volume and range of test subjects.  The first national survey of the intelligence of French 
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schoolchildren took place in 1944.  A total of 91,237 students between the ages of six and 
12 were tested.  Of these, 47,567 were boys and 47,670 were girls.278  The study was 
hailed by its progenitors as “the most widespread that has ever been accomplished in the 
world” in contrast to the Scottish mental survey, which was limited to children of eleven 
years of age.279  The study collected statistics on intellectual level according to age in 
both months and years, as well as sex.280  The study additionally collated data on the 
children’s home, father’s occupation, and the number of children in each family.281  The 
institute administered a mosaic intelligence test, adapted by French psychologist René 
Gille.  The test did not “pretend to give an absolute estimation of the subjects’ 
‘intelligence.’”282  However, it seemed “from a practical point of view, without doubt, one 
of the most important findings ever obtained.”283  Through demographic analysis and 
intelligence testing, the institute’s study hoped to draw conclusions about the formation 
of intelligence in French children: “Is aptitude hereditary or innate, or, to the contrary, 
purely acquired? … This study does not at all pretend to find an answer to these 
questions, but the observations provide clarity.”284  In its analysis of the collected data, the 
institute found that “differences observed in test performance, in accordance with the 
home, the father’s occupation, and the number of children in each family, match with 
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those observed in the very numerous additional studies conducted in France and the rest 
of the world.”285  This corroboration with the results of studies conducted in other nations 
still left the question of the cause of individual intelligence unresolved.  In their summary 
of the study, Stoetzel and Girard concluded, “we must above all never lose the point of 
view that the development of intelligence of the ages studied can result from environment 
as well as from hereditary factors.”286   Therefore, although the French survey confirmed a 
correlation between demographics and the formation of individual intelligence, it did not 
conclusively demonstrate causation along the lines of either genetics or environment.
Although the initial impulse for a national survey was driven by the desire to 
assess mentally deficiency as did the interwar research of Wallon, Dumas, and Heuyer, 
the institute determined that “in a study of national levels of intelligence, it would be a 
loss and grave error to consider only the least intellectually gifted.”287  As such, the 
institute decided to proceed with the assessment of children of all intellectual levels.  
However, the work of assessing France’s national level of intelligence, its sources, 
impairments, and improvements, was far from complete.  As with the first Scottish 
mental survey, the initial data could only offer a brusque though tantalizing view of the 
situation in France.  Indeed, Alfred Sauvy warned in the first volume published by the 
survey, that the work “only delivered part of the results or, rather, the results in all their 
brutality, which is to say that the work presents all the perils of superficial interpretation.  
285 Ibid, 574-575. (Translated by author from the original French: Les différences observées dans les 
performances au test, selon la résidence, selon las profession du père ou selon le nombre des enfants dans 
la famille, recoupent des constatations déjà faites au cours de très numbreuses études, accomplis en 
France et à l’étranger.)
286 Ibid, 575. (Translated by author from the original French: Il ne faut surtout jaimais perdre de vue que 
le développement intellectuel aux âges enquêtés peut résulter du milieu aussi bien que des facteurs 
héréditaires.)
287 Ibid, 575- 576. (Translated by author from the original French: Dans un bilan national du niveau 
intellectuel, ce serait à la fois un manque et une erreur grave que de considerer seulement les moins 
doués.)
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And that peril is great.”288  The institute was hesitant to proclaim the findings of the study 
conclusive.  Regardless of the institute’s reticence to make definitive statements, 
socioeconomic status appeared to be the primary differentiating factor in individual 
intelligence.289  In this respect, the institute considered its own findings commensurate 
with those of the Scottish mental surveys.  Girard concluded that family information, age 
of mother, height, weight, and residence, “are always associated with socioeconomic 
status, identifiable by the father’s occupation.”  Therefore paternal occupation 
“constitutes the common denominator in the differentiation of intellectual level.”  The 
initial French survey suggested that socioeconomic status, determined by the father’s 
occupation, was the best predictor of individual intelligence.  Even so, Girard recognized 
and concurred with Thomson’s warning against the assumption that “this factor is the 
cause of such differentiation.  The question therefore remains open and must be left to be 
answered by future research.”  Yet above all, to the great relief of the institute, “the 
intellectual and human capital of the nation has not deteriorated markedly after the 
hardships which the country was subject to.”290  France appeared safe, for the present, 
from rapidly declining levels of national intelligence.  
288 Alain Girard, “Le niveau intellectuel des enfants d’âge scolaire: La détermination des aptitudes.  
L’influence des facteurs conditionnels, familiaux et sociaux,” Population 9:2 (1954), 276. (Translated by 
author from the original French: ne livre qu'une partie des résultats, ou plutôt, livre les résultats dans toute 
leur brutalité, c'est-à-dire avec les pièges qu'ils tendent à l’interpretation superficielle.  Et ces pièges sont 
nombreux.)
289 Girard, “Le niveau intellectuel des enfants d’âge scolaire,” 277.
290 Ibid, 278.  (Translated by author from the original French: ...sont toujours associées aux variations de 
catégorie sociale, définies par la profession du père.  Celle-ci constitué le facteur commun de la 
differenciation.  Ce qui ne signifie pas, ajoute Sir Godfrey THOMSON, dans la preface du livre, que ce 
facteur agisse comme cause : ‘there is no suggestion that it is the cause.’  La question reste donc ouverte, et  
demande à être suivie au cours de nouvelles recherches.)  (le capital humain et intellectuel de la nation 
n'aurait pas subi de deterioration trop marquee par suite des privations auxquelles le pays se trouvait 
soumis.)
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The institute’s study attracted the attention of the international community, both as 
a result of its findings and its interdisciplinary approach to the problem of national 
intelligence.  Henri Laugier of the United Nations “particularly emphasized interest in the 
encouragement of ‘multidisciplinary’ research.  Considering ‘these studies of differential 
biometrics’ as ‘the substance of wise application of the diverse abilities of different 
individuals, from distinct social scientific positions,’” Laugier expressed “his desire that 
such collaboration be continued and augmented.”291  This desire for greater 
interdisciplinary collaboration on social issues would inform the international activities of 
organizations like the United Nations, and UNESCO specifically, as discourse on 
intelligence increasingly invoked the rhetoric of mind-power, resources, and human 
capital.  In the following decade UNESCO would address the relationship of intelligence 
as a national resource to international tensions, broadening concerns about national levels 
of intelligence to concerns about world peace.  The abundance of research on national 
levels of intelligence following the Second World War, and the alleged connection to 
differential fertility and population issues this research indicated, brought experts in the 
1950s to perceive differential fertility and declining levels of national intelligence as 
potential threats to international peace and stability.  Experts following the First World 
War were among the first to draw this connection between war, population, and 
intelligence.  With the introduction of the rhetoric of capital and resources, this 
connection sharpened.   
291 Ibid, 278. (Translated by author from the original French: Il insiste, en particulier, sur l'intérêt et la 
fecondité des recherches ‘multidisciplinaires.’  Considerant ‘ces études de biometrie differentielle’ comme 
‘le fond même de toute sage utilisation des aptitudes diverses des divers individus, dans les differents 
postes de l'activité sociale,’ il formule le voeu qu'elles puissent être poursuivies et amplifiées.)
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At the threshold of the Cold War, western nations feared for both the intellectual 
quality of their populations and what declining national levels of intelligence might mean 
for world peace.  Domestic studies of the relationship between intelligence and 
differential fertility revitalized interwar concerns that as populations increased, they 
declined in intellectual quality as a consequence of differential fertility.  Cooperation was 
never more necessary, and human scientists increasingly perceived a unique role for their 
professions in the maintenance of peaceful international collaboration to resolve issues of 
understanding that posed threats to international stability.  As one human scientist 
explained, “we are living in a world that threatens to brush aside everything that 
intelligence stands for.  Two great wars and the prospect of more; over half the population 
of the earth caught in this maelstrom of destruction: ten years of depression with millions 
everywhere still without employment; confusion over issues and values that leaves men 
frustrated and uncertain – it is little wonder that the temptation is to forsake reason and 
resort to force.”292  This global temptation to “resort to force” in response to population 
problems deeply informed the future of mass intelligence testing and research into the 
question of national levels of intelligence.  Anxieties about declining levels of national 
intelligence now provoked international action, as the problem of the relationship of 
differential fertility to intelligence was taken up by UNESCO under its Tensions 
Affecting International Understanding.  Experts increasingly viewed national intelligence 
as a contingency of world peace, sharing the view that “in these critical times it is 
impossible to over-emphasize the value of cooperation at the international level.”293  
UNESCO would assume the role of organizing international cooperation within the social 
292 Raymond B. Fosdick, “The Rockefeller Foundation: A Review for 1939,” Folder: Bourse Rockefeller, 
1930-1945, Box: AJ/16/6974, AN, 38-39.
293 George W. Wisker to Henri Piéron, October 1, 1948, Bobine: 16 1/3, Cote: 520 AP/6, AN.
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sciences in the years leading up to the Cold War.  Alongside concerns about international 
tensions, a subsequent crisis was forming within the human sciences.  While the impact 
of ideology on science had come under scrutiny leading up to the Second World War, by 
the 1950s, Western human scientists strove to avoid the taint of ideological science at all 
costs.  This led to a culture of openness that briefly repressed, but ultimately proved 
permissive to, the survival of race science and eugenic thought.  All through these 
developments, race science and eugenics quietly persisted via rhetorical shifts, the 
perpetuation of fears that intelligence was declining, and the belief that differential 
fertility was the root of it all.  As these fears were challenged in the decades to come, 
eugenicists and race scientists would again alter their tactics to remain a force in the I.Q. 
debates of this century.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Crisis of Ideology in Intelligence Testing during the Cold War
“At the mid-century it is appropriate to consider the shifting ground of the 
perennial hereditary-environment controversy in the perspective of the last fifty years,” 
United States sociologist Bernhard J. Stern announced to the American Philosophical 
Association in Philadelphia in 1949.294  Whereas eugenicists like Karl Pearson had 
“equated class status with biological ability” and had “bemoaned decreased fertility 
among the ‘superior stocks,’ and large families among what he called the ‘reckless and 
improvident,’” Stern remarked on the progress made by genetics.295  The profession had 
moved beyond the “crudeness” and “naivete” of its eugenic cousin, professing a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between environment and genetics in the 
inheritance of traits like intelligence.  “Any contemporary linking of eugenics and 
genetics might, perhaps, be thought of as unwarranted stirring up of dead issues 
belonging to the early, groping neo-Mendelism of the past.”  However, Stern warned, 
“because of the reluctance of geneticists to relinquish entirely the hope for human genetic 
engineering the linkage of genetics to eugenics is a real one.”296  Indeed, “eugenics has a 
tenacious and pernicious hold on genetics.”297  The present threat derived from geneticist 
Curt Stern’s most recent work, Principles of Human Genetics, which posited that “the 
intellectual endowment of Western populations is in danger of decreasing because of 
differential fertility along class lines.”298  
294 Bernhard J. Stern, “Human Heredity and Environment” Science and Society 15 (1950), 122.
295 Stern, “Human Heredity and Environment,” 122-123.
296 Ibid, 124-125.
297 Ibid, 125.
298 Ibid, 126. 
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In the immediate postwar years, the tropes of eugenics and race science persisted.  
Geneticists, demographers, and psychologists continued to hypothesize a potential 
linkage between the alleged declines in national levels of intelligence and differential 
fertility.  Mass surveys of large populations, such as the Scottish and Paris surveys of 
schoolchildren in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the intellectual assessments of the 
United States, British, and French militaries during the war, fed these fears of decline.  
Studies, including the United States Indianapolis Study (1947) and the United Kingdom’s 
Royal Commission on Population (1950,) yielded statistics that exacerbated concerns 
about the link between differential fertility and declining national intelligence, even as the 
mounting evidence indicated that national levels of intelligence were not in decline.  This 
era is best characterized as one of disarray.  Global witness of the devastating 
consequences of ideologically motivated science in the Second World War drove human 
science experts to eliminate any taint of ideology from their research conclusions.  While 
the majority of human scientists openly disavowed race science and eugenics, their 
corresponding fixation on openness of scientific discourse in the I.Q. debate ultimately 
helped to preserve a space for the possibility of race science and eugenics.  
This chapter relates the crises of ideology facing the intelligence testing 
community in the 1950s to what Edward Purcell has described as an association of 
democracy with relativism among American scientists, and a corresponding association 
of fascism with absolutism, in scientific research.299  Purcell’s contrast of conceptions of 
United States scientific practice as tolerant, pluralistic, and non-ideological with 
Communist scientific practices, which were viewed as intolerant, dogmatic, and 
299 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of 
Value (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1974), part III.
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ideological, demonstrates the development of a kind of conservatism in scientific practice 
that eschewed ideology and subsequently enabled the preservation of the status quo.300  In 
its rejection of ideological influence, the community of intelligence testing experts 
practiced considerable reticence in its scientific conclusions.  Experts erred on the side of 
not overstating available scientific knowledge lest they give the appearance of twisting 
scientific evidence to fulfill ideological agendas, leading to reticence on the part of many 
experts.  In consequence, race science and eugenics, although briefly repressed, did not 
disappear from the I.Q. controversy.  Indeed, the intelligence testing community’s 
fixation on openness helped to create the preconditions for the reemergence of race 
science and eugenics once the horrors of Nazi rassenhygiene faded from the public’s 
imagination.  
Amidst this ideological crisis, environmental explanations for group differences 
increasingly overshadowed hereditarian ones.  The language of socioeconomic difference 
supplanted that of racial difference, and the impact of environment was broadly 
acknowledged as a significant factor in determining I.Q.  As Edward Ramsden has 
shown, in their transition from hereditary to environmental explanations, experts rebuked 
ideology in favor of objectivity, which was associated with scientific and social 
progress.301  However, this shift in explanations of human difference, while distancing the 
human sciences from the stigma of ideologically-motivated science, was not effective in 
eradicating race science or eugenics, in spite of their steep decline in credibility.302  This 
chapter contributes to an emerging body of literature that argues for the longevity of 
300 Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory, part IV.
301 Edmund Ramsden, “Confronting the Stigma of Eugenics: Genetics, Demography and the Problems of 
Population,” Social Studies of Science 39:6 (December 2009), 859-860.
302 Ramsden, “Confronting the Stigma of Eugenics.” 
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eugenics and its perpetuation throughout the twentieth century.303  Juxtaposing old 
eugenics with the new, eugenicists argued that knowledge gained from failed applications 
and the development of genetics had finally prepared eugenics to author adequate and 
scientific solutions for the world’s population problems.304  These self-styled “new 
eugenicists” perceived a new future for the course of eugenics that they consciously 
distinguished from “old eugenics.”  Population genetics provided the way toward the 
repurposing of eugenics.  This new focus on population dynamics and characteristics in 
genetics and eugenics overlapped with developments in demography and psychology in 
particular as concerns about the impact of levels of intelligence on populations amplified 
during the Cold War.  
Anxieties over potentially declining levels of national intelligence were intimately 
connected to broader anxieties over maintaining world peace and assuring national 
success amidst international conflicts and rivalries.  The human scientific experts that 
directed their energies toward resolving the population intelligence dilemma viewed their 
activities as operating in the service of the maintenance of world peace.  These experts 
argued that population control was imperative to national security, global peace, and the 
expansion of democracy.  The postwar moment – characterized by the massive 
decolonization of Asia and Africa, the beginnings of the Cold War, and growing 
consciousness of the scarcity of natural resources – proved a formative context for the 
changing relationship of the human sciences to the nation state.  From modernization 
theory to the development of area studies, postwar human science was both the agent and 
303 Alexandra Minna Stern, Telling Genes: The Story of Genetic Counseling in America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press); Nathaniel Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection: How Genes Became the 
Heart of American Medicine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014). 
304 Ramsden, “Confronting the Stigma of Eugenics,” 853-857.
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benefactor of state power.  International conflict created unique opportunities for human 
science expertise that joined demography, psychology, and genetics to generate solutions 
to population problems that threatened global peace.305  As Cold War engagement 
intensified, the perceived value of investing in and promoting the intellectual quality of 
populations increased markedly, and human scientists began to perceive an ever more 
active role for themselves in the resolution of world conflict and the promotion of 
national security.  Intelligence came to be considered and understood by experts and 
nations as a kind of human resource that could serve as a particular kind of capital at the 
disposal of the nation state.  Through their claims to an ability to define and measure 
intelligence as a complex genetic and environmental phenomenon, human scientific 
experts sought to establish for themselves an advocacy role in world affairs and helped to 
reimagine intelligence as a national resource in the process.  Once experts began to 
dismiss fears of national intellectual decline, and nations diverted their energy toward the 
maximization of intelligence, old anxieties about the differential fertility of the poorer 
classes and minorities persisted and were shared by experts, nations, and publics alike.  
This is observable especially in the findings of the UNESCO committee on the relation of 
differential fertility to intelligence, formed under the mandate of easing international 
tensions.
305 Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Science Research during the 
Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and 
Fall of America's Soviet Experts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Joel Isaac. "The Human 
Sciences in Cold War America," The Historical Journal 50:3 (September 2007), 725-746; Audra J. Wolfe. 
"Defending Cold War Science," Berfrois (2013.)
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The United Nations and its specialized agencies organized the 1954 World 
Population Conference in Rome to address the population concerns of a postwar world.  
From its founding in 1945 as a global peace-keeping institution and protector of 
international human rights, the United Nations viewed population problems as potentially 
as threatening to world peace as war.306  The specialized agencies of the United Nations, 
including the World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), sought to 
address population concerns through their individual mandates.307  The United Nations 
Population Commission, founded in 1946 as an advisory council to the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations and later renamed the Population Division, 
proposed convening a world population conference at the urging of the International 
Union for the Scientific Study of Population and its executive director, United States 
demographer Frank Lorimer.308  The International Union for the Scientific Study of 
Population had been founded in 1928 with the financial assistance of the Milbank 
Memorial Fund following the World Population Conference of 1927.309  During the first 
three years of its existence, the Fund provided its primary support totaling $30,000.  
Originally called the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population 
Problems, it boasted a strong United States and French membership, including notable 
American demographers Henry Pratt Fairchild, Frank Lorimer, and Frank Notestein.  The 
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population likewise shared a close 
relationship with the United Nations Population Division in the postwar era, and its 
306 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception:The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Pres of Harvard University, 2008), 123-125.
307 Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 126.
308 Ibid, 126, 132, 144.
309 Clyde V. Kiser to Frederick Osborn, February 1, 1965, Folder: Frederick, Osborn, Box: 17, American 
Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia (APS.)
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proposal of the conference was well received by the United Nations.310  Acknowledging 
the seriousness of global population concerns, the United Nations Executive Board 
concluded: “such a Conference of demographic problems should direct the attention of 
both Governments and scientists to the importance of the current changes in the world 
population situation and, in particular the growth of population in the less-developed 
areas.”311  The specialized agencies each contributed research on concerns particular to 
their unique mandates.  Concerns about declining national levels of intelligence animated 
UNESCO’s contributions to the World Population Conference in Rome. 
The postwar era ushered in a new host of population concerns about the overall 
quality and quantity of populations, and the scarcity of resources.  Malthusian fears about 
natural resources motivated a spate of development projects in the Third World, while 
anxiety over a new kind of national resource, intelligence, sustained growing national 
concerns about human capital.312  In response to the trepidations expressed by population 
experts about the alleged declining intellectual quality of populations, UNESCO’s Social 
Science Division prepared a report on “Differential Fertility and Intelligence” for the 
World Population Conference.  The committee on differential fertility and intelligence 
and its reports have received only passing mention by historians.313  However, the history 
310 Lorimer, Frank, Carmen Miró, Wilson H. Grabill, and Vasilios Valaores, “The Role of the International 
Union for the Scientific Study of Population,” The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 49:4 (October 1971), 
86-94. 
311 Henri Laugier to Julian Huxley, April 21, 1948, File: SOA/20/05, Folder: 312 A 06(45)“54” - World 
Population Conference - Rome - 1954 - Part I up to 30 April 1953, Box: 312 to 312: 406(45)“54,” 
UNESCO Archives, Paris (UNESCO.)
312 For a recent comprehensive treatment of the rise of population studies and efforts to control 
populations in the postwar era, see Connelly, Fatal Misconception.  On development and aid, see especially 
Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Harvard University 
Press, 2010); David C. Engerman, “The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the 
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313 UNESCO’s Social Science Department presented one other session at the 1954 World Population 
Conference in Rome, entitled “Distribution of Genetic Factors in Relation to Population Change,” proposed 
originally by Frederick Osborn.  Alison Bashford, “Internationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Eugenics,” in 
Alison Bashford and Phillippa Levine, editors, The Oxford Handbook of Eugenics (New York: Oxford 
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of this committee reveals the thus far unrecognized centrality of concerns about 
intelligence to broader postwar global population concerns.  The Social and Economic 
Council of the UN funded the group under the Tensions Affecting International 
Understanding Project, which the UN had established to “encourage social scientists to 
engage in work touching upon and promoting international understanding” in the postwar 
era to help maintain global peace.314  The project’s mandate tasked UNESCO with 
“dealing boldly and concretely with the problem of eliminating from the minds of men 
those ideas which lead to misunderstanding and conflict.”315  Among those ideas leading 
to misunderstanding and conflict were the tropes of national intellectual decline wrought 
by fertility differentials.
Concerns about international tensions thus informed the activities of the 
UNESCO working group on the relationship between differential fertility and 
intelligence.  The convening of a world conference on population had been suggested by 
UNESCO’s first Director-General, British eugenicist Julian Huxley, as early as 1948, but 
was delayed due to concerns that “such a conference would evoke ideological rather than 
technical responses.”316  The Tensions Project charged the departments of UNESCO with 
utilizing “the experience and information gained” from its “wide network of direct 
University Press, 2010), 162-164; Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 118.    
314 Memorandum from Dr. A. Brodersen, Social Sciences to Head of External Relations, copy to Director-
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contacts with social scientists and social engineers” in order “to stimulate and coordinate 
further work, and bring problems and results to the knowledge of the world.”317  Critical 
of the dedication of human scientific resources to national prerogatives, this mandate 
recognized that “reconstruction and social development after the war naturally have a 
first claim on [human scientists’] time and energy.  But the postwar situation poses new 
international problems too.  The peoples of the world will have to think and live and work 
together in a community of international cooperation if they are to be spared a new and 
final catastrophe.”318  With the goals of the Tensions Project in mind, UNESCO voiced its 
support for the World Population Conference in Rome, and gathered a team of human 
science experts to form its working group on the relationship between differential 
intelligence and fertility.
The working group brought together a diverse international and interdisciplinary 
cohort with competing professional claims to understand intelligence.  By the Second 
World War, multiple professions beyond psychology viewed intelligence as within their 
profession’s domain.  Geneticists, sociologists, demographers, and anthropologists all 
participated in the I.Q. debate, which at times led to conflicting claims of authority.  As 
genetics continued to professionalize and its practitioners labored to distance it from its 
controversial cousin, eugenics, geneticists endeavored to create a leading role for 
themselves in the intelligence debate.  Yet this distancing proved imperfect.  As recent 
histories of postwar genetics have shown, the professionalization of genetics in fact 
317 “Social Science Programme 1948,” June 17, 1947, File: unknown, Folder: X 07.55 SS - Programme 
Budget of Organization Department Social Sciences - Part II - from 1/I/48 up to 31/XII/50, Box: X07.55 SS 
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significantly overlapped with eugenics.  Early geneticists utilized many of the same 
practices and techniques of eugenicists, and numerous prominent geneticists of this era 
identified previously or additionally as eugenicists, as was true of many of the UNESCO 
geneticists.319  However, in differentiating their profession from the false prophet of 
eugenics, they seized upon the contentious question of the genetic component of 
intelligence as within the domain of their scientific expertise.320  As sociologists 
increasingly entered into the intelligence debate, psychologists and sociologists each laid 
competing claims to the authority to explain group variations in performance on 
intelligence tests.  Psychologists remained divided among themselves as to the relative 
weight of genetic and environmental factors, while sociologists offered predominantly 
cultural explanations for intellectual disparities between groups.321  UNESCO formed its 
interdisciplinary working group conscious of these competing professional claims.  The 
makeup of the working group was precisely premised on the question of “whether some 
of the differences of opinion in this field did not arise from the fact that experts in 
different disciplines had been working separately and along their own lines, without any 
collaboration with other disciplines.”322  In integrating these distinct professions, 
UNESCO aspired to bridge disciplinary and national divides to bring a diverse cohort of 
experts together to speak definitively to the problem of intelligence and differential 
fertility. 
319 On the professionalization of genetics, see especially Stern, Telling Genes; Nathaniel Comfort, The 
Science of Human Perfection. 
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Psychologists, demographers, and geneticists from Europe and the Americas 
collaborated in the production of UNESCO’s working papers on the relationship between 
differential fertility and intelligence.  In spite of its international character, the group was 
dominated by British experts and though numerous American experts – including 
Frederick Osborn, Executive Vice President of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Population 
Council, Curt Stern of the University of California, Berkeley, J.V. McNeel of the 
University of Michigan, and Allison Davis of the University of Chicago – were invited 
and consulted, only one American was able to complete the journey to Paris for the 
drafting of the group’s working papers.323  Invited by UNESCO’s Social Science 
Department, the final group that met in Paris in February of 1954 at UNESCO House to 
prepare the working papers for the World Population Conference included: Swedish 
geneticist J.A. Böök of Uppsala University; English demographer and sociologist David 
V. Glass of the London School of Economics; Danish geneticist Tage Kemp of the 
Institute of Human Genetics in Copenhagen; Italian demographer Livio Livi of the 
University of Rome; Scottish psychologist James Maxwell of the University of 
Edinburgh; American psychologist Dael Wolfle of the United States Commission on 
Human Resources and Advanced Training; English geneticist and eugenicist Lionel 
Penrose of the University of London; English geneticist J.A. Fraser-Roberts of the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; French geneticist Jean Sutter of the 
Institut National d’Études Démographiques and French demographer Alain Girard, also 
of the Institut National d’Études Démographiques.324  By bringing diverse perspectives to 
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bear on the interpretation of collected data on the relationship between differential 
fertility and intelligence, the Social Science Department hoped to develop new and 
conclusive insights into the issue at hand.
Prior to the Second World War, research conducted by eugenicists, demographers, 
and population geneticists had predicted that national intelligence quotient averages 
would decline between 0.9 and 5.0 points annually.325  This anxiety was due in part to 
pessimistic readings of data from decades of intelligence testing surveys, demographic 
surveys, and eugenic predictions of racial degeneration.  Anxiety over the question of the 
relationship of differential fertility to national levels of intelligence was thus not novel.  
However, following the war and two major conferences held in England by the English 
Royal Commission on Population (1950) and in the United States by the Milbank 
Memorial Fund (1947), human scientific experts and national governments revisited the 
issue with renewed urgency.326  Contemporary research suggested a negative correlation 
(r = -.25) between intelligence and family size.327  Additional evidence that family size in 
fact had deleterious effects on children’s intelligence focused human scientific attention 
on the fertility and reproductive practices of particular groups within national populations 
who tended to underperform on intelligence tests: the poor and racial minorities.  
UNESCO’s working group on the relationship between intelligence and differential 
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fertility confronted directly the controversial issue of genetic and environmental impact 
on intelligence.
The group’s individual members presented a total six working papers authored by 
James Maxwell, Jan A. Böök, Livio Livi, Jean Sutter and Léon Tabah, Alain Girard, and 
Lionel S. Penrose from psychological, sociological, demographic, and genetic 
perspectives for discussion at the preparatory meeting in February 1954 at UNESCO 
before authoring its final report for the World Population Conference in Rome.  These 
papers consolidated information on current international and interdisciplinary research 
into the question of differential fertility and intelligence in an attempt present a synthetic 
statement.  They drew upon recent studies and a large body of recently acquired data 
from populations-based intelligence test surveys including the Scottish mental surveys, 
the French mental surveys, the Indianapolis Study, and Allison Davis’s research on 
culture-free intelligence tests.  Joined by Social Science Department Director Alva 
Myrdal and UNESCO psychologist Otto Klineberg, the group convened in Paris for four 
days to discuss extant research on the relationship between differential fertility and 
intelligence, which centered on population studies, generational studies of intelligence 
test data, and environmental considerations of family life.  It prioritized four areas in 
which it would present its recommendations for further research: the measurement of 
intelligence, the genetics of intelligence, differential fertility, and the combination of 
factors that bear upon intelligence.328  
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The working group struggled to agree upon a definition of what the tests actually 
measured.  Some members suggested that the tests measured “test intelligence,” 
“observed intelligence,” or Spearman’s “general intelligence.”  Regardless of their 
uncertainty as to what exactly the tests measured, they agreed that the tests measured 
something valuable.  The preliminary meeting of the working group in Paris confirmed 
the group’s consensus that the tests were capable of predicting both social and economic 
success.329  In spite of their consensus on the ultimate value of the tests, the group could 
not agree upon a definition of intelligence., nor could they agree upon the relative weight 
of various factors in determining individual intelligence.  This was due largely to cultural 
and professional differences.  At a subsequent meeting, Wolfle highlighted the problem of 
disparities in cultural definitions of intelligence.330  In his working paper, Böök expressed 
reservations over drawing any definitive conclusions about the inheritance of I.Q. 
precisely due to the inability to definitively and precisely define what it measured.  He 
observed in his preliminary report, “from the geneticist's viewpoint the crucial problem 
is, of course, the heritability of the IQ test responses.  Though psychologists have 
generally remained skeptical, a great many biologists and geneticists seem to have 
accepted IQ tests, more or less at their face value, as a measure of natural ability.  One 
cannot be sufficiently warned against many of these conclusions… as long as not even 
the most qualified psychologist can tell exactly what qualities the IQ test measures.”331  
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Böök thus identified a critical professional divide on the matter of I.Q. and its 
inheritance.  Although psychologists in general continued to express their uncertainty of 
the value of I.Q. as an innate quality, geneticists increasingly weighed in on this debate 
and asserted the importance of their own profession’s contributions.  The group’s final 
report settled upon an “operational definition” of test intelligence without resolving the 
genetic implications of this definition.332
The group continuously struggled to generate a decisive conclusion on the relative 
importance of genetics in determining an individual’s intelligence.  In an early draft of 
their report, the group stated that up to 50 percent of intelligence was heritable.  Another 
of the working papers estimated that heredity was responsible for 50 to 75 percent of 
intelligence.333  In later drafts, they revised the report to state that at least 50 percent of 
intelligence was heritable.  During the group’s preliminary meeting, Livi, Maxwell, and 
Girard expressed the need for longitudinal studies in order to assess how accurately test 
performance in childhood correlated with performance in adulthood, in order to properly 
assess the relationship of intelligence to genetics and therefore to demographic 
concerns.334  In spite of the fact that they could not agree upon what precisely the tests 
measured, or to what degree environment and heredity factored, the group ultimately 
determined that “a substantial proportion of the variance in the test performance in the 
populations tested is to be explained by genetic factors which determine the range within 
which measured intelligence can develop.  This makes the test results relevant to the 
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problem of differential fertility.”335  In proposing that intelligence tests were valid 
instruments for measuring the undetermined degree of genetically-determined intellectual 
potential, the experts preserved the ambiguity of the nature-nurture balance while 
simultaneously affirming the relevance of intelligence testing data to differential fertility 
and population problems. 
The point on which the group was most conclusive, was the impact of family size 
on children’s intelligence.  Léon Tabah and Jean Sutter, drawing attention to research 
indicating a negative correlation between children’s levels of intelligence and family size, 
suggested that this discrepancy was primarily environmental and due to socioeconomic 
status rather than genetics.  They moreover identified parental occupation as an important 
factor in the determination of children’s levels of intelligence.336  Tabah and Sutter based 
their conclusions on survey data collected during the French mental surveys of 
schoolchildren.  A remarkable finding of the French study was the significance of sibship 
in the determination of intelligence quotient.  Although the survey found that girls’ 
intelligence quotients were unaffected by the sex of their siblings, this appeared to be a 
critical factor in the determination of boys’ intelligence quotients.  Boys with a younger 
brother tended to underperform compared with their male peers, while boys with a 
younger sister typically outperformed their male peers.  Likewise, boys with an older 
sister outperformed boys with an older brother.  The French survey found this pattern to 
hold true in both urban and country settings, as well as across occupational groups.  
Similarly, age gap between siblings was a statistically significant factor; the greater the 
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age gap between siblings, the higher their intelligence test scores were likely to be.  Only 
children tended to score the highest on intelligence tests, while multiples tended to score 
lower.337  Tabah and Sutter’s conclusions appear to support an environmentalist stance on 
the development of intelligence, though they protested they were “still far from being 
able to make any definitive statements.”338  Their environmentalist leanings were 
nevertheless far from optimistic.  While they recognized the importance of environment 
on the formation of intelligence over that of genetics, their conclusions reinforced 
theories that the largest families were among the least intelligent, whether by nature or 
nurture.  One could not control one’s birth order, nor the occupational or socioeconomic 
status of one’s parents.  Tabah and Sutter’s conclusions ultimately reinforced older 
conclusions about the intelligence of the poor in new language.  
Race was conspicuously absent from the working groups’ report.  In the years 
following the Second World War, the human science professions grappled intensely with 
questions of racial equality and prejudice.  Studies such as Gunnar Myrdal’s An 
American Dilemma and Otto Klineberg’s research on racial intellectual equality, 
combined with the first stirrings of the American Civil Rights Movement and the horrors 
of the Holocaust, placed considerable pressure on human scientific professions to root out 
instances of prejudice and bias in psychological research.  This transition corresponded 
with greater attention to the influence of environment and culture on psychological 
data.339  Postwar psychologists especially perceived for their profession a duty to pursue 
socially responsible research that demonstrated racial equality, yet many remained highly 
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wary of the influence of ideology on objective scientific research.340  This resulted in the 
reticence of many experts to make assertions beyond what they could concretely and 
specifically prove.  The majority of intelligence testing experts thus erred on the side of 
caution, assiduously avoiding all traces of ideology in their research and conclusions.  
Ironically, this desire to shield science from the influence of ideology resulted in an 
intellectual and political climate permissive to the survival of race science and eugenics.  
The reticence that avoidance of ideology inspired led to reserved statements of scientific 
knowledge that ultimately created a space for race science and eugenics to emerge from 
latency in the late 1960s and 1970s.
The tropes of eugenics and race science persisted in part due to the reservations of 
intelligence testing experts who were reluctant to overstate available scientific 
knowledge.  For instance, in spite of widespread anxieties that national levels of 
intelligence were declining due to differential fertility, data from the 1947 Scottish 
Mental Survey in fact suggested that national levels of intelligence were actually on the 
rise.  Yet though the UNESCO experts relied heavily upon this data in forming their 
conclusions, they neglected to directly engage this evidence of rising national levels of 
intelligence.  The final statement prepared by the group noted that, of all the mass surveys 
conducted, that, “the most important example, the Scottish Surveys of all 11-year-old 
schoolchildren in 1932 and 1947, showed no change in the average I.Q. over this 15-year 
period.”  This indicated “no proof of a decline in general intelligence.”341  This 
representation, however, was inaccurate; not only did the survey results not indicate 
declining levels of intelligence – they revealed an increase in overall intelligence that the 
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UNESCO experts rationalized as statistical anomaly.342  Although some expressed 
optimism, many of UNESCO’s experts proffered a number of explanations that 
diminished the statistical significance of survey’s demonstration of this apparent rise in 
intelligence.  “Test sophistication” was one of these explanations for this apparent 
improvement in test intelligence scores.343  According to this theory, as a population grew 
more familiar with psychometric tests, its improved performance was attributable to the 
advantage gained by familiarity with the format or content of the test, which could result 
in erroneous improvement of scores.  Thus in some instances the reticence of human 
scientists to engage in ideological arguments led them to interpret data conservatively.  In 
other instances, however, this reservation could serve eugenic agendas.  Indeed, several 
of the group’s members were self-identified eugenicists, and Penrose even held a 
professorship in eugenics.  Penrose’s heterotesis hypothesis, also known as “assortative” 
or “assortive” mating, was another slightly more controversial explanation for the failure 
of differential fertility to produce statistically observable national declines in 
intelligence.344  Penrose suggested that populations would naturally achieve a kind of 
equilibrium that would prevent national declines in intelligence.  Though the most 
intelligent members of a population tended to have fewer children, those with the very 
lowest intelligence tended to have very low fertility.  This effectively balanced the greater 
fertility of the moderately intellectually sub-normal population.  He proposed that it was 
“possible to consider the increased fertility of the slightly subnormal as a natural process 
342 Ramsden, “Confronting the Stigma of Eugenics,” 110.
343 Ibid, 118.
344 “Summary Report of the Fifth meeting held at Unesco House, Paris on Wednesday, 3 February 1954,” 
File: UNESCO/SS/POP.M./Conf.1/1/S.R.5, Folder: 312.1 A 54 - Fertility Studies - General - Part III from 
1st February 1954, Box: 312.1 A 53 Part I to 314.371 (910) 079, UNESCO.
144
of counterbalancing the complete absence of fertility at the very lowest levels.”345  
Penrose concluded that assortive mating produced stasis, rather than a true decline in 
overall levels of intelligence.  His hypothesis met with Kemp’s, Böök’s, and Livi’s 
approval, and demonstrates how reluctance to engage in ideology on the part of many 
human scientists created spaces for the continued expression of hereditarian thought.  
The group’s final statement vacillated in its conclusions.  It showed reluctance to 
declare that there was no danger of differential fertility provoking a decline in national 
levels of intelligence, in spite of broad evidence in favor of this conclusion.  The final 
statement resolved, “the fact that there has been no demonstrable decline in test 
intelligence does not necessarily mean that differential fertility has had no effect; the 
possibility remains that such differential fertility may have acted to keep the population 
from improving.”346  This conclusion suggested that though nations may not observe 
decline, they were possibly experiencing stagnation.  It furthermore perpetuated old 
eugenic and race science tropes and focused attention on those populations with the 
highest rates of fertility: racial minorities and members of lower socioeconomic classes.  
Yet there was not cause for immediate concern.  The statement determined that there was 
“no basis for pessimism;” the effects of differential fertility appeared to be diminishing, 
the negative impact on a child’s intelligence in proportion to family size was minute, the 
most intelligent groups seemed to be experiencing an overall increase in their fertility, 
and changing mores might be “expected to produce a leveling or equalization of the 
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fertility in all groups.”347  The statement advised governments and society to work 
strenuously to improve environmental conditions for all in order to maximize “in each 
country a considerable reservoir of intelligence,” hitherto undeveloped.  The issue of 
“social wastage of intelligence” was raised in the final day of the working group’s 
meeting in Paris and was universally acknowledged as a critical issue facing all 
societies.348  In spite of the overall optimistic tone of the statement, it concluded 
ambiguously with the testament: “The group stresses once again that there has been no 
proof of a decline in the genetic endowment of the populations studied; and no present 
indication that such a decline may be predicted for the future; however, although the 
predictions are ‘not proven,’ the problem is not one to be dismissed.”  They advocated 
that the issue receive “more research of an international and inter-disciplinary character” 
so that vital national resources might not be lost.349
The final statement ultimately furthered past tropes in revised language.  It 
resolved that there was “undoubtedly a substantial genetic component in test 
intelligence.”350  Though earlier drafts had incorporated approximations or estimates of 
the relative importance of genetic and environmental considerations, the final version 
avoided controversy by refraining from any conclusive statements.  Any oblique 
reference to eugenics, in spite of the presence of several self-professed eugenicists within 
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the working group, was also conspicuously absent in an effort to avoid controversy.351  
This intentional ambiguity was a means of avoiding contention, and was ultimately 
successful; the UNESCO paper “aroused considerable favourable comment” among the 
World Population Conference attendees.352  Historians have contended that the turn 
toward environmental explanations for psychological traits, particularly between races, 
was more than it appeared on the surface, and that dispelling racist ideas became “the 
special responsibility of human scientists” during this era.353  However, the UNESCO 
working group buried race rather than confront it.  In an irony of the working group’s 
conclusion, arguments that environment played a critical role in the development of 
general intelligence were not anathema to the possibility of decline of genetic potential.  
Although the group acknowledged that environmental factors played an important role in 
the formation of individual intelligence, factors like the occupation or socioeconomic 
status of one’s father, one’s birth order, number of siblings, or gender, were not factors 
that individuals could control.  The fact of environmental influence did not reject genetic 
determinism outright, nor did it rebuke the tropes of race science and eugenics.  The 
reluctance of many human scientists to overstate the influence of environmental factors 
over those of genetic ones helped to preserve a space for the apparent return of race 
science in the late 1960s.  Moreover, the group’s explanation helped to further entrench 
the idea that differential intelligence was a reflection of socioeconomic difference.  This 
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distinction became ever more crucial in national contexts in which class became 
increasingly interchangeable with race, and nations became progressively invested in the 
maximization of the human resource of intelligence.    
Scholars have argued that abuses during the interwar years and the Second World 
War led to the disappearance of race science and eugenics by the postwar era.354  
However, contrary to suppositions that race science disappeared following the revelation 
of Nazi crimes against humanity committed in the name of race science and eugenics, 
scientific experts equivocated on the connections between race and psychological traits in 
the postwar years, often in ways that belied the influence of race science thinking.  The 
UNESCO Statements on Race, which historians have often interpreted as evidence of the 
dismantling of race science, are in fact a reflection of its contested survival through a 
revised rhetoric and dialogue of difference facilitated by a gradual transition away from 
discussion of racial groups toward discussion of populations.  The scholarship of Tracy 
Teslow and Perrin Selcer has shown that though race science was publicly rejected in the 
UNESCO statements on race, scientists sharply disagreed on the science (especially the 
science pertaining to the variation of mental traits within and between racial groups) and 
many retained racist beliefs that they ultimately suppressed for political or peacekeeping 
reasons.355  However, the significance of the statements’ remarks on racial variations in 
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intelligence for the repackaging and perpetuation of race science into the postwar decades 
has not been fully considered.356  Though the statements were positively received 
internationally as evidence of progress toward international peace and enjoyed broad 
support, their construction was a highly contentious process.357  Physical anthropologists 
and geneticists were especially critical of the statements.  Many of these scientists wrote 
letters of protest to UNESCO accusing the organization of distorting the science in order 
to achieve ideological aims.  Several even went so far as to state that the organization’s 
scientific abuses were tantamount to Nazi abuses of science.  UNESCO produced the 
statement in a moment of disarray within the human science community.  The prerogative 
of disproving racial science came into conflict with the prerogative of avoiding 
ideologically inflected science.  The statements were drafted with the intention of 
preventing any future international conflicts caused by racist dogma, which “comes at the 
very head of the list of main obstacles to human solidarity and brotherhood.”358  The path 
to peace rested foremost on racial equality, yet racism did not simply dissipate with 
defamation of race science, and many efforts to reject race science preserved an 
essentialist, biological, and hereditary definition of race itself.359  Due to dissent among 
experts within and outside of UNESCO, the statements hedged on scientific consensus 
and conspicuously avoided asserting any radical claims.  The experts responsible for 
drafting the statements walked a fine line between upholding political ideals and 
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shielding objective scientific conclusions from ideological influence.  In consequence, the 
first statements were largely equivocal.  The reticence of these experts produced a 
statement that fell far short of its political goals by reducing its claims to the absence of 
proof of unequal genetic intellectual endowment between racial groups.
Anthropologist Ashley Montagu drafted the first UNESCO statement in 
consultation with a group of UNESCO experts.  The initial 1950 “Statement on Race” 
defined race as “a group or population characterized by some concentrations, relative as 
to frequency and distribution, of hereditary particles (genes) or physical characters, which 
appear, fluctuate, and often disappear in the course of time by reason of geographic 
and/or cultural isolation.”360  The statement’s definition thus largely preserved race as a 
biological category.  On the subject of intellectual traits, the statement demurred that 
intelligence tests were yet unable to distinguish between genetic endowment and 
environmental influence in the cultivation of intellectual capacity.  In the event that 
environment of various groups was equal, expert consensus was that intellectual 
capacities would be similar across all groups.  Though it stopped short of criticizing the 
nature of intelligence tests or declaring the faultiness of testing data that supported the 
conclusions of racial intellectual disparities, statement concluded: “according to present 
knowledge there is no proof that the groups of mankind differ in their innate mental 
characteristics, whether in respect of intelligence or temperament.  The scientific 
evidence indicates that the range of mental capacities in all ethnic groups is much the 
same.”361  This first statement sparked debate over the validity of the science behind 
UNESCO’s claims, particularly the science behind the claim of the similarity of 
360 UNESCO, “Statement on Race,” 1950, UNESCO.
361 Ibid.
150
intellectual capacity across groups.  The statement was accused of being too ideologically 
motivated to the point of overstating scientific evidence.  The ensuing dispute among 
UNESCO and outside experts resulted in the production of a yet more ambiguous 
statement in the following year.
The 1951 “Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences” was drafted 
largely in response to an outpouring of criticism that the preliminary UNESCO statement 
relied too exclusively on the testimony of sociologists and had failed to consult physical 
anthropologists or geneticists.  The revised statement offered a much broader definition 
of race and acknowledged that no single definition was universal across all professions.362 
The revision also included a more equivocal and complicated assertion on the question of 
racial variation in innate intellectual ability.  It reflected, “even those psychologists who 
claim to have found the greatest differences in intelligence between groups of different 
racial origin and have contended that they are hereditary, always report that some 
members of the group of inferior performance surpass not merely the lowest ranking 
member of the superior group but also the average of its members.”  Therefore, “it is 
possible, though not proved, that some types of innate capacity for intellectual and 
emotional responses are commoner in one human group than in another, but it is certain 
that, within a single group, innate capacities vary as much as, if not more than, they do 
between different groups.”363  The revision reflected expert disagreement about whether 
the statement was in danger of overstating scientific consensus on racial variation in 
innate intellectual abilities, and the threat to free and objective science incumbent in such 
an overstatement.  Anxiety that the statement appear ideological rather than scientific 
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informed its production as well as subsequent revisions, all of which reflected the 
reticence of experts to exaggerate available knowledge.
There was substantial disagreement over the drafting of the statement’s sections 
on the inheritance of mental traits.  In their letters to the Acting Head of the Social 
Sciences Department, Robert C. Angell, the experts consulted by UNESCO harshly 
criticized what many interpreted as gross overstatement of available information on the 
role of genetics and environment in the inheritance of mental traits.  In his 
recommendations for the first draft, geneticist and evolutionary biologist Theodosius 
Dobzhansky advised Angell to “delete the phrase ‘so far as temperament is concerned, 
there is no evidence that there exist any inborn differences between human groups.’  
There is no conclusive evidence to the contrary either.”364  Geneticist L.C. Dunn, in 
agreement with Dobzhansky, wrote, “the case for the general position is so good that it 
should not be weakened by overstatement.  A few of the statements assume more 
knowledge than we have at the moment; such are (p. 3, par. 3) ‘no evidence that there 
exist any inborn differences between human groups.’  This is subject to misunderstanding 
because there is evidence that the frequency of genes indirectly affecting temperament 
differ in different groups.”365  Psychologist Otto Klineberg urged a “less dogmatic” tone 
for the statement, attesting “that it is premature to say that there are no inborn 
psychological differences between racial groups; it is, however, possible and desirable to 
say that there is no acceptable scientific proof of the existence of inborn psychological 
364 Theodosius Dobzhansky to Robert C. Angell, January 17, 1950, File: unknown, Box: 323.12 (68.01) A 
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differences between racial groups.”366  Julian Huxley, too, recommended “pretty drastic 
redrafting” and criticized the statement’s conclusions about intellectual differences, 
asserting “it is still impossible to disentangle genetic from environmental factors in 
intelligence quotients, so that it is impossible to give an answer to the question whether 
there are any measurable differences in regard to the mean genetic intelligence of 
different groups.”367  Concern that the statement reflected political goals more so than an 
accurate picture of the state of available knowledge on the subject of race and 
psychological differences between races inflected most of the feedback from experts.  
Their fixation on openness and the assertion only of evidence that was tested and proven 
helped to produce ambiguities within the UNESCO statements on race and beyond them.
Though all of these experts expressed support for the goals and ideals behind the 
statement, a majority were highly critical of what they viewed as the willing ignorance of 
the statements toward the state of the field of genetics.  In his instructions to Montagu for 
the 1951 revision, Angell advised, “almost all the experts feel that you have gone too far 
in the direction of stating that we know that genetic factors have nothing to do with 
temperamental and mental characteristics, so far as racial groups are concerned.”  Angell 
thus proposed a softening of the claim, stating “all of them seem to feel we should state 
this negatively: that our knowledge at the present time is not certain on this point, though 
making it clear that we have no scientific knowledge on the matter of intelligence which 
would support a race doctrine.”368  This revision resulted in a much less forceful 
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statement that reflected the primary critique of the statement’s resort to ideology.  
Angell’s response to criticism of the initial statement highlights the conflicting goals of 
refuting race science and preserving the image of an ideology-free scientific statement 
during this era.  However, in seeking to avoid the harmful effects of ideology on science, 
as in the painfully recent examples of Nazi race science and Soviet Lysenkoism, the 
UNESCO experts reduced the question of the validity of race science to a question 
strictly about biology.  This placed the burden of refuting scientific racism on evidentiary 
scientific consensus on the nonexistence of genetic differences between races, and 
ultimately reinforced a principally biological understanding of race.
This had profound consequences for the I.Q. controversy and the perpetuation of 
race science.  The lack of consensus among psychologists, demographers, and geneticists 
regarding intelligence tests demonstrated in the context of the working group on the 
relationship between intelligence and differential fertility fueled much of the debate over 
the statement’s wording.  Uncertainty over the degree to which the tests measured innate 
ability or environmental influences prompted many experts to question the certitude with 
which the statement asserted intellectual equality between races.  Klineberg, who 
authored the influential and progressive pamphlet “Race and Psychology” as part of an 
UNESCO series entitled, “The Race Question in Modern Science,” particularly criticized 
the statement’s claims about intelligence tests.369  He corrected the statement, reflecting, 
“the tests do enable us to differentiate between what is due to innate capacity and what is 
the result of environmental influences, if these tests are applied to a group of individuals 
who have had more or less the same environmental opportunities.”  Opportunity for such 
369 Otto Klineberg, Race and Psychology: The Race Question in Modern Science (UNESCO, 1951). 
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comparison was severely limited by the fact that it was not possible to assume that 
different racial groups experienced the same environmental opportunities, and only 
therefore differentiation between environmental and genetic influences was not 
possible.370  Thus this tendency toward reticence and reservation inflected the responses 
of even those experts most invested in progressive interpretations of the available 
scientific data.  The eschewing of all ideology helped to bring about a kind of relativism 
that helped to produce a climate tolerant of the persistence of race science.
Many experts felt a need for caution.  They warned that predicating equal rights 
on equal innate intellectual endowments could prove deeply threatening to equality, 
should scientific evidence later suggest the inequality of innate endowments between 
races.  United States geneticist Leslie Clarence Dunn expressed his concerns to Angell 
that “some of the overstatements would, if exploited by opponents of racial equality, lead 
to discrediting of the entire portion of this statement which I believe to be otherwise 
reasonable and sound.”371  Another expert refuted the notion that abilities must be equal in 
order to assure equality of treatment and opportunity, and that “the effort to belittle 
[biological differences] on humanitarian grounds is a tactical mistake because if some 
one (sic) SHOULD prove them, you are out on a limb. Human beings deserve treatment 
as equals because of their quality of being human, and not because no one has yet found a 
way to prove some less brilliant than others.”372  United States geneticist Curt Stern 
agreed that the second statement was “somewhat colored by its intentions.”  Stern 
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likewise criticized what he believed was an overstatement, asserting that “if Science 
wants to destroy prejudice it can only hope to accomplish this if its position is as 
relatively unassailable as its very best founded facts.  Our knowledge of the importance 
of genetic and non genetic (sic) factors in accounting for group differences in mankind 
has not yet reached that position.”373  United States geneticist H.J. Muller agreed that it 
was “absurd” to state that psychological traits were not in any way subject to the laws of 
heredity.  On the contrary, Muller argued that “we do have every reason to infer that 
genetic differences, and even important ones, probably do exist between one living racial 
group of men and other, and our statement should not imply the contrary.”  However, “it 
would be a tragic mistake to suppose that the above realistic, scientific view leads to the 
conclusion that race prejudices are justified.”374  These experts actively sought to separate 
politics and ideology from science, viewing political and legal equality as separate and 
unrelated to genetic equality.  Apart from demonstrating the controversy surrounding the 
drafting of the statements, these experts’ testimonies highlight a reticence to discount the 
notion that genetic differences in innate mental abilities existed between races, adding 
further weight to the argument that the statements were never intended to remove race as 
a scientific or biological category.375  This tension helped to produce the ambiguous 
language of the statements and highlights the important role of politics and ideology in 
the creation of this very public international attack on race science.
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 Some of the experts consulted went so far as to accuse the statement of 
dogmatism, offering dramatic comparisons to fascist and communist science.  Dunn and 
Klineberg each offered criticisms to this effect.  The alleged “slanting of scientific data to 
support a social theory” provoked another critic to compare the actions of UNESCO to 
Hitler and the Soviet Union in reference to Lysenko.376  Although many critics who raised 
this point affirmed their support for social equality among all races, they expressed 
varying degrees of concern and alarm at what they perceived as the doctrinaire tone of 
the statements.  For example, Eugen Fischer, a German anthropologist and eugenicist 
who had been a member of the Nazi Party, expressed wariness at how the statements 
privileged “certain scientific doctrines as the only correct ones.”  He asserted his 
opposition “to the principle of advancing them as doctrines. The experiences of the past 
have strengthened my conviction that freedom of scientific inquiry is imperilled (sic) 
when any scientific findings or opinions are elevated, by an authoritative body into the 
position of doctrines.”377  This extreme sensitivity to dogmatism and doctrine colored the 
responses of may experts and created a dilemma for the political goals behind the drafting 
of the statements.  These accusations highlight the tendentious expert reception of the 
UNESCO statements on race with regard to questions of intellectual differences among 
or between races, and demonstrate the extremeness of the prerogative of ideology-free 
science in the postwar years and its influence on the statement of scientific knowledge 
and consensus.  
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As a result of multiple experts’ critique of the UNESCO statements for 
misrepresentation of scientific knowledge in the interest of advancing social goals, the 
language of the statements remained ambiguous and conservative.  Experts proved highly 
reticent to assert the innate equality of intellectual endowment between all races in 
positive and affirmative terms, and expressed their eagerness to err on the side of 
uncertainty.  This characterization of dissent was especially true for genetic experts.  The 
dialogue surrounding the UNESCO statements on race suggests the entrenchment and 
tenacity of racialized thinking about intelligence, even among those who considered 
themselves progressive and liberal.  The statements failed to deliver a strong ideological 
or political statement, and the human scientific community expressed reluctance to 
engage in ideological or political arguments of any kind.  This desire to insulate objective 
science from ideological taint ultimately placed the burden of proof on demonstrating the 
innate intellectual quality of all racial groups beyond a shadow of a doubt.  It furthermore 
separated legal equality from innate equality, treating the former as a political possibility 
and the latter as an uncertainty incapable of being addressed by extant scientific 
knowledge.  In consequence, the terms of the conversation remained focused on the 
identification of heritable, genetic endowment, rather than establishing the scientific 
irrelevance of hypothetical differences between individuals and groups.  This dilemma 
became progressively tangled in the politics of population control in the Cold War years.  
Yet even as they criticized the close and compromised relationship between science and 
the state in communist and fascist regimes that produced unobjective and ideological 
science, human scientific experts increasingly saw a political role for human science in 
the realm of international affairs.  
158
 
As nations increasingly viewed intelligence as a national resource and a form of 
human capital necessary for success in war and for security during times of international 
conflict, intelligence testing experts grew in importance to the state.  Experts perceived a 
decisive connection between population control, global order, and the expansion of 
democracy to the developing world.  These experts, particularly those from the United 
States, held the firm conviction that their scientific expertise was fundamental to the 
preservation of world peace.378  This proved especially true in the aftermath of the first 
displays of atomic power and initial stirrings of the Cold War.  The human scientific 
experts at UNESCO perceived a changing role for science vis-à-vis democracy.  
Although it never convened, the proposed 1951 conference on the “Role of the Social 
Scientist in World Affairs” presented a vision for the contributions of human science to 
the spread of democracy and freedom throughout the world.  The proposed conference 
represented, “for the Social Sciences Department, a most important educational aim for 
social science activities in general, and the Tensions Project in particular.”  It promised 
“wide practical implications, and which [would] furnish concrete indication that Unesco 
is dealing boldly and concretely with the problem of eliminating from the minds of men 
those ideas which lead to misunderstanding and conflict.”379  The discussion between 
human scientists across Europe and the United States in particular exposes the changing 
way in which these experts conceived of their disciplines in the service of nations and the 
maintenance of world peace and affairs.  The experts consulted on the conference 
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forthrightly expressed their conviction that the human sciences had an important role to 
play in the prevention and amelioration of international tensions that might lead to 
conflict and war.  The Cold War featured in the letters of these experts, who expressed 
concerns at a growing divide between east and west, along with concerns about the 
impact of ideology on the practice of science in the world.380  Though the conference was 
not held, likely for budgetary reasons, the insights and opinions of this internationally 
focused human science cohort highlight the changing implications of human science for 
the prevention of war and international conflict.    
Acting Director of UNESCO Robert C. Angell solicited the opinions of an 
international cohort of human scientists on the proposed meeting on the role of social 
scientists in world affairs.  Angell consulted twenty-five human scientists, predominantly 
from the United States, Great Britain, and other European countries, on whether such a 
conference would be desirable at that time.  Several experts voiced concerns about the 
viability of so large a conference and the possible threat of a reductionist debate narrowly 
focused on differences in ethical beliefs.381  A few expressed trepidation that such a 
meeting might be too broad in its aims.382  Even though many of these experts expressed 
doubts or worries, the majority responded positively and in favor of the conference’s 
potential to address the changing role of the social scientist in world affairs.  German 
sociologist Max Horkheimer captured the sentiment of many of those consulted when he 
wrote to Angell, “the task of an objective and profound diagnosis of the ills of modern 
380 David C. Engerman, “Social Science in the Cold War,” Isis 101(2) (June 2010), 393-400; David C. 
Engerman. "Bernath Lecture: American Knowledge and Global Power," Diplomatic History 31(4) 
(September 2007), 599-600; Herman, The Romance of American Psychology, 9-12, 124-126.
381 Robert Redfield to Robert C. Angell, March 27, 1950, File: unknown, Folder: 327.6 : 3 A 06: Meeting 
of Social Scientists on “The Role of Social Scientists in World Affairs,” UNESCO.
382 Quincy Wright to Robert C. Angell, March 22 , 1950, File; unknown, Folder: 327.6 : 3 A 06: Meeting 
of Social Scientists on “The Role of Social Scientists in World Affairs,” UNESCO.
160
society should not be neglected, even if such a diagnosis will not result immediately in 
positive suggestions.”383  These experts perceived a political role for their professions.  
While they continued to emphasize the need to sequester ideology from scientific 
practice, they simultaneously sought to expand their professional jurisdiction.  These 
experts saw the conference as an opportunity to construct a role for their professions in 
the resolution of international tensions in a decade significantly rocked by political, 
ideological, and military conflict. 
 The respondents overwhelmingly stressed the importance of neutrality in their 
feedback to Angell.  They recognized that important national distinctions between the 
professions might prove problematic in such a conference, in spite of concerted efforts 
over the decades to internationalize the tools and methods of these very professions as in 
the case of intelligence testings particularly.  United States psychologist Gordon Allport 
expressed particular concern that the conference not become “a sounding board for 
national interests.”384  Allport still expressed desire for a trial attempt of a conference that 
superseded national needs in order to achieve international needs.  If this could be 
achieved, “the world has turned a corner and adopted a promising method for healing its 
wounds.”385  Pleas for objectivity closely followed those of neutrality.  Horkheimer 
emphasized, “it should be kept in mind that it is not one of the least functions of modern 
social science that it is capable, by treating controversial issues in an unbiased and 
detached way, to dispel part of the emotional clouds, which in Europe usually surround 
social and political problems.  Social science is by its very existence an anti-dote against 
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the climate of hate and violence.”386 The feedback on the proposed conference thus 
highlighted a consciousness of differences in the practice of human science in the United 
States compared with Europe.  For some of the experts consulted, the United States 
served as an example to all of Europe for its emphasis on application over theory.  For 
others, fear that such national distinctions might stymie progress lessened the practicality 
and desirability of the proposed conference.
This feedback exemplified the growing political divide between the first and 
second world as the Cold War conflict heightened.  These particular anxieties revolved 
around broader concerns about the global impact of communism, and highlight the extent 
to which experts from democratic nations viewed communism as synonymous with 
ideological science, and democracy as synonymous with detached objectivity.  The 
respondents contrasted scientific practice in the democratic West with Lysenkoism in the 
East, describing the former as objective and the latter as ideological.  One expert’s 
feelings were pessimistic at the potential of scientists to play any profound role in world 
affairs as long as this political and ideological divide persisted.  He confided in Angell, 
“my feeling is that world affairs are so bedeviled by the insoluble antagonism between 
East and West; so that little, if anything, can come out of any meeting – let it be of social 
scientists, atomic experts, philosophers or any other sort of specialists – while the 
Moscow centre of anti-liberal and anti-humanistic activities hold sway over half our 
earth.”387  Another expert expected that “the East-West conflict will be at the back of all 
our minds. I don't suppose that it will be possible to get any Russian social scientists. I 
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would however, like to see the conference oriented around the problem of ritualising (sic) 
the east-west (sic) conflict and turning it into more fruitful channels.”388  The communist 
approach to human science was ultimately incompatible, in the minds of these experts, 
with the democratic approach.  These human scientific experts therefore remained 
pessimistic in their ability to achieve a truly international role for their professions that 
could bridge the divide between the first and second world so long as communism 
persisted.
Above all else, the experts consulted by Angell emphasized an active role for the 
social scientist in world affairs.  In their letters, these human scientists drew attention to 
their professions’ unique abilities to bring their research to bear upon the most urgent and 
human problems of the world, which was becoming increasingly interconnected even as 
it was shaken by tension and conflict.  One expert expressed “at the present time social 
scientists, other scientists, administrators and policy makers are all confused as to what 
the social scientist can do, or how much he might be expected to do; and as long as this 
confusion exists, social scientists will not pull their fair weight in the world.”389  The 
proposed conference was an opportunity to articulate these capabilities to the 
international community.  Gunnar Myrdal likewise saw great potential in the conference, 
stating “we must strive for a broad view of the social process in full perspective, bringing 
together its economic, political, and psychological aspects, in a way which both explains 
how things happen, and provides a basis on which effective policies of control can be 
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established.”390  In the view of these experts, international cooperation and collaboration 
by human scientists would urge the application of human scientific knowledge to solve 
the problems of human suffering.  International tensions had created opportunities for 
such exchanges, while simultaneously complicating them.  
War and international conflict were thus crucial in the reshaping of the human 
sciences over the twentieth century.  As tensions continued to build, the human sciences 
sought advisory roles in international affairs.  The Tensions project supplied UNESCO 
with the mandate to deal “boldly and concretely with the problem of eliminating from the 
minds of men those ideas which lead to misunderstanding and conflict.”391  In the human 
sciences, this doubled as a mandate to establish professional authority to speak to the 
issues causing social tension internationally.  This is apparent in the proposed UNESCO 
conference on the role of the social scientist in human affairs, the working groups on the 
statements on race, and the working group on the relationship between intelligence and 
differential fertility.  As the natural sciences grew in importance to national governments 
for defense and national resources, so too did the human sciences.  The problem of the 
intelligence levels of populations in particular increased the significance of the human 
sciences to nation states as experts and nations increasingly understood intelligence as a 
kind of human capital and national resource of crucial importance during times of war 
and conflict.   
The United States government began to formally recognize intelligence as a vital 
resource in the years between the Second World War and Cold War through both military 
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and federal initiatives.  In the years following the passage of the 1948 Selective Service 
Act, military officials explored the possibility of exempting or deferring service for 
talented individuals on the basis of their “potential worth,” beyond those in critical 
professions.392  The 1948 act required all male citizens to register for Selective Service on 
their eighteenth birthday.  Under the leadership of General Lewis B. Hershey, the 
Selective Service System began to considered options for draft-deferment based on 
intelligence test scores in the context of the beginnings of the Korean War.393  In 1950, as 
proposals for a policy of draft-deferment based on I.Q. testing emerged, Henry Chauncey 
– head of the Educational Testing Service, founded in 1947 to administer the SAT exam – 
approached General Hershey and entered into a contract to develop and administer the 
draft-deferment test.  The following year, President Truman signed an executive order 
authorizing the test and the Selective Service System entered into a contract with the 
Educational Testing Service to begin work on it.394  In this way, the United States 
government discriminated between draftees, preserving the most intelligent from combat 
with the expectation that their unique abilities might be applied elsewhere to the benefit 
of the nation.
The proposal for the draft-deferment intelligence test marked the greatest testing 
endeavor on the part of the United States Army in time of peace.395  It reflected the degree 
to which mass applications of intelligence tests had become normalized in the United 
States Armed Forces.  Although Chauncey firmly advised General Hershey against 
calling the tests “intelligence tests,” they were scaled for easy comparison with the Army 
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General Classification Test, which closely resembled other I.Q. tests.396  Approximately 
two-thirds of test-takers surpassed the score required for eligibility for draft-deferment; 
however, the policy sparked considerable public criticism.  Many saw this path to draft-
deferment as an exemption for the privileged few.397  Although the G.I. Bill had been in 
force since 1944, and higher education was expanding, a university or college education 
was still out of reach for the vast majority of Americans.  This was particularly the case 
for poor and minority Americans.  In spite of the unpopularity of the policy, the United 
States Armed Forces determined that it was in the interest of national security to postpone 
and redirect the military service of the most intelligent.  This decision reflected changing 
views on intelligence as a vital national resource worthy of protection and investment.  In 
response to changing views on intelligence and the Cold War, the government began to 
channel its support into legislation designed to maximize the intelligence of its citizens 
and exempt the brightest among these from certain obligations of citizenship, specifically, 
selective service.   
In addition to adjustments made to the Selective Service System, the federal 
government increased expenditure on higher education, particularly in science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics, in the name of national defense.  The Cold 
War and developing views on intelligence as human capital were largely responsible for 
this policy shift.  In its nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, the United States saw the 
maximization of its intellectual resources as critical to its ultimate victory in the Cold 




immensely to the expansion of government funding of academic research.398  In 1958, the 
United States Congress passed the National Defense Education Act.  The act was drafted 
largely in response to the launch of the Soviet Union satellite, Sputnik, the year before 
and the growing feeling that the United States students were falling behind their Cold 
War enemy in science and math.  The act funneled federal funding into universities with 
the goal of catching up to the Soviets in the international arms race.399  This act was part 
of a larger movement toward the investment of government resources in the 
maximization of citizens’ intellectual potential in the name of national defense.  
Institutions of higher education responded to this wartime drive.  For instance, in 1952 
the College Board initiated what would become the Advanced Placement Program, which 
allowed the brightest students to take courses in high school for college credit.  Early on, 
students were typically selected for this program according to their I.Q.400  The defense 
relevant fields of biology, chemistry, physics, and mathematics numbered among the first 
subjects in which exams were offered.401  These developments marked the growing 
national recognition of intelligence as a vital resource for defense.  This recognition 
coincided with growing acceptance of intelligence testing – particularly group 
intelligence testing – and the validity of intelligence test results.
The increased popular acceptance of the validity of intelligence tests 
corresponded with a wider embrace of the profession of psychology more generally.  In 
1957, Life Magazine ran a five-part series on psychology written by journalist Ernest 
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Havemann.  The second installment elaborated on advances and achievements in 
psychometrics.  Havemann declared, since Binet’s initial intelligence test, “individual and 
group tests have been perfected and the initials – I.Q. – have become a household 
phrase.”  In Havemann’s popular representation of the field of psychometrics, by “giving 
intelligence tests to hundreds of thousands of people the psychologists have established 
beyond doubt that intellectual capacity is inherited.”402  Thus the crucial question of the 
heritability of intelligence, which the UNESCO working group on the relationship 
between differential fertility and intelligence and the UNESCO committee that produced 
the statements on race attempted to address, was brought before the public.  Havemann 
explained, intelligence as a trait was not directly inherited, and thus “college professors 
sometimes have dull sons and stupid parents sometimes have brilliant children, or the 
same family may have one bright, one average and one dull child.”403  However, “it works 
out by and large that brighter parents tend to have brighter children.  The children of 
professional men have been shown to have the highest I.Q.’s (averaging around 115) and 
those of day laborers the lowest (around 96).”404  In its popular distillation of information 
on intelligence tests, the article reproduced old eugenic and race science tropes that the 
poor on average had less intelligent children than the middle and professional classes.   It 
raised, but did not confront, the socioeconomic and racial implications of the proposition 
that intelligence was a heritable trait.  
Yet Havemann did acknowledge a role for environment in the development of 
intelligence, however controversially.  He informed readers, “a child born into a poor 
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home often shows improvement in I.Q. if adopted by a more intelligent and stimulating 
family, and it has been found that Negro children born into backward rural families 
improve steadily if they move to the city.  Nevertheless,” he noted, “the amount of 
improvement is always limited by the mental capacity that was there at birth.”405  
Havemann insisted that intelligence testing data proved intelligence was heritable, and 
that environment could only maximize innate potential.  His assertion that professional 
occupation corresponded with innate potential implied without directly stating that 
socioeconomic divisions were symptomatic of unequal innate capacities.  Within the 
United States population, Havemann reported, “46 percent of us score between 90 and 
109” and were considered of “average” intelligence.  Only 1 percent of the population 
was “very superior,” while 15 percent were “low average,” 6 percent were “borderline,” 
and 3 percent were “mental defectives.”406  Havemann explained that scientists were 
already engaged in research that might one day allow them to isolate the genes for 
intelligence.  He described a “most provocative experiment” in which 142 rats were 
divided into intelligent and unintelligent groups, based on their ability to learn to 
memorize a maze.  These rats were then mated within their respective groups and their 
progeny became increasingly unequal in intelligence over the course of several 
generations.  Havemann concluded, “doubtless this experiment has some theoretical 
implications for the human race,” even if “it hardly promises us a breed of super-geniuses 
for tomorrow.”407  The theoretical possibility of maximizing intelligence in humans 
through selective reproduction echoed the intentions of the eugenics of a bygone era.  The 





environmental explanations for human difference invoked by the UNESCO experts on 
the committees on race and on the relationship between differential fertility and 
intelligence.  The article thus represented old ways of thinking about intelligence in a new 
language born out of the postwar and post-Holocaust context, demonstrating the lingering 
influence of eugenics and race science in their latency.  
  
Conversations about intelligence in the postwar years increasingly turned to the 
language of capital.  Experts and nations continued to conceive of intelligence as a type 
of human capital and national resource, especially in the context of the Cold War.  Human 
scientists entered into this dialogue in profound ways.  In claiming the authority to define 
and identify innate intellectual ability for their professions, they advocated for an 
increased role for human science in world affairs and the distillation of international 
conflict through the resolution of population problems, especially those related to 
intelligence.  In response to the altered political and social climes of the postwar period 
and the discrediting of race science and eugenics, these human scientists reconceptualized 
intelligence as a complex genetic and environmental phenomenon.  This 
reconceptualization, however, was highly attentive to race and class differences.  Experts 
more and more concluded “society is deprived of untapped resources of human ability” 
as a result of older methods of identifying intelligence.408  The UNESCO Meeting of 
Physical Anthropologists and Geneticists for a Definition of the Concept of Race 
determined “the most urgent task is to provide opportunities for education and 
development for the underprivileged everywhere, both underprivileged classes and 
408 “Standard Intelligence Tests Held Remiss in Evaluating Children's Mental Capabilities,” New York 
Times, March 23, 1950, Folder 5290, Box 496, Series 1.3, FA058, GEB, RAC.
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underprivileged societies and nations.  This will release immense reservoirs of capacity 
which are now unutilized; and, once accomplished, will permit us to determine more 
accurately the residual genetic differences.”409  In this way, environment became a way of 
discussing populations’ intellectual potential and paths to maximizing that potential.  This 
potential was largely discussed utilizing a language of socioeconomic difference that 
masked racial tensions and discriminatory inclinations that were no longer socially 
acceptable means of identifying human difference in the post-Holocaust moment.  It 
moreover created space for the expectation that equal environmental conditions could 
reveal innate genetic inequalities between groups, an expectation that race scientists and 
eugenicists would exploit in the decades to come.
During the Cold War, governments and scientists undertook initiatives to increase 
intelligence, rather than merely prevent its decline, in the hopes of maximizing national 
intellectual potential.  War and international conflict had created opportunities for the rise 
of populations-based intelligence testing that coincided with the professionalization of 
demography, the growing relevance of population studies to international affairs, and the 
increasing legitimacy of the field of genetics.  The promise of genetics was strong for 
those invested in questions of population quality control.  The turn to genetics did not, 
however, necessarily imply a departure from race science and eugenics.  The UNESCO 
group on the “Social and International Implications of Science” celebrated that 
“knowledge about genetics and human heredity is already sufficiently advanced to be of 
direct practical value in genetic prognosis, i.e., the furnishing of genetic advice in 
409 Julian Huxley, “Meeting of Physical Anthropologists and Geneticists for a Definition of the Concept of 
Race, Working Paper, Addendum II, Note on Possible Racial Differences in Psychological Characters,” 
March 31, 1951, File: UNESCO/SS/RACE/CONF.2/2, Folder: Folder: 323.12 A 102/064(44) “51” - 
Statement on Race - Expert Meeting of Physical Anthropologists & Geneticists - Paris 1951, Box: 323.12 A 
102 Part II - 323.12 A 102/064 (44) “51,” UNESCO.
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prospective marriages and families... and finally in the broad field of engenics (sic).  
Human genetics has placed the equality of man on a solid scientific foundation.  It has 
proved a powerful factor in fighting and liquidating racial antagonism on a scientific 
front.”410  In many instances, however, postwar genetics built its foundation on prewar 
eugenics.411  Even as anxieties about declining levels of national intelligence faded, 
concerns about differential fertility remained in the context of endeavors to maximize 
national intelligence, demonstrating the adaptability of race science and eugenics to 
changing political climes and contexts. 
The semantics of population difference perpetuated numerous assumptions that 
had fueled race science and eugenics before the Second World War.  As the following 
chapter explores, genetics and eugenics shared an at times overlapping trajectory on the 
question of human difference.  The idea of human intelligence as human capital that had 
gained traction in the immediate postwar years would further animate questions of nature 
and nurture in explanations of population differences.  Population genetics, and the 
intersecting aims of psychology, demography, and eugenics in the proceeding Cold War 
years would help to further cement the transformation of intellect into a kind of human 
capital and national resource.  This transformation transpired alongside critical 
developments in eugenics and race science that led them back to prominence by the late 
1960s.
410 Memorandum on Group Discussions on the Social and International Implications of Science, File 
unknown, Folder: 5 : 304 Social Implications of Science, 3.
411 Stern, Telling Genes; Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Reinvention of Eugenics and Reemergence of Race Science
“A storm is brewing over a suggestion by a leading educational psychologist that 
intelligence is determined largely by heredity and cannot be significantly altered by 
improving environment,” a New York Times article informed its readers.412  This leading 
psychologist was Arthur Jensen, an educational psychologist at the University of 
California, Berkeley.  According to the article, Jensen’s research determined that 
“compensatory education programs designed to raise the intelligence of disadvantaged 
children by enriching their cultural surroundings are misdirected.”  In a stark rejection of 
the past decade’s embrace of a more environmental approach to understanding the 
development of intelligence and subsequent effort to minimize environmental inequalities 
between groups, Jensen proposed that “the measured mental differences between racial 
and ethnic groups are as much a part of group identity as skin color, hair texture, and 
blood chemistry.”413  Jensen’s article appeared to represent a sudden reemergence of race 
science following its discrediting in the wake of the Holocaust.  Yet in spite of their 
discrediting, race science and eugenics did not disappear during these years of liberal 
scientific consensus.  In response to changing political climes, race science entered into a 
period of latency while eugenics underwent reinvention at the hands of new leadership in 
the 1960s.  
412 Robert Reinhold, “Psychologist Arouses Storm by Linking Heredity to I.Q.,” New York Times, March 
30, 1969, 52.
413 Reinhold, “Psychologist Arouses Storm by Linking Heredity to I.Q.,” 52; Ivan Kaye, “Nature versus 
Nurture: An Old Debate is Revived,” The Sun, April 6, 1969, K2.
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The survival of race science and eugenics was largely the result of their 
adaptability to changing political climes and the liberal scientific community’s 
repudiation of science for ideological aims.  The reticence of experts to dismiss concerns 
about the decline of nations’ intelligence in relation to differential fertility, along with 
their reluctance to offer statements or remarks that might be interpreted as ideological, 
helped to construct an environment permissive to the perpetuation of race science and 
eugenics.  This was evident in the UNESCO committee on the relationship of differential 
fertility to intelligence as well as the UNESCO committee that produced the statements 
on race.  In their efforts to not overstate available scientific knowledge, these experts 
were not able to extinguish race science definitively.  Instead of disappearing, race 
science entered into a period of latency until conditions changed and eugenicists actively 
engaged in processes of reinventing eugenics.  As experts increasingly invoked the 
language of socioeconomic difference in place of racial difference, race scientists readily 
adapted to the changing political clime, and would continue to adapt as the political 
context changed leading into the late 1960s and the 1970s.  In revisiting this era, it is 
possible trace a narrative of the continuity of race science and eugenics, rather than one 
of rupture.
This chapter highlights the role of newly formed relationships between 
demographers, geneticists, and psychologists in the perpetuation of eugenic thought and 
practices in the decades following the Second World War.  In so doing it builds on the 
work of scholars who have demonstrated the longevity of race science and eugenics in 
the twentieth century.414  As anxiety over the relationship between differential fertility and 
414 Alexandra Minna Stern, Telling Genes: The Story of Genetic Counseling in America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2012); Nathaniel Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection: How Genes 
Became the Heart of American Medicine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Tracy Teslow, 
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declining levels of intelligence subsided in the wake of a mass of data disproving declines 
in national intelligence, I.Q. experts redirected their energies toward recommendations 
for the maximization of intellectual capital and in the process reinvented eugenics.  
Reversing their allegations that levels of intelligence were declining, experts reframed 
their concerns around the growing anxiety that nations were failing to exploit their 
populations’ potential fully.  This anxiety focused expert attention once again on those 
groups who consistently underperformed on inteligence tests, which ultimately created an 
opening for the reassertion of race science and eugenics.  War and international conflict 
in the Cold War years further ingrained the idea that intelligence was a form of human 
capital and a vital national resource that should be maximized.  During time of war and 
international uncertainty especially, this resource came to be viewed by experts as 
necessary for states to maximize.  An intelligence race transpired in tandem with the Cold 
War arms race.  Concerns that United States students were falling behind their Soviet 
counterparts drove the institution of Advanced Placement courses in mathematics and the 
sciences, and the space race established profound ties between government and academic 
research in the natural sciences.  Human science experts as well sought to carve a niche 
for themselves vis-a-vis the state through their claims to expertise on intelligence.  The 
idea of intelligence as human capital, which had gained traction in the 1950s, continued 
to feature in conversations about intellectual differences within and between populations 
into the late 1950s and the early 1960s.  The maximization of intelligence and the impact 
of differential fertility on national levels of intelligence largely animated the major 
Constructing Race: The Science of Bodies and Cultures in American Anthropology (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); Perrin Selcer. “Beyond the Cephalic Index: Negotiating Politics to Produce 
UNESCO’s Scientific Statements on Race” Current Anthropology 55(S5) (April 2012): S173-S184.
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population conferences of this decade that were instrumental in the reframing of 
eugenics, its applications, and prerogatives.
Race and class were all but absent from this 1960s reframing.  Intelligence was 
increasingly viewed by psychologists, geneticists, and other experts as not a question of 
nature or nurture, but a question of how environmental factors conditioned the 
development of genetic endowments.  The UNESCO statements on race, as well as the 
work of experts like Otto Klineberg and Allison Davis, identified environmental 
conditions as the cause of seeming differences in native intelligence between racial and 
class groups.  Environmental explanations for differences in group and individual 
intelligence, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, created an opportunity and a 
language for race science to make what seemed to be a sudden reappearance in the 1970s. 
In their rebuke of race science and eugenics, experts demonstrated a reticence to overstate 
scientific knowledge or engage in ideologically-motivated science.  Thus the postwar 
liberal scientific consensus, in its effort to practice sound science, inadvertently helped to 
create the conditions for the evident return of race science and eugenics following the 
lack of success of efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to equalize the environmental conditions 
of all.  In spite of the widespread turn toward environmentalism, blatant attacks on the 
idea of equality between racial groups still reached broad audiences.  As discussions 
about intellectual human capital shifted from decline toward maximization, overt racialist 
assumptions sporadically surfaced against the background of the ongoing the Civil Rights 
Movement and provoked experts to engage new publics in response.  The passage of the 
Civil Rights Act in 1964, the revision of the national origins immigration quota policy in 
the 1965 Immigration Act, the 1965 Moynihan Report, and President Lyndon B. 
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Johnson’s “War on Poverty” and expanding welfare programs all provided the backdrop 
for a rapidly changing United States society.  This expansion of efforts to improve the 
opportunities of all and minimize racial and class inequality ultimately elicited a backlash 
from components within the scientific community – whose views would be represented in 
the work of Arthur Jensen, William Shockley, and Richard Herrnstein – who argued 
strongly against the efficacy of government intervention in the maximization of I.Q. for 
certain racial groups.  Arthur Jensen’s controversial thesis that black students were 
genetically less intelligent than white students would help to spark a culture war that 
would span the decades to follow.
The maximization of population potential was seized upon by the American 
Eugenics Society as a platform for reinventing itself in the service of nations.  These self-
styled “new eugenicists” viewed population genetics, psychology, and demography as the 
foundational disciplines of their new vision for eugenics.  Contrary to beliefs that 
eugenics disappeared in the postwar era, it continued to thrive in multiple contexts and to 
attract the interests of new groups.415  Beginning in the 1960s, the American Eugenics 
Society seized upon population genetics as the legitimizing discipline for its new eugenic 
vision.  Through its invocation of population genetics as the chosen handmaiden of 
eugenics, the society endeavored to craft a narrative of eugenics that utilized its past 
offenses as a foil for distinguishing eugenics’ future instrumentality to states.416  The new 
eugenic vision drew on population genetics, guided by demography and psychology, to 
maximize population quality through state intervention.  In the views of members of the 
American Eugenics Society, scientific breakthroughs in medical birth control, and 
415 Stern, Telling Genes; Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection.
416 Edmund Ramsden, “Confronting the Stigma of Eugenics: Genetics, Demography and the Problems of 
Population,” Social Studies of Science 39(6) (December 2009): 853-884.
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advances in genetic knowledge of native intelligence, character, and personality, assured 
the legitimacy of putting a eugenic plan into action.  
This chapter demonstrates the malleability of race science and the persistence of 
eugenics in the 1960s.  As the world grew more concerned with the conservation of 
resources and the control of global populations, eugenicists took advantage of the 
changing times.  Conservation was “intimately bound to the matter of population control, 
to the prevention of war, to the ultimate welfare of man, and, right now, to the ideal of 
‘The Great Society.’”417  I.Q. experts of the 1960s viewed population control, the 
maintenance of world peace, and the maximization of human resources, alongside the 
conservation of natural resources, as a means of building up societies and nations.  In 
viewing eugenics and race science as movements that were highly responsive to changing 
climes, it becomes clear that the work of the neohereditarians of the 1970s, and even the 
emergence of neohereditarianism in the 1990s, was not an aberration, but a development 
along a continuum.  
The Princeton Conferences on Population Genetics and Demography demonstrate 
this continuity.  The Princeton Conferences were organized by the American Eugenics 
Society and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation’s Population Council with the express 
intention of bringing demographers and geneticists into conversation to address current 
issues confronting population genetics.  Though the focus of the early conferences 
remained on genetics and demography, psychology was recognized as an essential 
417 Preston E. Cloud, Jr., “Terrestrial Resources and the Future of Man, from Preston E. Cloud,” February 
7, 1965, Folder: 1963, Box: 105, Series 4, Population Council, Accession I, FA210, Rockefeller Archive 
Center (RAC), 2. 
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collaborative discipline in population genetics.  Secretary of the American Eugenics 
Society Frederick Osborn was a driving force behind the organization of the conferences, 
which marked a crucial opportunity for greater unification across disciplinary divides to 
pave the way toward a more complete population genetics that integrated the particular 
expertise of demographers and psychologists.  In Osborn’s words, “the purpose of the 
conference was to discuss [demographers’ and geneticists’] joint interests in present 
genetic trends.”  Demographers would provide demographic information on “differential 
fertility and mortality as between people of different measurable types, marriage, mate 
selection, consanguinity,” while “the geneticist must take this material and tell us how it 
is affecting the distribution and frequency of genes.”  Together the geneticist and 
demographer might assess the “genetically determined structural limitations on 
behavioral development,” or, the upper limits of genetic capacity.418  The conferences 
drew a wide swath of population geneticists, demographers, and psychologists interested 
in questions of differential fertility, assortative mating, and population-based assessments 
of I.Q.  The experts who participated in these conferences viewed population genetics as 
a necessarily interdisciplinary exercise.  Osborn summed up the sentiment of the 
conferences’ participants when he stated, “population genetics must draw on medicine 
and medical genetics for criteria and hereditary factors in defect and susceptibility to 
disease; on psychology for methods of measurement and analysis of the interaction of 
heredity and environment in the development of personality, intelligence, and character, 
and on sociology and more particularly demography for rates of deaths and births, mating 
patterns and the relative or decrease of particular genetic types, and the social and 
418 Frederick Osborn to Dudley Kirk, October 26, 1964, Folder: AES – Princeton Conferences, 1st #1, Box: 
8, American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA (APS.)
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physical factors which determine these rates.”419  Population genetics thus depended to a 
significant extent upon interdisciplinary human scientific knowledge and expertise.  The 
Princeton Conferences heralded the beginning of the process of bridging disciplinary 
gaps between professions that had hitherto remained relatively distinct in their parallel 
projects of assessing the qualities and potential of various human groups.  The 
conferences also represented one of several postwar efforts aimed at the reformation of 
eugenics.
Five Princeton Conferences convened in the 1960s.420  In contrast with the sundry 
interdisciplinary population-focused conferences of geneticists and social scientists in the 
1950s, the focus and tenor of the conferences signaled a shift away from preoccupations 
with declining levels of intelligence toward interest in the maximization of levels of 
intelligence.  In spite of this change in attitude, assortative mating and differential fertility 
remained issues of primary interest among human scientists invested in the assessment 
and increase of national levels of intelligence.  In his memorandum to conference 
attendees, Osborn emphasized the focus of the initial conference would be on “studies of 
differential rates of reproduction of individuals differing in mental and emotional traits of 
character, personality and intelligence,” areas of research that had been at the heart of the 
intelligence controversy.  The initial conference was held under the general assumption 
that “differences in the psychological traits of individuals and families in similar 
environments are at least to some degree related to differences in genetic inheritance.”  
Though genetics was thus recognized as a driving force behind population variation in 
419 Memorandum from Frederick Osborn, September 24, 1964, Box: 8, Folder: AES – Princeton 
Conferences, 1st #2, Box: 8, American Eugenics Society Papers, APS.
420 The first Princeton Conference was held from October 16-17, 1964, the second from November 18-20, 
1965, the third from October 20-22, 1966, the fourth from November 9-11, 1967, and the fifth from 
November 6-8, 1969.
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intelligence, Osborn notably bracketed the question of the extent of the genetic basis of 
this variation during the first conference.  Apart from the controversial nature of the 
question of the genetic basis for population differences, often demarcated in intelligence 
testing data along class and racial lines, the first conferences lacked balanced 
participation from psychologists.421  It was thus decided that once a more interdisciplinary 
conference body was achieved, the attendees would proceed in their efforts to assess the 
extent of the genetic basis of psychological differences between and among populations.
Transparency and legitimacy in the conference proceedings were prioritized from 
the start.  This was in part related to the effort of the American Eugenics Society to 
restyle both itself and eugenics as a reinvented and valid enterprise with the ability to 
redress important national and international issues facing the postwar world.  Osborn was 
the public face of this renaissance.  A widely know philanthropist, scientist, and General 
during the Second World War, Osborn offered a new and authoritative narrative that 
juxtaposed the new eugenics with the old.  The conference organizers and attendees were 
keen to utilize the conferences as a foundation for developing this new vision for 
eugenics, which largely redefined eugenics as population genetics.  Speaking for the 
American Eugenics Society, Osborn identified one of the society’s foremost goals as 
“fostering a closer relationship of population geneticists with demographers and other 
social scientists” who shared “a common interest in factors affecting the quality of 
population.”422  This recognition of a shared venture between geneticists and social 
scientists was essential to the rehabilitation of eugenics in the postwar era.  Demographer 
421 Memorandum from Frederick Osborn, September 24, 1964, Folder: AES – Princeton Conferences, 1st 
#2, Box: 8, American Eugenics Society Papers, APS.
422 Clyde V. Kiser, “Types of Demographic Data of Possible Relevance to Population Genetics,” Folder: 
AES – Princeton Conferences, 1st, #3, Box: 8, American Eugenics Society Papers, APS, 1.
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and conference participant Clyde V. Kiser affirmed that “there is an interaction between 
genetic and demographic trends and that a better understanding of this reciprocal 
relationship is needed for the fuller development of each discipline and for the fuller 
development of any rational eugenic program or public policy concerned with health, 
welfare, and quality of the population.”423  This new vision for eugenics, however, 
retained significant vestiges of the old eugenics.  Like eugenics prior to the Second World 
War, it focused on the differential qualities of populations, yet broke with the past by 
emphasizing the maximization of quality rather than the prevention of degeneration.  In 
spite of this change, the new eugenicists still endeavored to craft national policy solutions 
to population issues as did their predecessors, and innate intelligence remained the focus 
of eugenic concerns.
One critical issue hindered the American Eugenics Society’s progress toward a re-
envisioning of eugenics as the handmaiden of population genetics.  This was the inability 
of psychologists to agree upon a finite definition of intelligence.  Until psychologists 
could reach consensus on a definition of intelligence, its origins and influences, with 
certitude, eugenic proposals to maximize a population’s intelligence would rest on shaky 
science.  In his paper for the initial Princeton Conference, Kiser submitted, “perhaps one 
of the fondest dreams of the population geneticist is to secure a simple and workable yet 
reliable and meaningful direct measure of native intelligence.  Many of the so-called 
studies on the relationship of intelligence to given variables have suffered from the 
inadequacy of the measure of intelligence itself.”424  This issue was hardly new.  




measured, had characterized much internal discussion between psychologists and 
psychometricians since the first intelligence test applications.  This issue had similarly 
plagued the experts who gathered to form the UNESCO working group on the 
relationship between intelligence and differential fertility, hindering their ability to fully 
elaborate the relationship between intelligence, environment, and genetics.  The transition 
toward population-based intelligence testing away from an initial focus on individuals, 
combined with the professionalization of genetics, however, rendered the question of the 
true definition of intelligence and its formation newly relevant.  This question 
undergirded all of the conferences’ work on differential fertility, assortative mating, and 
assessments of levels of intelligence within and between populations.  The answer to this 
question was highly germane to those who sought to legitimate eugenics as a means of 
deriving science-driven policy solutions to population issues nationally and 
internationally.  
The conference attendees recognized an important development in the field of 
psychology: the breakdown of any semblance of a dichotomy between environment and 
heredity.  Increasingly, psychologists, demographers, and geneticists viewed environment 
and genetics as deeply interrelated phenomena in the determination of I.Q.425  During the 
initial conference participants agreed that the development of intelligence was analogous 
to the development of stature.  Like height, intelligence was controlled by multiple 
genetic factors and yet was also significantly influenced by environmental factors.  They 
compared I.Q. tests to rulers, and I.Q. to units of measurement.426  This analogy preserved 
425 Transcripts No. 8, American Eugenics Society Workshop on Population Genetics and Demography, 
Princeton Inn, Princeton, New Jersey, Friday, October 16, 1964, Folder: AES – Princeton Conferences, 1st, 
Transcripts #8, Box: 8, American Eugenics Society Papers, APS, 186-196.
426 Ibid, 195-196.
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the relevance of I.Q. tests as tools of measurement and comparison while allowing for the 
ambiguity and uncertainty created by a more environmental approach to understanding 
the determination of intelligence.  In spite of the lack of professional consensus on the 
exact weight and relationship of factors responsible for I.Q. and performance on 
intelligence tests, the conference proceedings focused on the question of innate 
intelligence and its measurement among populations, recognizing that “the relation of 
family size to intelligence of parents is a question of importance not only to geneticists 
and demographers but to all interested in questions of social welfare and public policy.”427 
In Kiser’s words, “about all we can say with assurance is that it is jointly influenced by 
genetic and environmental factors.  However, the position of many eugenicists today is 
that whatever relation of fertility to intelligence is not a situation to which either the 
geneticist or the social engineer can view with indifference.”428  Even though 
inconclusive findings on the precise relationship between differential fertility, 
intelligence, genetics, and environment remained evasive, the conferences reinforced the 
importance of the subject for both nations and the new eugenics.
In spite of their unanimous agreement that the resolution of the relationship 
between differential fertility and intelligence was paramount, conference participants 
regularly confronted disciplinary differences, which the conferences were largely 
intended to address and overcome.  The road to achieving this goal was complicated by 
each discipline’s assurance of its own particular contributions.  The conferences 
427 Kiser, “Types of Demographic Data of Possible Relevance to Population Genetics,” older: AES – 
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highlighted several areas of disagreement and contestation between professions.  Osborn 
often complained that geneticists had a poor grasp on psychological data, and that the 
demographers proved only “slightly more aware,” which he attributed to their social 
scientific background.429  One psychologist (who was later accused of being less a 
psychologist than a geneticist by another attendee) expressed concern that many of the 
geneticists present were “inclined to take some of the older data on the heritability of the 
I.Q. and accept it in a very uncritical way.”430  One of the issues of greatest contention 
was the relative usefulness of I.Q., psychometric tests, and how best to interpret their 
data.  One geneticist made the comment that culture-free tests would in fact defeat the 
very purpose of I.Q. tests, which were most useful as predictors of success in society, an 
argument that was contemporaneously made in justification of the SAT, which was 
criticized early on for its favoring of students from privileged socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  Since social success was closely related to the cultural mores of the society 
in question, a culture-free test would be unable to produce useful forecasts of individual 
success.431  One psychologist corroborated this claim that the “intelligence” measured by 
the tests was culturally-determined, stating that “it is important not to forget intelligence 
is not something measured by I.Q. tests.  It is something that is developed and there is a 
certain, undoubtedly a certain genetic component to this but the expression might be 
greatly limited.... [and since] intelligence is something which is developed, you see it is 
429 Frederick Osborn to Dr. Gardner Lindzey, January 20, 1965, Folder: AES – Princeton Conferences, 2nd, 
June 1962-May 1965, Box: 8, American Eugenics Society Papers, APS. 
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not going to be culture-free because no child is brought up without culture, in a 
vacuum”432  The social scientists in attendance were thus the likeliest to be critical of 
cultural biases in the tests and to call their efficacy into question on those grounds. 
Though the dialogue at the conferences was often characterized by disciplinary 
disagreement, the conferences were planned with the explicit intention to work across 
and through professional divides in order to achieve a comprehensive approach to 
population issues and the problem of the relationship of differential fertility to 
intelligence.  The second Princeton Conference, in 1965, was similarly organized “to 
bring the experience and wisdom of several disciplines to bear on the problem of 
measuring variations in human heredity and of determining the selective forces which 
operate to change gene frequencies.”  Its ancillary mission was to combat the 
“overwhelming tide of sociological and social determinism which has almost 
monopolized thinking on these questions in the social sciences.”433  In an effort to 
institutionalize more natural channels of communication and exchange between social 
and natural science professions invested in population questions, this conference 
produced a proposal for a Training Program in Population Genetics and Demography to 
be hosted at the University of Chicago, the same institution that had supported Allison 
Davis’s research on culture free tests.434  The project received a grant from the National 
Science Foundation in the sum of $40,000 for the establishment of the program.435  The 
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conferences thus did aid the progression toward greater cooperation across disciplinary 
divides, if they did not succeed entirely in overcoming them.
Differential fertility and assortative mating were the issues of primary concern 
across all of the conferences, but assortative mating in particular was the focus of the 
fourth Princeton Conference, held in 1967.  Research on assortative mating dated back to 
early twentieth century research on population dynamics, however, interest in assortative 
mating sharply increased in the wake of the findings of the second Scottish Mental 
Survey of 1947.436  In the early 1950s, Lionel Penrose’s theory of heterotesis offered a 
widely accepted explanation of the second survey’s observation of an unexpected 
increase in national levels of intelligence, and had partially informed the UNESCO 
working group on the relationship between differential fertility and intelligence’s 
conclusions.  Following the UNESCO report, interest in assortative mating as an 
explanation for fertility trends, reproductive patterns, and variations in populations’ levels 
of intelligence grew into the postwar years.  During the Princeton Conferences, the 
genetic and socioeconomic dynamics governing the phenomenon of assortative mating 
drove discussion.  Some participants offered environmental explanations for the 
phenomenon.  Bruce K. Eckland of the Educational Testing Service, for instance, 
protested the notion that mate-selection was a free choice; such choice was always 
conditioned by environmental conditions like class, education, as well as other factors 
that might prevent individuals from meeting their “ideal” mates.437  He offered five 
explanations for class endogamy in assortative mating.  First, members of the same class 
436 Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, Dynamics of Population: Social and Biological Significance of 
Changing Birth Rates in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), Introduction.
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were expected to share similar values.  Second, place of residence acted as a means of 
segregating groups during the courtship process.  Third, Eckland admitted that class 
endogamy frequently was “simply a function of the interlocking nature of class and 
ethnicity.”  Fourth, families often pressured their children to pursue a mate of their own 
class.  And finally, educational advantages or disadvantages presented by one’s family 
served to reinforce class inequalities and inhibit social mobility.438  All of these factors 
collaborated to result in “like” marrying “like,” and the preservation of homogeny within 
groups.
In spite of his strong assertions on the subject, Eckland nevertheless expressed 
dissatisfaction with extant knowledge of assortative mating and in particular its effects on 
a population’s gene frequencies and distribution.  The relationship between differential 
fertility and assortative mating particularly required greater clarification and 
understanding.  A correlation between differential fertility and assortative mating would 
have significant implications for a population’s overall intelligence, for better or worse.  
According to Eckland’s survey of the literature, “in the absence of differential fertility, 
assortative mating alone does not alter the gene frequencies of the total population. 
Nevertheless, it does change the distribution of genes (Stern, 1960) and this, itself, is of 
considerable importance.”  He gave the example of mate selection based on similarity in 
educability or intelligence; this would over time increase “the proportion of the relevant 
homozygous genotypes which over successive generations” would “produce a biotic 
model of class structure in which a child's educability and, therefore, future social status 
are genetically determined.”  Thus, even though assortative mating might be governed by 
438 Ibid, 19-20.
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social circumstances, it would still influence the genetic attributes of populations, 
resulting in greater genetic similarity within social classes and greater genetic 
dissimilarity between classes.  This same logic could be extended to racial groups.  Under 
these circumstances, Eckland impressed, “assortative mating would seem to have 
consequences just as relevant as any other mechanisms involving the genetic character of 
human societies.”439  Other experts at the conference corroborated these anxieties.  The 
second paper drew similar conclusions to those of Eckland, stating that although one 
could not yet lay claim to certainty of the degree to which genetics influenced 
intelligence and educational attainment, there was certainly a genetic component.  Due to 
this, “assortative marriages for intelligence and educational attainment will be of eugenic 
importance if accompanied by differential fertility of the different marriage groups.”  
Even if the correlation “between the genetic components of intelligence and fertility are 
nearly zero” the correlation would prove highly statistically significant, for even “a very 
small positive or negative correlation over a period of many generations would be of 
great significance for the evolution of intelligence.”440  In this case, should even a rigidly 
environmental explanation for the development of intelligence be accepted, the genetic 
ramifications of assortative mating rendered the intelligence of populations – and its 
maximization – a matter of eugenic concern.
Building on the theme of the preceding conference, the fifth, held in 1969, 
focused on further investigation of the relationship between differential fertility and 
assortative mating.  Between the fourth and fifth conferences, Eckland’s conclusions 
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somewhat shifted course as a result of the availability of new demographic research.  
From his examination of data collected by Project Talent (a longitudinal study of the 
intelligence of American high schoolers begun in 1960), the Educational Testing Service, 
and other sources, he observed that “traditional mating boundaries, such as class specific 
and ethnic factors, tend to be giving away to new boundaries which probably for the first 
time in human history control the process of assortative mating for a highly heritable and 
functional trait.”  This was highly germane to the dialogue on the relationship between 
assortative mating and intelligence, because, Eckland concluded, “the new boundaries 
operate primarily within our educational system and the character specific trait is mental 
ability.”441  Mental ability, as measured by educational attainment was beginning to 
surpass the influences of class and race on assortative mating.  Education, more than any 
other factor was determining who married whom, as well as the number of their children.  
Kiser’s contributions supported Eckland’s conclusion that education was particularly 
significant to understanding the relationship between differential fertility and assortative 
mating.  Kiser investigated the quantitative effects of assortative mating on differential 
fertility as assessed by couples’ educational attainment.  His findings indicated that 
assortative mating influenced the differential fertility of those at educational extremes.  
Across racial groups, those with the least education experienced the greatest disparity in 
expected and actual fertility, and higher educational attainment tended to suppress 
fertility in white men and women particularly.442  This revelation had significant 
consequences for the future of eugenic family planning: the most intelligent were 
441 Bruce K. Eckland, Abstract: The Construction of New Mating Boundaries, Fifth Princeton Conference, 
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deciding to limit their family size, while those of lesser intelligence continued to have 
larger families.  The final Princeton Conference of the 1960s also turned its focus outside 
of the United States, concentrating on the broader social implications of changing trends 
in fertility across the globe.  Marriage outside of caste in India, and changing fertility 
patterns in Japan and Korea featured in the proposals for the conference.443  Also, race 
was recognized as a more statistically significant factor in changing patterns of 
differential fertility.  Kiser proposed that, “with respect to differentials there has been a 
widening of the variations in fertility by color and perhaps also by religion.  There has 
been a narrowing of differentials in fertility by region, urban-rural, and socio-economic 
status.”444  Race therefore became an increasingly explicit and significant category to the 
relation of differential fertility, assortative mating, and population quality in the minds of 
the Princeton Conference attendees.
The Princeton Conferences were organized on the principal that because of the 
“obvious connections between the genetical (sic) study of populations and the study of 
their ecology, it is an extraordinary fact that demographers and population geneticists 
carry on their affairs in ignorance of each other’s existence.”445  The conferences made 
strides in unifying these professions in the pursuit of answers to their shared questions.  
The Princeton Conferences underscore the continued focus on the relationship between 
intelligence and differential fertility, connecting the history of intelligence testing with 
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the history of population studies in a profound way which not been explored in extant 
scholarship.  Because they were unable to overcome disciplinary divides, the Princeton 
meetings were generally deemed less than successful by their organizers and participants 
in their endeavor to bridge genetics, demography, and psychology to address issues of 
population quality control.  However, they remain highly significant for their 
unprecedented effort to bring these disciplines’ expertise to bear upon issues of 
population intelligence to articulate a vision of a new eugenics.  The conferences were a 
formative step in the direction of a more interdisciplinary eugenics that emphasized a 
clean and conscious break from what they viewed as the pseudoscience of prewar 
eugenicists while nevertheless maintaining a focus on the question of human intelligence 
and differential fertility.
Studies on differential fertility in the immediate postwar years had assuaged 
concerns that the poorest members of society were reproducing at threateningly higher 
rates than the rest of the population, resulting in national declines in intelligence.  The 
baby boom marked significant changes in fertility patterns, which helped to redirect 
eugenic concerns about levels of intelligence away from anxiety over declining rates of 
intelligence toward explorations of how to increase national levels of intelligence.  The 
conclusions of studies on assortative mating and differential fertility that had “showed 
widespread and persistent negative associations between fertility and intelligence” were 
reevaluated as representative of a transitional phase in reproductive habits.  This helped 
to inspire a shift away from anxiety over “a possible deterioration in man’s genetic 
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resources” to research in improving genetic resources.446  The American Eugenics Society 
helped to lead this shift away from preventing degeneration to ensuring maximization of 
intelligence.  
The American Eugenics Society underwent great changes during the postwar era.  
The changing of the guard ushered in a significant recalibration of the society’s identity 
and agenda.  The revitalized society consciously distinguished its past focus on medical 
genetics from its new focus on population genetics, “which is the field of the geneticists 
and demographers with assists from psychologists.”447  However, the postwar activities of 
the American Eugenics Society, renamed the Society for the Study of Social Biology in 
the 1970s, underscore the continued centrality of concerns about levels of intelligence 
among populations to postwar eugenics and suggest continuity in spite of the society’s 
narrative of metamorphosis.  The restyled society additionally demonstrates the 
significance of the working relationships between demographers, psychologists, and self-
professed eugenicists to the history of postwar ideas about intelligence as a national 
human resource.
In tandem with eugenics’ reincarnation as population genetics, the society’s 
membership and board of directors underwent considerable changes during these years.  
First, membership became more international.  A significant percentage of society 
membership represented international members in the 1960s; nearly a third of individual 
memberships and library memberships were foreign.448  Second, the board of directors 
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became more enmeshed within a network of foundations and institutions acutely 
concerned with population issues.  The members of the board of directors typically had 
simultaneous affiliations with numerous foundations, including the Milbank Memorial 
Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Population Council, and Princeton’s Office of 
Population Research in particular, in addition to sustaining connections with 
governmental programs or offices, especially the UN and UNESCO.  Clyde Kiser, for 
example, served as President of the American Eugenics Society, while also serving as 
Vice President of Technical Affairs for the Milbank Memorial Fund.  Frank Lorimer, also 
on the board of the American Eugenics Society and formerly the Administrative Director 
of IUSSP, maintained a position as an ad hoc consultant to the UN Population Division 
and UNESCO’s Department of Social Sciences.  Frederick Osborn regularly consulted 
UNESCO’s Social Science Department and had extensive connections to the United 
States federal government from his military service during the Second World War.  The 
Princeton Office of Population Research was largely created with funding from Milbank, 
and was put under the charge of Milbank affiliate, Frank W. Notestein.449  The restyling of 
the American Eugenics Society and eugenics itself was thus carried out by individuals 
with international reach who were established in a broad network of foundations related 
to the study of population.  These individuals, while working toward the creation of 
national eugenic policies, also engaged in projects and initiatives of international scope, 
emphasizing the transnational nature of their enterprise as well as a continued tension 
between national and international focuses.
449 William H. Tucker, The Funding of Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund (Illinois 
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These foundations routinely funded each other’s research projects, creating a 
complex international web of fiscal exchange.  A relatively small number of individuals 
with overlapping institutional ties were responsible for moving research funds among and 
between themselves via these various institutional affiliations.  For instance, in 1960 the 
Population Council awarded Milbank a grant of $30,000 so that they might be able to 
continue a study on psychological factors affecting fertility being conducted at 
Princeton.450  The American Eugenics Society in fact received the majority of its funding 
in the 1960s from institutions affiliated with its board members, principally Milbank and 
Rockefeller.  From the Milbank Memorial Fund, the society received an annual sum of 
$4,000 for the years 1959 to 1970, and continued to receive Milbank support into the 
1970s in slightly reduced amounts.451  The Rockefeller Foundation’s Population Council 
also awarded the American Eugenics Society annual grants in the sum of $4,000 from the 
middle of the 1950s into the 1970s, with the exception of yearly grants of $6,000 in 1969 
to 1971.452  Between 1965 and 1970, Milbank donated $24,000 and the Population 
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Council donated $33,000 to the American Eugenics Society.453  The endorsement of these 
foundations and institutions reflect a new degree of legitimacy attained by the American 
Eugenics Society in the postwar years, due in part to its change in image and in part to its 
new and well-connected body of members and board of directors.
A major shift in the identity of the American Eugenics Society from the prewar to 
postwar era was its transition away from medical genetics toward population genetics.  Its 
Committee on Population Genetics Research signaled this significant shift.  The initial 
meeting of the Research Committee on Population Genetics of the American Eugenics 
Society was held in 1966.454  The society organized the committee to “seek projects in the 
field of population genetics” and to author “research proposals to be given to foundations 
to obtain funds for pilot projects or short-term studies, just to get them going and 
recognized.”455  The Population Genetics Research Committee’s membership included 
psychiatrist Gordon Allen of the New York Psychiatric Institute, biologist Carl Jay 
Bajema, Demographic Director of the Population Council Dudley Kirk, geneticists 
Richard Lewontin and Richard Osborne, and demographers Frank Lorimer and Frederick 
Osborn.  In his recommendations to the committee, Bajema emphasized that “although 
the capacity for reproduction may be influenced by genetic factors and by such 
environmental conditions as nutrition and disease, variations in fertility between different 
sub-groups within existing human populations arises chiefly from social and 
psychological factors.”  For this reason, the Research Committee on Population Genetics 
453 The American Eugenics Society, Inc., Six-Year Report of the Officers: 1965-1970, Folder: 5149, Box: 
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asserted that further research on the relationship between intelligence and fertility 
patterns would be of the utmost importance and potential value.456  
The committee followed and promoted numerous studies in population genetics 
investigating population intelligence including the Berkeley Growth Study, Project 
Talent, Terman’s study of Genetic Genius, the Harvard Growth Study, the Educational 
Testing Service’s Mental Growth Survey, the Minneapolis I.Q. and Social Mobility Study, 
and the University of Wisconsin Study.457  The American Eugenics Society itself lacked 
the funds to do any more than continue to publish the Eugenics Quarterly by the 1960s, 
however, it played a patronage role by proxy, utilizing its massive network of potential 
funders established by its members’ abundant institutional and foundational connections.  
The American Eugenics Society primarily saw its role as the facilitator of foundation 
funding for worthy research projects.  In 1967 the society contacted the National 
Institutes of Health, National Institute of Communicable Diseases, the Russell Sage 
Foundation, Ford Foundation, and Carnegie Institute of Washington to inquire about 
financial support for these and other projects investigating the influence of I.Q. on 
population genetics.458
The American Eugenics Society claimed an influential role in the genetitization of 
medicine generally, and the rise of population genetics particularly.  This role involved 
building bridges across disciplinary divides between demographers, geneticists, and 
psychologists to produce a forward thinking eugenic vision to further human evolution.  
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The society focused its attention on medical genetics beginning in the early 1950s and 
claimed the distinction of having been an influence on the spread of medical genetics and 
hereditary clinics in American medical schools.459  By the 1960s, many medical schools 
in the United States and Europe hosted programs in medical genetics as well, providing 
services in hereditary counseling.  Frederick Osborn identified the 1960s as a critical 
moment in the history of eugenics because, “for the first time the active cooperation of 
demographers and geneticists and psychologists can be enlisted in the study of present 
trends in human evolution.  Scientific as well as public interest has been aroused by the 
too rapid growth of world population and this has led to a new interest in problems of 
population quality.”460  A global postwar population boom brought the attention of 
national governments, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions to 
development and overpopulation in the Third World.  A transnational movement to 
control the populations of developing nations coincided with developments in modern 
birth control technology and social movements for women’s rights and self-
determination.461  Rising anxieties over rapid global population growth, the scarcity of 
resources, and the maximization of population potential in the First World informed the 
American Eugenics Society’s postwar vision for eugenics.  The society saw the 
promotion of research in population genetics by geneticists, demographers, and 
psychologists that would inform national and international policy solutions as its new 
role.462  
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During the 1960s, the American Eugenics Society went to great lengths to craft a 
narrative of its history that could invoke its controversial beginnings as a foil for its 
modern incarnation.  The society now openly condemned the presence of racial biases at 
the time of its founding, yet charitably chronicled its break from racism beginning in the 
1920s.  Since the changes to board membership in the 1930s, the society claimed that it 
had clung firmly as well to an anti-racist and anti-classist stance.463  Adopting a much 
more moderate perspective in the 1960s, the board alleged that it broke with past stances 
when it maintained that “the position of the American Eugenics Society is that there is no 
scientific evidence justifying a belief in the general ‘superiority’ in genetic potential of 
one race as against another.  It is agreed that differences in the environment are sufficient 
to account for the differences in personal characteristics between racial groups in this 
country.”464  This narrative and official position represented a reformed stance for the 
society.  In reality, however, the American Eugenics Society’s practices had fallen under 
scrutiny for racist and classist agendas well into the 1930s, and languished in relative 
obscurity for much of the interim between the 1940s and 1950s.465  
 In an effort to clarify its new eugenic position, the society released a special 
statement in 1961.  It recognized the diversity of its members, who were united by a 
“common interest... to promote the advancement, discussion and dissemination of 
scientific knowledge of human genetics, as it relates to the welfare and improvement of 
individuals and populations.”466  The statement emphasized the society’s focus on 
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improving the quality of populations, particularly as related to intelligence.  Though 
concrete knowledge on the genetic transmission of intelligence was still lacking, the 
statement asserted the importance of bringing genetic research, along with psychological 
and demographic studies, to bear upon fertility patterns and overall population quality.  
The society assumed responsibility for furthering this research to better understand the 
influence of socioeconomic and psychological factors on fertility.467  Above all, the 
society stated its role as facilitator of eugenic progress, politically as well as 
scientifically: “the Eugenics Society has a definite and important role to play in the 
development of population policies within the United States.  Where information is 
lacking, the Society will exert its influence to gain knowledge.  Where dissemination is 
poor, the Society will sponsor conferences and encourage publication.  And where there 
is failure to utilize available information, the Society will seek to promote a better 
understanding of what might be accomplished by application of existing knowledge.”468  
In this respect, the society was perpetuating its early role as an agent of political change 
and dissemination of eugenic information.  
This refined version of eugenics recognized the impact of the changing global 
context on fertility patterns, particularly as they related to questions of levels of 
intelligence within and between populations.  As nations became more technologically 
advanced, they underwent changes in reproductive patterns.  For instance, advances in 
modern medicine and public health meant that fewer members of society died of natural 
causes, which placed “new emphasis on the question of handing on the genetic factors 




quality, and possibly new opportunities for improvement.”469  The society chose to focus 
on opportunities for improvement.  Increasingly what had appeared to be a negative 
relationship between fertility and intelligence was reinterpreted as a phase by many 
within the society.  As population expert and society member Frank Lorimer asserted, “it 
is now clear that the negative association between fertility and indices of intelligence, 
which in the past was sometimes viewed as inherent in the structure of modern society, 
was in large part a transitional phenomenon.”  Lorimer therefore encouraged optimism 
about the progress that eugenic policies might affect on a population’s overall level of 
intelligence or other desirable psychological traits.  As Lorimer explained, “the challenge 
of eugenics today is less apocalyptic than it formerly seemed to some people.  Humanity 
is not on the verge of dysgenic disaster.  On the other hand, the possibilities of positive 
advances in influencing the future course of human evolution seem brighter than ever 
before.”470  In place of its past pessimism about the future of the race, the newly styled 
American Eugenics Society offered an ambitious and optimistic vision.  Population 
genetics, with its integration of genetics, demography, and psychology, promised to guide 
the progress of human evolution as never before possible.
Director Frederick Osborn was a driving force behind the changes within the 
American Eugenic Society.  Osborn was a key promoter of this new image of the society 
and its refined eugenic vision that integrated genetics, demography, and psychology to 
formulate policy solutions to population issues.  Osborn emphasized that the role of 
eugenics in the future would be positive, that of “maintaining” or “improving” 
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populations’ genetic qualities.  To fill this role, eugenics must partner with geneticists, 
demographers, psychologists and others.  In Osborn’s words, “genetics provides the core 
of genetic theory while any implementation must be broadly based in population studies, 
medicine, psychology, and sociology.”471  The society emphasized the importance of 
interdisciplinarity when it released a promotional statement in 1966 explaining that 
eugenics “draws from the field of genetics for an understanding of the processes of 
heredity; from psychology for analysis of the part played by variations in heredity and in 
the development of personality, intelligence and character; and from demography for the 
rates of births and deaths, mating habits, and relative increase or decline of groups with 
different characteristics, and the social and psychological factors which are related to 
these rates.”472  This more complete and new configuration of eugenics would enable 
eugenicists to articulate effective policy proposals to further the development of 
populations.
As director, Osborn was active in his efforts to erase any traces of ideology, 
scientism, or controversy from the American Eugenics Society.  Whereas the old eugenics 
was openly ideological, Osborn’s new vision for eugenics represented it as science 
wholly untainted by ideology.  In his endeavor to alter the image of the society and 
eugenics in general, he emphasized the society’s new focus on population genetics as 
well as its professionalism and grounding in the hard science of genetics.  As he boasted 
to a colleague, “our Board of Directors is now composed of leading geneticists, 
demographers, and psychologists and our membership is increasingly from men in the 
fields related to eugenics.  The Society at present is scientific and not propagandistic and 
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we think this is wise until our scientific backing is more completely developed.”  Though 
he acknowledged the “need [for] powerful propagandists and we welcome them in the 
field,” he demurred that it would be “unwise to tie the name of the Society into 
propaganda at this time,” signaling that the society would, for the present, refrain from 
proselytizing.473  In demonstrating restraint, Osborn sought to cultivate an air of 
respectability.  Osborn also led his own public campaign to improve the image of 
eugenics in his solicitation of members of the press.  In a letter to a representative of 
Science Writer, he impressed that “the eugenic movement is no longer racists, nor social 
class, nor propagandist, but a serious attempt in an applied science to find out what is 
going on in human evolution and what could be done to improve it.”474  Osborn 
celebrated what he considered the great potential of eugenics for society.  He asserted that 
“for the first time the active cooperation of demographers and geneticists and 
psychologists can now be enlisted in the study of present trends in human evolution.  
Scientific as well as public interest has been aroused by the too rapid growth of world 
population and this has led to a new interest in problems of population quality.”475  The 
greatest potential contribution of eugenics would be that of the maximization of 
population quality and, principally, the maximization of population intelligence.
The American Eugenics Society was optimistic about the prospect of achieving 
the goal of the maximization of population intelligence.  It reversed its concerns about the 
decline of national levels of intelligence, believed to be caused by differential fertility.  In 
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its review and consolidation of information from multiple longitudinal studies, the society 
observed fertility differentials between classes undergoing a process of reversal.  The 
observation that members of the lowest classes, who consistently underperformed on 
intelligence tests, were reproducing at much greater rates than the highest classes had 
been for many years a source of anxiety that “these trends would mean a slow wearing 
away of intellectual capacity.”  In the event that intelligence had any genetic basis, “the 
inverse relationship between intelligence and reproduction was a deep cause of 
concern.”476  However, following the end of the Second World War and the baby boom, 
this fertility pattern began to reverse; “by 1950 college[-educated] couples and high 
school[-educated] couples were having substantially more children than were needed for 
their own replacement while the birth rate of elementary school[-educated] couples was 
little if any higher than it had been during the depression.”  Some studies even suggested 
“a direct positive relationship between education and size of family at all levels,” which 
would supplant previous claims that differential fertility was governed by socioeconomic 
class.477  Osborn was optimistic that this reversal in fertility trends might be channeled 
into a eugenic program capable of improving the overall quality of the population.478  He 
went so far as to declare the field of “positive eugenics” now implied “raising the level of 
intelligence and character” of populations.479  
One reason for Osborn and the American Eugenics Society’s optimism at the 
possibility of achieving a “wholly voluntary system of eugenics” was the improvement 
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and availability of reliable medical birth control.  For this, “the most important first step 
would be making the new forms of birth control – the pill and the IUD available to 
everyone so that the less intelligent, less responsible parents would reduce their present 
high birth rates to a minimum, which we now know they would do if they had the 
opportunity.”480  In fact, the society attributed the reduction of “the negative relationship 
between fertility and social class” to the “recent increase in availability and effectiveness 
of contraception.”481  Thus, though they proceeded with newfound optimism, the 
American Eugenics Society’s vision was still profoundly shaped by the imperative to 
control individual reproductive practices, however altered the context or tools for doing 
so.  The American Eugenics Society promoted the view that population genetics, with the 
assistance of technological developments in birth control, could ultimately produce 
policy solutions to population problems and greatly improve overall population quality.  
In his report before the United States Commission on Population Growth and the 
American Future, Michael Tietelbaum espoused somewhat utopian visions for American 
society, such as the idea that “if the more intelligent in each class had the most children it 
should equalize class abilities and move us closer to a ‘classless’ society in which a 
specialized group would be increasing its general intelligence.”482  The society recognized 
the likelihood of “undoubtedly an enormous reservoir of untapped genetic resources in 
the lower economic groups” that might be tapped into.483  Borrowing from the 1968 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, the society defined “eugenics” as “an 
applied science that seeks to maintain or improve the genetic potentialities of the human 
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species.”484  In order to do so, population policies would be necessary as guiding 
inspiration; “present population policies are beginning to have this effect,” however, it 
was recognized that “the situation should be continuously studied, and where necessary, 
policies modified to meet the needs of genetic adaptation to our rapidly changing 
environments.”485  Such policy suggestions focused emphatically on directing energies 
toward maximization of population potential, which meant concentrating on the 
maximization of I.Q.  Though the society always shied away from formal policy 
recommendations itself, lest its actions be construed as propagandistic or ideological, it 
did not hesitate to encourage such recommendations from other quarters.
In 1972, the American Eugenics Society changed its name to the Society for the 
Study of Social Biology.  This change reflected the bridging of the social and biological 
sciences that the society had endeavored to bring about over the previous decade and also 
distanced the society from the taint of the word “eugenics,” which was reinforced by the 
emerging historical literature on eugenics and its relation to the Holocaust.  In Eckland’s 
words, “the traditional and sometimes artificial boundaries separating the biological and 
social sciences are undergoing revision.  We are experiencing a convergence of interests 
and a synthesis of principles.”486  There was substantial “evidence of the emergence of a 
new field that takes as its central problem the coactions of social and biological variables 
is widely scattered across the scientific community.”487  This new field of “social biology” 
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integrated genetics, demography, and psychology to produce a eugenic vision sensitive of 
the combined prerogative of the natural and social sciences to control population quality, 
free of the stigma of eugenics.  This change transpired in tandem with the reemergence of 
several highly public controversies against the background of the Civil Rights Movement 
in the United States over the question of native intellectual inequalities between racial 
groups. 
The American Eugenics Society’s transformation transpired within the  context of 
the developing Cold War, the rapidly increasing global population, the Civil Rights 
Movement, and Johnson’s Great Society.  Concern with natural and human resources was 
at the heart of this dynamic context.  As one expert advised the National Academy of 
Sciences, “the foremost danger confronting man, in addition to his exponentially 
expanding population and the threat of nuclear war, is a deeply ingrained belief in some 
‘natural’ rate of economic and material growth that can and must continue into the 
infinite future, but which, in plain truth, cannot do so.”488  This perceived danger 
threatened the global population, and required introspection on the part of the United 
States: “no measure of ‘The Great Society’ or any society can be more telling than its 
ability to analyse (sic) its own ills, and to act with compassion and with good judgment as 
far as other parts of the world and the yet unborn are concerned.”489  Initiatives like 
Project Talent, a longitudinal study begun in 1960 that tested a representative sample of 
Series 1.74, FA021, SSRC, RAC, 109.
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440,000 high school students in order to draw up “an inventory of human resources” and 
“a set of standards for educational and psychological measurement” to predict success, 
aspired to map out the most optimal measures to identify and increase national 
intellectual resources.490  Increasingly, mainstream human science experts, and behavioral 
scientists in particular, reached the consensus view that “all living things and each of their 
characteristics are the products of any interaction between genetic material and an 
environment, and differences in the genetic material as well as differences in the 
environment make for different types of living things and differences in their 
characteristics.”491  This view reflected an embrace of interaction between environment 
and genetics in the development of most traits.  This perspective began to emerge as the 
the most compelling model of genetics in the 1950s and was dominant by the 1960s.  
New studies in intelligence sought to better understand this relationship.  For instance, in 
South Africa, the Carnegie Institute of Washington embarked on studies of intelligence 
and the final months of individual development in utero in an effort to better understand 
the role of the emerging field of epigenetics in the development of intelligence.492  Some 
demographic studies in intelligence suggested that increasing fertility control was in fact 
leading to higher fertility rates among the more intelligent members of society, with some 
studies indicating, “that the relation of I.Q. to the fertility of individuals was not negative 
and might even be positive in a major part of our population.493  One study by Carl Jay 
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Bajema, a leading postwar expert on intelligence testing and fertility, suggested the 
possibility of “a positive relationship between ability (as measured by I.Q.) and fertility 
right across the board, the more intelligent in every class having more children than the 
average of their class.”494  These findings reflect a shift in the postwar era away from a 
focus on the negative effects of differential fertility on national intelligence toward efforts 
to maximize national levels.
However, one dilemma particularly stood in the way of the goal of maximizing 
overall levels of intelligence.  This was the dilemma of persistent trends in racial 
disparities on intelligence test performance.  Arthur Jensen, a professor of education at 
the University of California, Berkeley, incited a war between neohereditarians and 
environmentalists in 1969 with his incendiary article, “Can We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic 
Achievement?,” published in the Harvard Educational Review.  Jensen’s article on 
intellectual differences between black and white students in the United States launched a 
standoff between neohereditarians and environmentalists against the backdrop of the 
Civil Rights Movement and a series of reports that highlighted the failures of social 
programs intended to redress inequalities between groups.  Jensen claimed these 
disparities were genetic in nature and that social and government programs intended to 
rectify inequalities through environmental interventions had failed to close the 
achievement gap as a result.  Two federal reports in the mid-1960s sought to tackle the 
dilemma of the persistence of racial inequality in spite of the institution of formal 
political and civil rights.  These were the Coleman Report and the Moynihan Report.  
Both reports, which focused on social and cultural factors as the cause of persistent racial 
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inequality unintentionally helped bring about the reemergence of hereditarian arguments 
regarding the intelligence of black Americans by providing Jensen and others with the 
opportunity to claim that interventions designed to provide equal environmental 
conditions for all in fact laid bare the genetic basis of inequalities.  In this manner, the 
apparent failure of Great Society programs, combined with the cultural backlash against 
the advances of the Civil Rights Movement, in part enabled the revival of race science 
from its period of latency.
In 1965, sociologist and Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
published his controversial report explaining the persistence of economic inequality 
between white and black Americans, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.495  
Although not intended to play into the hands of race scientists, his report in part helped to 
fuel the neohereditarianism that surged at the end of the 1960s following the publication 
of Jensen’s article.  The Moynihan Report was premised on the observation that the “gap 
between the Negro and most other groups in America is widening,” and that this was 
attributable to the nature of the black family.496  The report concluded, “a national effort 
towards the problems of Negro Americans must be directed towards the question of 
family structure.  The object should be to strengthen the Negro family so as to enable it to 
raise and support its members as do other families.”497  In order to achieve this goal, “the 
programs of the Federal government bearing on this objective shall be designed to have 
the effect, directly or indirectly, of enhancing the stability and resources of the American 
495 Daniel Geary, Beyond Civil Rights: The Moynihan Report and its Legacy (Philadelphia: University of 
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Negro family.”498  The Moynihan Report was met with widespread public disapproval and 
civil rights groups particularly protested the report’s findings.  The Johnson 
administration soon abandoned its support of the report due to outcry that it “blamed the 
victim.”499  
According to historian Daniel Geary, the report’s controversy derived from 
“multiple and conflicting meanings” and ambiguities characteristic of postwar liberalism 
and its assumptions related to race and government intervention, as is evidenced by the 
support and criticism it drew from individuals and groups that defy neat political and 
ideological divisions.500  In focusing on the unit of the family, the Moynihan report 
emulated mass intelligence testing studies trends that explored the relation between 
differential fertility and intelligence.  However, by drawing on an environmental 
explanation for the persistence of racial inequality, Moynihan’s report attracted the 
attention of neohereditarians who believed first that the report demonstrated a failure of 
government initiatives to eliminate racial inequalities through environmental 
manipulations, and second, that national efforts to uplift black families would ultimately 
waste national resources.  The Coleman Report, which derived from the Civil Rights Act 
of 1965, additionally focused on an alleged waste of national resources.  The Civil Rights 
Act had expanded the application of intelligence testing in two respects.  First, the act 
included an amendment that allowed the use of intelligence tests for employment.501  
Second, it created a provision for a study of school performance disparities between 
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white and black schools that resulted in the Coleman Report.502  Sociologist James S. 
Coleman headed the study, which released its report, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity, in 1966, one year following the unpopular Moynihan Report.  The Coleman 
report concluded that government spending did not measurably influence school 
performance.  Rather, social factors appeared to determine performance rather than 
government intervention.503  Like the Moynihan Report, the Coleman Report failed to 
factor institutionalized racism into its account of racial inequality and achievement 
disparities.  These influential reports provided neohereditarians with the ammunition to 
forge arguments that failed social and governmental interventions in fact demonstrated 
the validity of hereditarian theses.  While such arguments would have found few 
receptive audiences a decade or two prior, the tumultuous political and social climate of 
the late 1960s, and the considerable cultural backlash against the expansion of the rights 
of minorities, created conditions for what appeared to be a return of race science.
It was against the backdrop of the findings of the Moynihan and Coleman reports 
that Jensen released his article in the Harvard Educational Review.  The article opened 
with the damning assertion, “compensatory education has been tried and apparently it has 
failed.”  The “uncritical acceptance” of the “deprivation hypothesis” or, the theory of that 
discriminatory practices and socioeconomic disadvantage were the driving cause of 
disparities in school performance, had in Jensen’s interpretation led to “unprecedented 
support from Federal funds” which had largely gone to waste.504  In addition to the 
Moynihan and Coleman reports, Jensen cited a 1967 study of the United States 
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Commission on Civil Rights, indicating no appreciable rise in school performance with 
compensatory education, to corroborate his claims.505  Given this evidence of the 
diminutive impact of governmental investment in remediating educational disadvantages, 
Jensen alleged that these disparities were largely genetic.  Jensen asserted, “genetic 
factors in individual differences have usually been belittled, obscured, or denigrated, 
probably for reasons of interest mainly on historical, political, and ideological 
grounds.”506  This neglect of genetic factors, he argued, precluded the development of 
effective policy solutions, resulting in wastage of resources.  He contended, “the belief in 
the almost infinite plasticity of intellect, the ostrich-like denial of biological factors in 
individual differences, and the slighting of the role of genetics in the study of intelligence 
can only hinder investigation and understanding of the conditions, processes, and limits 
through which the social environment influences human behavior.”507  The failure of 
social programs demonstrated definitively, in Jensen’s view, that intellectual differences 
derived primarily from genetics; any other opinion reflected the influence of political or 
ideological preferences.
Jensen did not wholly discount a role for environmental conditions in the 
cultivation of individual intelligence.  He offered a modified perspective on the relation 
of environmental factors in the development of intelligence.  Recognizing that heredity 
and environment were not “in opposition to each other,” he did not discount the role of 
environment entirely.  Rather, Jensen viewed environment as a “threshold,” comparing it 
to good or bad nutrition for the achievement of one’s full genetic potential of height.508  





This characterization echoed that of Ernest Havemann’s 1957 explanation in Life 
Magazine, as well as explanations prominent in the Princeton Conferences.  When 
discussing the heredity of intelligence he described it as a population statistic rather than 
a means of measuring up individuals.  He suggested that “there is no way of partitioning 
a given individual’s IQ into hereditary and environmental components, as if the person 
inherited, say, 80 points of IQ and acquired 20 additional points from his environment.”509 
Thus while it was appropriate to discuss the relative percentages of the influence of 
environment and genetics on intelligence among groups, the ratio of environmental and 
genetic influence would necessarily vary between individuals.  For this reason, “the 
question of race differences in intelligence comes up not when we deal with individuals 
as individuals, but when certain identifiable groups or subcultures within the society are 
brought into comparison with one another as groups or populations.”510  However, 
offering his statistic that black Americans scored approximately 15 I.Q. points below 
white Americans on eighty-one different I.Q. tests as an example, Jensen maintained “the 
possible importance of genetic factors in racial behavioral differences has been greatly 
ignored, almost to the point of being a tabooed subject.”511  At points in the article 
Jensen’s language in some ways bore a strange resemblance that of the UNESCO 
statements on race, which had emphasized that “innate capacities vary as much as, if not 
more than, they do between different groups.”512  Jensen imitated this sentiment in his 
assertion that a predominately genetic model of intelligence should not form the basis for 
individual discrimination.  He proposed, “since, as far as we know, the full range of 
human talents is represented in all the major races of man and in all socioeconomic 
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levels, it is unjust to allow the mere fact of an individual’s racial or social background to 
affect the treatment accorded to him.”513  Thus, even if disparities between racial groups 
persisted as a result of genetic differences, this only accounted for population differences; 
individuals would still need to be assessed on their own unique merits and abilities.
Jensen was careful to distinguish between socioeconomic status and race.514  He 
acknowledged that a genetic approach to intelligence also had ramifications for class 
distinctions in the maximization of intelligence, citing as evidence that “mild 
subnormality… is virtually confined to the lower social classes.  Indeed, there is evidence 
that almost no children of higher social class parents have IQ scores of less than 80.”515  
Jensen, like others before him, attributed this phenomenon largely to the selective process 
of assortative mating.  He maintained, “assortative mating can have a profound effect on 
a people’s intellectual resources, especially at the levels of intelligence required for 
complex problem solving, invention, and scientific and technological innovation,” 
whereas those at the lower end of the I.Q. scale were less likely to be successful in 
finding partners with whom to have families.516  As society advanced, demand for such 
prime intellectual resources would only increase.  Indeed, Jensen validated his own 
assertions with the suggestion that “one may sensibly ask the question whether our 
collective national intelligence is adequate to meet the growing needs of our increasingly 
complex industrial society.”517  Citing the Moynihan Report’s research, Jensen theorized 
that this could disparately affect the future success of black Americans, for whom “the 
differential birthrate, as a function of socioeconomic status, is greater in the Negro than in 






the white population.”518  Thus class and race acted as related and at times interrelated 
variables.
Jensen drew on both Coleman and Moynihan’s reports to argue for innate 
disparities in the intelligence of white and black students.519  These reports would 
similarly influence the work of other neohereditarians, including Richard Herrnstein and 
William Shockley.520  With his controversial article, Jensen opened the floodgates to what 
appeared to be a sudden revival of scientific racism.  Yet race science had never truly 
disappeared.  Rather, the changing clime enabled the revival of race science from 
dormancy.  Jensen’s article, in spite of its polemical nature, received support from 
neoconservatives and even from Moynihan himself, who lent the report an air of 
legitimacy by acknowledging that innate intellectual racial disparities were “an open 
question.”521  In fact, a writer for the New York Times Magazine reported, “the word has 
filtered down that the article was distributed as ‘must reading’ by Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan to members of the Nixon Cabinet.”522  Jensen’s article drew broad public and 
professional attention, attracting derision, criticism, and support.  The New York Times 
expressed the view that some “geneticists, while praising the scientific rigor of Dr. 
Jensen’s presentation, said he may have gone too far.”  Among these was Professor 
Steven G. Vandenberg, a geneticist at the University of Colorado.  Vandenberg stated, 
“quite apart from science, I think one should not shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theater without 
good evidence.  He seems to go a little beyond what is known today.”  Others were more 
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supportive, such as Christopher S. Jencks, an educational specialist of disadvantaged 
minorities at Harvard, who concluded, “if you leave aside the discussion of race, it’s 
probably the best thing that’s been done on genetics and intelligence.”523  Jensen 
maintained that his work was not a product of race science, although many 
contemporaries were quick to identify it as such.  In response to accusations that his 
research supported and encouraged racists, Jensen issued a statement in The Sun stating, 
“I don’t want to give these people the power of censorship over my research.  I know 
many fine scholars who didn’t submit research because of the fear that it might be 
misinterpreted.  I think it is important that people read my article before making 
interpretations of it.”524  In spite of Jensen’s insistence that his research was not race 
science, it heralded a revival of neohereditarianism undergirded by racial essentialism.  
The environmental turn ultimately provided the fodder for what appeared to be 
the sudden reemergence of race science in the form of the work of Jensen, Shockley, and 
Herrnstein.  This turn arrived on the heels of the inability of Great Society programs 
under the Johnson administration to achieve their stated aims.  Efforts to the improve the 
conditions of all in order to achieve equality between races and classes and to maximize 
each individual’s potential abilities had struggled to produce their anticipated results.  The 
inefficacy of these programs was largely due to the fact that they overlooked the role of 
institutionalized racism and classism in perpetuating inequalities between groups.  One 
consequence of their apparent failure was a reaction against the more progressive 
environmental explanations of differences between groups that had dominated in the 
1950s and 1960s.  The ostensible failure of environmental remedies to such differences 
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provided an opportunity for what appeared to be a sudden reemergence of race science in 
the form of the work of Arthur Jensen.  When Jensen’s 1969 article appeared in the 
Harvard Educational Review, its conclusions that black students were less intelligent 
than their white peers played into the changing political clime.  General disenchantment 
on the part of both liberals and conservatives with government programs intended to 
redress socioeconomic and racial inequality, which had largely failed to achieve their 
goals, combined with the cultural backlash against the advancing Civil Rights Movement 
marked a break from the preceding era’s political climate.  The passage of progressive 
federal legislation, including elimination of the National Origins Quota system of 
immigration with the passage of the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1965 and the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, disrupted the political status quo and evoked a 
powerful response from conservative America.  Indeed, “Jensenism,” inspired by the 
article in the Harvard Educational Review, flourished in neoconservative quarters in the 
decade to follow with profound and lasting implications for modern I.Q. controversy.  
The tensions of this changing political clime were compounded by the publication of the 
government reports, which argued that inequality was actually increasing between races 
and that the Great Society programs were failing.
The transition toward the focus on maximizing the intelligence of populations, 
rather than preventing national declines, occurred in multiple national contexts.  Even 
France, which at the beginning of the twentieth century escaped the trend in anxiety over 
intellectual decline, once again became invested in the maximization of I.Q.525  National 
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and international efforts at natural resource conservation overlapped with efforts to 
conserve and maximize human capital, and intelligence in particular.  These efforts were 
evident in ongoing scientific concerns about the relationship between fertility patterns 
and levels of intelligence, and also in designs for the creation of national population 
plans.  Professional organizations, however, remained highly sensitive to ideology or 
propaganda and endeavored to shield professional and organizational reputations from 
the taint of racialist leanings.  The tumultuous decade of the 1970s witnessed the first 
major reemergence of explicit endorsement of the hereditarian basis of racial intellectual 
differences since before the Second World War.  Geneticists, demographers, 
psychologists, and eugenicists pooled knowledge, resources, and expertise to deliberate 
on avenues to the maximization of the intelligence of populations.  This enterprise invited 
the seeming return of race science explanations for intellectual differences.  
Race science had never in fact disappeared, nor had eugenics.  However, the 
conscious restyling performed by organizations like the American Eugenics Society and 
individuals like Arthur Jensen posited their arguments as novel from, and not contiguous 
with, past arguments by leveraging new advancements in the science of genetics as a 
newly validating, determining factor.  The history of this era demonstrates the continuity 
and perpetuation of the claims of race science and eugenics throughout the twentieth 
century, and helps to contextualize seemingly unconnected or aberrant instances of 
racialized science, such as Jensen’s inflammatory article, among political reactions 
against the expansion of the formal rights of racial minorities.  By the 1970s, “Jensenism” 
had sparked considerable debate over the appropriate response of the scientific 
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community in the United States while it simultaneously provoked strong reactions 
abroad.    
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Origins of the Modern I.Q. Controversy
Arthur Jensen’s provocative article in the Harvard Educational Review, which 
claimed that black students were inherently less intelligent than their white peers, helped 
to spark a culture war between scientists that fell largely along neoconservative and 
liberal lines in both the United States and Europe.  In the developing controversy, Jensen 
served as the face of group of human science experts espousing neohereditarian theories 
of human intelligence and neoconservative ideals.  Arthur Jensen, Richard Herrnstein, 
and William Shockley led the neoconservative front in the United States, while Hans 
Eysenck, Alain de Benoist, Albert Jacquard and others represented neoconservative voice 
in the U.K. and France.  The publication of work alleging the innate intellectual 
inferiority of certain groups elicited strong reactions from liberal scientists who attacked 
the neohereditarian camp as propositioning a return of “racist science.”  However, race 
science had never truly disappeared.  The apparent failure of liberal interventions in 
education and Great Society programs intended to rectify racial and class inequality, in 
addition to the gains achieved by the Civil Rights Movement and the greater opening of 
American society generally, helped to establish a context receptive to the kinds of policy 
solutions and social responses suggested by hereditarian arguments.  This ushered in the 
seeming return of race science in the 1970s.
While the late 1950s and 1960s had given life to the concern that nations were 
failing to maximize overall levels of intelligence, in the 1970s and 1980s there was a 
palpable shift to the concern that efforts directed at maximizing overall levels of 
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intelligence were futile in the case of certain groups.  The apparent inefficacy of state 
programs geared toward addressing racial and social inequalities, caused largely by their 
inability to address systemic racism and classism, helped to generate doubt about the 
power of environmental interventions to achieve social progress and eradicate inequality.  
The gradual chipping away at the postwar status quo achieved by activists fighting for the 
rights of women and minorities further directed criticism toward these interventions.  
This shift established a context for a resurgence of attacks on environmental explanations 
for the development of I.Q. from a growing cohort of neohereditarian experts espousing 
or appealing to neoconservative views of the state and society.  The formal expansion of 
the rights of racial minorities and women during this era, combined with the postwar 
transition toward a more environmental model of understanding the development of 
individual intelligence, engendered forceful responses from hardline neohereditarians in 
the late 1960s and into the 1970s.  The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the 
revision of the national origins immigration quota policy in the form of the 1965 
Immigration Act, the 1965 Moynihan Report and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War on 
Poverty” provided the backdrop for a rapidly changing American society.  
Neohereditarians organized to demonstrate publicly the futility, and even the 
cruelty, of programs designed by white liberals to uplift the poor and minorities.  This 
response was sparked by the controversial figure of Arthur Jensen who became the 
representative leader of neohereditarians in the United States and abroad.  Many of 
Jensen’s supporters identified this neohereditarian turn as “Jensenism,” which would 
become understood by its critics as an ideologically-motivated reaction against 
environmental understandings of intelligence with deep connections to the rise of 
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conservatism and the new right in the United States and Europe.  Jensenism served as the 
banner under which scientists and experts, many of whom did indeed embrace 
neoconservative values, mobilized against government interventions in education and 
social welfare.  Neohereditarian explanations of intellectual difference directly 
challenged the postwar consensus that the influence of better nutrition, early childhood 
educational interventions, and even affirmative action could improve individual 
intelligence or minimize disparities between socioeconomic and racial groups.  If such 
disparities were innate as they argued, then government intervention was misdirected and 
would be unable to achieve the desired results; such programs were thus efforts in futility 
and examples of the wastage of state and taxpayer resources.  Their case tapped into 
widespread public disillusionment with the failure of numerous liberal programs – which 
tackled inequality from a cultural perspective, rather than a structural or institutional 
perspective – to eradicate targeted inequalities successfully.  The I.Q. controversy was 
thus mired in a larger culture war over the proper role of the state in regulation and 
intervention, as well as the rapidly changing social status quo.  
Alongside this broader culture war, the resurgence of hereditarianism triggered a 
largely overlooked conversation among experts laying professional claim to the definition 
and measurement of intelligence.  In response to Jensen’s article, the Genetics Society of 
America produced a statement on the genetic basis of intelligence in a declaration that 
many members criticized as more political than scientific.  As in the immediate postwar 
years, scientific experts harbored anxiety about the interference of ideology in the 
practice of science and sought to avoid the appearance of ideological bents within their 
own work and professional organizations.  Indeed, accusations of ideological agendas 
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would echo on both sides of the I.Q. controversy up even to the present.  Many members 
of the Genetics Society of America resisted the statement released by the society for the 
express reason that the statement was ideological, rather than being grounded in scientific 
fact, highlighting the perpetuation of a tension between the desire to publicly decry race 
science and the refusal of many experts to resort to an ideological response in order to do 
so.  These experts preferred to err on the side of reservation, stating only what scientific 
knowledge they could certainly prove, even when their political or personal beliefs might 
otherwise compel them to put up a much stronger affront to neohereditarian assertions 
lest they themselves be accused of Lysenkoist tendencies and in turn do more damage 
than good to their cause.  Openly ideological liberal scientists thus offered the most 
powerful and most public responses to this neohereditarian critique.  Accusations of 
Lysenkoism were among the most powerful tools of race scientists in the I.Q. 
controversy, even though many of their own claims were rooted in ideology rather than 
accepted scientific evidence.  This stock neohereditarian defense helped to set up the 
impossible scenario of combating ideological claims with scientific evidence.  In their 
hesitancy to respond in a manner that might be deemed ideological, scientific societies, 
like the Genetics Society of America and the UNESCO committees of the 1950s before 
it, thus presented more reserved arguments against race science proponents.  
The very effort of professional scientific organizations to maintain scientific 
objectivity hampered their ability to stamp out race science resoundingly in the 1970s.  In 
allowing the specter of ideological science to dictate scientific practice from the 1950s 
onward, the scientific establishment unwittingly placed a powerful tool in the hands of 
race scientists, who deployed this tool in the 1970s.  Individuals including Jensen, 
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Schockley, and Herrnstein would each leverage accusations of Lysenkoism against 
organizations that stood to confront their research, such as the National Academy of 
Sciences and the Genetics Society of America.  This hesitancy of establishment experts 
and organizations to engage race science on an ideological level helped to foster an 
environment permissible to the survival of race science into the 1990s, as evidenced by 
the intransigently Jensenist publications of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, 
which demonstrate the tenacious hold of race science into recent times.  This chapter thus 
builds on the work of scholars who have begun to demonstrate the significant reach of 
race science and eugenics late into the twentieth century by offering an explanation for 
the seeming return of race science in the form of the work of individuals like Herrnstein 
and Murray, a demonstration of the international reach of this trend, and an exploration of 
the facets of race science that have preserved its great malleability in diverse political 
contexts over time.526 
The 1960s came to a close with a series of highly public and controversial genetic 
explanations for alleged intellectual disparities between races and classes in the United 
States.  While Arthur Jensen’s article was largely responsible for publicizing the growing 
controversy, neohereditarian explanations for I.Q. began to surface in the mid-1960s, 
beginning with a 1967 statement presented before the National Academy of Sciences 
526 Alexandra Minna Stern, Telling Genes: The Story of Genetic Counseling in America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2012); Nathaniel Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection: How Genes 
Became the Heart of American Medicine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Tracy Teslow, 
Constructing Race: The Science of Bodies and Cultures in American Anthropology (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); Perrin Selcer. “Beyond the Cephalic Index: Negotiating Politics to Produce 
UNESCO’s Scientific Statements on Race” Current Anthropology 55(S5) (April 2012): S173-S184; 
Edmund Ramsden, “Confronting the Stigma of Eugenics: Genetics, Demography and the Problems of 
Population,” Social Studies of Science 39(6) (December 2009): 853-884.
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endorsing research into the relationship between genetics and environment in generating 
alleged intellectual inequalities between racial groups.  The 1967 statement, prepared by 
James F. Crow, James V. Neel, and Curt Stern, and presented before the National 
Academy of Sciences at the Symposium on Genetic Implications of Demographic Trends, 
brought many of the questions hitherto explored by organizations like the American 
Eugenics Society before a federally-funded national body of scientists.  The statement 
considered the potential role of eugenics in mitigating environmental and genetic 
influences on demographic trends, including differential fertility.  It moreover criticized 
scientists who were wary of engaging in potentially controversial research at the expense 
of evolutionary progress, and promoted greater research into the relationship between 
genetics and environment in producing demographic trends and disparities between 
groups within the population.527  Two years following the National Academy of Sciences 
statement, the publication of Jensen’s article propelled the developing I.Q. controversy 
into mainstream consciousness.  These occurrences would spur the primary professional 
society of geneticists into action in an effort to distance their profession from what they 
described as a reappearance of eugenics.  However, eugenics had never disappeared, and 
several respected geneticists, including renowned biologist Richard Lewontin, were in 
fact members of the American Eugenics Society during these years.  The developing I.Q. 
controversy drew eugenics and race science out of relative obscurity and into the public 
eye, giving the impression of a sudden and abrupt return of a pseudoscience assumed 
extinct.
527 James F. Crow, James V. Neel, and Curt Stern, “A Statement by the Council of the Academy,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 59(3) (March 15, 1968,) 651-654.
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Yet the neohereditarian front began to muster almost half a decade prior to the 
publication of Jensen’s article in the form of the work of physicist William B. Shockley.  
Shockley would prove to be among the greatest promoters of Jensen and his research.  
Though it was Jensen who would provide the spark, Shockley fanned the flames.  
Drawing on his status as a Nobel Laureate and his affiliation with the National Academy 
of Sciences, Shockley mobilized his intellectual influence to rally the support of the 
scientific community and American public around Jensen’s article and to promote an 
overarching critique of government intervention.  Shockley openly and explicitly 
criticized the Great Society programs intended to remediate racial and socioeconomic 
inequality through an environmental approach that overlooked the role of heredity.528  
Jensen’s article provided an opportunity to bring his research agenda before the National 
Academy of Sciences and a broader national audience.  In a 1965 interview for the U.S. 
News & World Report, Shockley had previously posed the possibility that quality of the 
national population as a whole was declining.  “We’re living in a society in which the 
achievements of the human mind have made it possible for people to survive with the 
help of machines and technology and welfare,” Shockley told the U.S. News & World 
Report, reviving the old eugenic specter of national degeneration.  As a result of these 
interventions, “one frightening possibility is that our humanitarian relief programs may 
be exerting a negative influence,” in that they ensured the survival of the least fit of 
society.  In consequence, the potential for dysgenic reproduction had never been 
greater.529  
528 Daniel Geary, Beyond Civil Rights: The Moynihan Report and its Legacy (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 196.
529 “Is the Quality of U.S. Population Declining: Interview with a Nobel Prize-Winning Scientist,” U.S. 
News & World Report, November 22, 1965, 69.
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Shockley’s position strikingly mirrored arguments made by early eugenicists.  
Reintroducing other old eugenic arguments, such as the argument that criminality was 
possibly genetically predetermined, Shockley cited a dearth of “scientific investigations, 
possibly because nobody wants to raise the question for fear of being called a racist.”530  
He insisted, as would other neohereditarians, that he was neither racist nor classist.  To 
prove this, Shockley proposed a color-blind and class-blind solution.  Rather than 
targeting the poor or racial minorities, as past eugenicists had done, he suggested that 
reproductive control should only be extended to the most genetically inferior of the 
population.531  Coincidentally, in Shockley’s estimation, there was considerable overlap 
between the most genetically inferior and minorities and the poorest classes.  In another 
scenario, Shockley suggested that threat of nuclear war might necessarily lead to the 
institution of eugenic measures of population control.532  He explained, “a nuclear war 
might inflict so much genetic damage that it would become absolutely necessary to select 
from the survivors those persons with sufficiently undamaged genes to perpetuate a 
healthy human race.  This would clearly require society to make complex eugenic 
decisions.”533  Dire circumstances would require drastic measures for the sake of the 
entirety of the race.  In Shockley’s estimation, the Cold War provided prime conditions 
for the revival of past eugenic impulses to control populations.  Shockley used the 
popular press to approach the question of government population control from the 
perspective of national security and resources, spinning a narrative of eugenics as a tool 
of a benevolent government, infinitely preferable to ineffective – and even harmful – 






Shockley’s interview with the U.S. News & World Report earned him the 
unequivocal reprobation of establishment scientists like the Department of Genetics at 
Stanford University, which declared his racial assertions on I.Q. to be “malice,” 
“mischief,” “pseudoscience,” “hackneyed,” and characterized “his innuendos about the 
hereditary basis of the purported intellectual and social deficits of Negroes” to be 
“deplorable.”534  Shockley took their defamation of him as evidence of the “taboos that 
inhibit research on human quality problems and especially their racial aspects.”535  To 
bolster his claim that the reaction against his interview derived from Lysenkoist 
tendencies, Shockley reproduced the comments he received from the chairman of the 
National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science and Public Policy, Harvey Brooks, 
following the interview.  Brooks shared his qualms with Shockley about the “touchy 
implications” of racial arguments about I.Q.  He expressed concern “that at this point any 
study, no matter how objectively conducted, with which your name is in any way 
associated will henceforth be doomed to attack as being ‘racist.’”536  Shockley criticized 
what he interpreted as Brooks’ endorsement of such research “taboos.”  Brooks’ gesture 
of tentative support of Shockley’s research is revealed in his statement, “I am becoming 
convinced as you are that this is a subject which badly needs further attention conducted 
in a low key.  I am not yet entirely convinced that the National Academy is the best body 
to conduct such a study, but I would like to give the matter further thought.”537  Brooks 
rejected Shockley’s proposal that the National Academy of Sciences to tackle his 
suggested investigation of racial disparities in I.Q.  However, it remains unclear from 
534 William B. Shockley, “Human Quality Problems and Research Taboos,” February 26, 1969, 
PP/CRI/D/2/39, Wellcome Library Archives, 2.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid, 2-3. (Shockley’s emphasis added.)
537 Harvey Brooks to William Shockley, May 4, 1966, PP/CRI/D/2/39, Wellcome Library Archives.
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surviving correspondence to what degree Brooks’ stance was informed by his belief that 
addressing I.Q. from the vantage of race “in the present climate [was] probably the kiss 
of death,” or the belief that such research would necessarily promote race science.538  
Neohereditarians would continuously decry what they described as the oppressive force 
of consensus within the scientific community and rampant liberal bias in the media.  In 
1969, Shockley employed this exchange as evidence of a lack of objectivity on the part of 
the mainstream scientific establishment in defense of Jensen and others in the field 
espousing Jensenist ideas.  
Shockley seized the opportunity presented by Jensen’s article to appeal to the 800 
members of the National Academy of Sciences in addition to the press.539  Shockley’s 
appeal was intended to motivate members of the National Academy of Sciences to move 
the organization from its current “unsearch” stance, toward an approach that “endeavors 
to promote vigorous inquiry directed towards establishing relevant objective realities 
about our national human quality problems including their racial aspects.”540  Shockley 
framed his appeal around African-American author Kirstin Hunter’s observation that 
black women looked to children as their “only dependable source of happiness.”  He 
encouraged the National Academy of Science members “to look aside from the probably 
dysgenic effects and the potential agony to all concerned if this observation is valid is an 
irresponsibility on the part of our nation's intellectual community quite comparable, in 
my opinion, to the disregard by German intellectuals of the mysterious disappearance of 
538 Ibid.
539 An Information Note by William Shockley, April 28, 1969, PP/CRI/D/2/39, Wellcome Library 
Archives.
540 William B. Shockley to Fellow Member of the National Academy of Sciences, April 15, 1969, 
PP/CRI/D/2/39, Wellcome Library Archives.
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Jews in their country during the Nazi era.”541  Mourning “the current Lysenko-like 
record” of the National Academy of Sciences and several years of failed “attempts to 
provoke objective explorations and discussions on the part of the president and the 
council of the Academy,” Shockley accused the Academy of totalitarian obfuscation of 
science.542  
Shockley took particular issue with Brooks’ “doubt that the NAS should study the 
possible dysgenic effects of welfare programs, and above all, not consider racial 
questions, no matter how scientific the methods!”543  Shockley interpreted the reluctance 
of Brooks and other academics in his camp “as meaning that the public should not be 
trusted and thus as being more in keeping with totalitarian politics than with our own.  
The view that controversial research results should be obscured is in conflict with the 
wisdom of the First Amendment.”544  The most damning criticism of Jensen’s work was 
that it was tantamount to eugenics.  In response to one of Jensen’s attackers, Shockley 
replied: “Eugenics recalls Hitler's Germany.  But the lesson of Nazi history is not that 
eugenics is intolerable.”  Rather, citing Denmark’s eugenic welfare program as an 
example of successful eugenics, “the lesson to be learned from Nazi history was 
anticipated when freedom of speech and of the press was put in our constitution.  No one 
with faith in human nature can believe the Germans would have tolerated Jewish 
genocide if a free press could report the facts.”545  Although this rhetorical strategy did 
not win over supporters among the National Academy of Sciences membership, 
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consensus in the popular and academic presses would be a strategy mirrored by other 
neohereditarians.  The accusation that their critics were guilty of the same crimes as Nazi 
Germany and Communist Russia became a key defense of neohereditarians.  
A crisis over ideological science was at the heart of the early I.Q. controversy.  
Shockley’s research efforts encountered scrutiny and disapproval from mainstream 
scientists for over a decade.  Yet they also enjoyed early support from unexpected 
quarters.  As early as the late 1950s, Vermont Royster, editor of the Wall Street Journal, 
expressed affirmation of Shockley’s accusations of Lysenkoism.  Royster professed in an 
editorial, “it is certainly obvious – Dr. Lysenko to the contrary – that simple changes in 
the environment, which is the object and purpose of our present welfare programs, cannot 
repair genetic damage.  Such programs can lift those capable of profiting by them; those, 
that is, whose only blocks to progress are environmental obstacles.”  Royster thus 
endorsed Shockley, Jensen, and other’s anxieties about the turn toward toward 
environmental models for understanding human difference and the subsequent investment 
in welfare as the remedy against inequality.  In defense of Shockley, Royster reasoned, 
“we will be served no better than the Russians if our men of intellect fall victim to the 
Lysenko syndrome.”546  Such comparisons to Communism in the context of the Cold War 
tapped into contemporary concerns about totalitarianism as well as concerns about 
academic and intellectual freedom.  Jensen’s article emboldened numerous other 
neohereditarians to speak out publicly in popular print.  Writing “in support of Arthur 
Jensen,” a former student of Lewis M. Terman, emphatically agreed with Jensen, 
confessing, “I have long felt that heredity is probably of more importance than 
546 Vermont Royster, “Thinking Things Over: The Lysenko Syndrome,” The Wall Street Journal, May 22, 
1958, 16.
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environment in determining intelligence.”547  Another psychologist from Harvard wrote, 
“the environmentalists have had the microphone in recent years and they have talked up 
an American brand of Lysenkoism, which holds that brain power can be taught.  That 
motion draws much of its powerful appeal from the hope we all feel that somehow we 
can shake the world and make it better, right now.  Practically everybody is trying to 
improve somebody.”548  The Lysenkoist critique became a powerful tool in the 
neohereditarian arsenal in this and the decades to come.  This critique dismissed 
environmentalists as naive at best, treacherous at worst, and party to a collective silencing 
of those holding differing opinions.  In decrying the liberal consensus, neohereditarians 
helped to construct the I.Q. controversy along liberal and neoconservative divides with 
considerable political consequences.
The early I.Q. controversy was not restricted to experts.  Representatives from 
Congress engaged in the conversation.  Shockley found support in Republican 
Representative Charles S. Grubser of California, who openly criticized the National 
Academy of Sciences over its position toward Shockley.  Grubser declared before the 
Congress that he was “shocked that men who call themselves scientists are afraid to seek 
the truth” and posed “the question: Is not the logical first step in solving any problem that 
of learning the truth about that problem?”549  Joshua Lederberg of Stanford’s Department 
of Genetics wrote to Grubser, insisting on incorporating the full text of the 1967 National 
Academy of Sciences statement into the Congressional Record, which Grubser did.550  
Thus did Congress apply pressure on the National Academy of Sciences to ensure its 
547 Harry F. Harlow to Editor, New York Times Magazine, September 15, 1969.
548 S.S. Stevens to Editor, New York Times Magazine, September 11, 1969.
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fulfillment of its duties to provide the government with objective and authoritative 
scientific knowledge in order to inform and advise legislative decisions.  Democratic 
Representative O.C. Fisher of Texas additionally appealed to Philip Handler, president of 
the National Academy of Sciences to inquire after gaps in the Academy’s research 
program.  Fisher wrote, “I am vitally concerned that national policies be based on sound 
scientific facts.  One key area is that of possible dysgenic effects associated with current 
national reproductive patterns.”  Fisher insisted Handler organize a review of Jensen’s 
research in the hopes of drawing definitive conclusions in an area of research that had 
possibly been avoided intentionally for reasons of liberal bias or political correctness.  He 
expressed, “I am most eager to make sure that considerations of national problems have 
an input the best available analysis, particularly as such an analysis may illuminate 
obscure, generally overlooked, or even evaded areas.”551  In thus portraying the issue as 
one of intellectual bracketing or intentional neglect, Shockley and other Jensen supporters 
were able to rally national political attention and set in place a pattern of defense of 
neohereditarian views.  
While Shockley worked to rally the National Academy of Sciences’ support for 
Jensen’s research, Harvard psychologist Richard Herrnstein led a public appeal in his 
1971 article published in The Atlantic Monthly.  Herrnstein offered to the public a history 
of intelligence testing, portraying intelligence tests as instruments that had only recently 
become subjects of controversy, when in fact they had been controversial since their 
inception.552  The editors introduced Herrnstein’s remarks with a disclaimer stating their 
recognition of intelligence testing as an issue of paramount national significance.  They 
551 O.C. Fisher to Philip Handler, October 1, 1969, PP/CRI/D/2/39, Wellcome Library Archives.
552 Richard J. Herrnstein, “I.Q.” The Atlantic Monthly 228(3) (September 1971), 45.
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wrote, “The Atlantic believes that it is not only possible but necessary to have public 
discussion of important, albeit painful, social issues.  The subject of intelligence is such 
an issue - important because social legislation must come to terms with actual human 
potentialities, painful because the actualities are not sometimes what we vainly hope.”553  
This statement reflected the growing sense of urgency around the I.Q. controversy related 
to the development of national legislation at the start of the 1970s.  It was also revealing 
in its acceptance of the possibility that intelligence testing might in fact expose hard 
truths about human potential that should inform the development of national legislation 
governing social welfare programs and education.  In the context of a burgeoning 
literature on the cultivation and selection of human resources and human capital, 
demonstration of innate intellectual inequalities had the potential to undermine recent 
advances in affirmative action measures that sought to ameliorate the damaging effects of 
discrimination and unequal opportunity.  
Herrnstein, however, assumed the position that intelligence tests in fact broke 
down systemic barriers to equal opportunity.  In his article, Herrnstein waxed poetic 
about the historic ability of intelligence tests to identify superior ability in a meritocratic 
fashion.  In his view, since the use of intelligence tests in the First World War, 
“intelligence tests, and the related aptitude tests, have more and more become society’s 
instrument for the selection of human resources.”  From the wartime origins of their first 
mass applications, “not only for the military, but for schools from secondary to 
professional, for industry, and for civil service, objective tests have cut away the 
traditional grounds for selection – family, social class, and, most important, money.”554  
553 Ibid, 44. (Emphasis in original.)
554 Ibid.
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Intelligence tests thus performed an important function in identifying and cultivating 
human capital.  This achievement was, in Herrnstein’s estimation, psychology’s “most 
telling accomplishment to date.”  Psychology had delivered an objective means of 
ensuring the meritocratic advancement of society.  In Herrnstein’s expert opinion, “it may 
be fairly said that nowhere else – not in psychotherapy, educational reform, or consumer 
research – has there arisen so potent an instrument as the objective measure of 
intelligence.”555  Herrnstein’s conviction of the objectivity of intelligence tests rendered 
them a highly relevant tool for modern times in his expert opinion; objection to the tests 
derived from misconceptions about the interpretation of intelligence testing data.
Professional disagreement over the definitions of “intelligence” and “I.Q.” had 
continually undermined both the legitimacy and the efficacy of intelligence testing since 
the early twentieth century.  The issue, according to Herrnstein, was the general failure to 
appreciate I.Q. as a relative measure intended to predict individual success among peers.  
I.Q. was not a constant and unchanging unit of measurement: “unlike inches, pounds, or 
seconds, the I.Q. is entirely a measure of relative standing in a given group.”  Rather than 
a concrete measurement, “the I.Q. gives one’s standing among the people with whom one 
will live.”556  In response to criticisms that intelligence tests presupposed a Western 
definition of intelligence, Herrnstein explained that it was not the case that “‘intelligence’ 
itself is peculiarly European or North American, even if the instrument for gauging it 
is.”557  He also tackled criticisms that intelligence test scores were more reflective of 





not “prove that I.Q. is caused by social class, any more than it proves the reverse.”558  
Moreover, he asserted, “the correlation between I.Q. and social class (usually defined in 
terms of occupation, income, and patterns of personal association) is undeniable, 
substantial, and worth noting.”  According to Herrnstein, “a cautious conclusion, based 
on a survey of the scientific literature, is that the upper class scores about thirty I.Q. 
points above the lower class.”  Even so, “there is no basis for assuming that no poor 
people have high I.Q.s.”559  Studies such as those of Terman’s work on genius and gifted 
children provided considerable evidence that talent existed throughout the social strata.  
Those intellectually-gifted individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, however, 
were likely to elevate their social class because, “in addition to everything else, a high 
I.Q. pays in money.”  Terman’s longitudinal studies demonstrated “the economic 
advantages of a high I.Q., after discounting education, race, occupation, and 
geography.”560  Terman’s research thus confirmed Herrnstein’s assurances that 
intelligence testing was not in fact a force for perpetuating inequalities, but a powerful 
tool of a meritocratic society.
Turning to Jensen’s “disturbing and controversial article,” Herrnstein asked, 
“what evidence has he for this unexpected and unpopular conclusion” of the futility of 
compensatory education?  “By what evidence do we test the environmental doctrine?”561  
In answer to this question, Herrnstein proposed that evidence of the faultiness of the 
“environmental doctrine” was in fact widely available to and accepted by experts.  In 
response to critics’ portrayal of Jensen as an extremist, he insisted, “the article is cautious 
558 Ibid, 50.
559 Ibid, 50.
560 Ibid, 52. 
561 Ibid, 54.
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and detailed, far from extreme in position or tone.  Not only its facts but even most of its 
conclusions are familiar to experts.”  Rather than introducing new or surprising data into 
the developing modern I.Q. controversy, “Jensen echoes most experts on the subject of 
the I.Q. by concluding that substantially more can be ascribed to inheritance than 
environment.”  The controversy of the article thus derived not from its substance, but 
from its social implications.  Indeed, Herrnstein wrote, “since the importance of 
inheritance seems to say something about racial differences in I.Q. that most well-
disposed people do not want to hear, it has been argued that Jensen should not have 
written on the subject at all.”562  However, Jensen’s claim that genetics controlled “about 
80 percent [of intelligence] and that only 20 percent is left to everything else,” had been 
made by “most of the other experts in the field.”563  According to Herrnstein, “it is the 
relationship between heritability and racial differences that raises the hackles.  Given the 
well-established, roughly fifteen-point black-white difference in I.Q., the argument is 
whether the difference arises in the environment or in the genes.”564  In portraying 
Jensen’s evidence as endorsed by the majority of experts, Herrnstein attempted to 
convince his readers that it was the social consequences of Jensen’s research, rather than 
its scientific conclusions, that was the source of the controversy surrounding the article.
Herrnstein argued for candid discussion and additional research into the sources 
of variation in heritability, stating, “no one disputes the existence of all three kinds of 
variation – in I.Q., environment, and inheritance – only their interconnections.”565  
Explaining that “heritability” described “something about a trait in a population as a 
562 Ibid, 55.




whole, not about the relation between particular parents and their offspring,” he 
advocated greater research on the heritability of intelligence in diverse populations.566  
Citing Jensen’s work, he claimed that experts lacked “a good estimate of the heritability 
of intelligence among blacks” in particular.  While he affirmed the validity of Jensen’s 
“evidence for a genetic component in the black-white difference, the overwhelming case 
is for believing that American blacks have been at an environmental disadvantage.”567  
This environmental damage would necessarily need to be assessed and better understood 
in order to parse its influence from that of inheritance.  In short, “a neutral commentator 
(a rarity these days) would have to say that the case is simply not settled, given our 
present stage of knowledge.”  Herrnstein thus advocated for greater research into innate 
intellectual inequalities between races.  Mimicking the Lysenkoist accusations of 
Shockley, he openly criticized opposition to further research, branding the question of 
“whether inquiry shall (again) be shut off because someone thinks society is best left in 
ignorance” a “fundamental issue” of the day.568
Herrnstein made his final push for Jensen in his claim that the “mere fact of 
heritability in I.Q. is socially and politically important” in a meritocratic society.569  
Indeed, unless heritability was properly understood by experts, it could pose a threat to 
social stability.  Picturing a dark future along the lines of British sociologist Michael 
Young’s The Rise of Meritocracy, which predicted that a meritocratic society would breed 
greater social stratification and inequality than a non-meritocratic society, Herrnstein 






inequality.570  According to Herrnstein, “the measurement of intelligence is one of the 
yardsticks by which we may assess the growing meritocracy… The biological 
stratification of society would surely go on whether we had tests to gauge it or not, but 
with them a more humane and tolerant grasp of human differences is possible.  And at the 
moment that seems our best hope.”571  Herrnstein thus endeavored to assure readers that 
the acceptance of innate intellectual inequalities between both individuals and groups did 
not foretell a dystopian future, but might actually ensure a brighter and more fair future 
for all.  
The publication of Jensen’s article in the Harvard Educational Review and the 
outpouring of support of neohereditarians embracing Jensenism initiated the modern I.Q. 
controversy, which would persist in decades to come.  A part of the broader ongoing 
culture wars, the controversy largely fell along neoconservative and liberal lines, with 
neohereditarians siding with many neoconservative positions on the state and society, and 
their opposition standing in support of liberal institutions.  The controversy drew in 
human science experts, politicians, activists, professional organizations, students, the 
press, and the public, all while drawing proponents of race science and eugenics out from 
their positions of latency.  Among those to enter into the debate were professional 
organizations, most notably, the Genetics Society of America.  However, as was 
ultimately true of the Genetics Society of America’s intervention in the controversy, the 
influence of ideology on scientific practice proved a flash-point.
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The Genetics Society of America responded to the resurgence of claims of the 
genetic bases for racial and class differences made by Jensen, Shockley, Herrnstein, and 
others with an official statement of the society’s position on the relationship between 
genetics, race, and intelligence.  In 1973, the Genetics Society of America created an ad 
hoc committee, headed by Elizabeth S. Russell, on Genetics, Race, and Intelligence to 
produce a formal statement.572  The impulse to produce such a statement was strong.  
During the forty-second annual meeting of the Genetics Society of America, member 
Harrison Echols petitioned the Genetics Society of America to take action against the 
recent “revival of theories which purport to show inherited differences in intelligence 
between races and social classes.”573  Drawing upon the specter of eugenics, Echols 
maintained that the society was under a moral and professional obligation to redress the 
errors of the “new hereditarianism.”  According to Echols, the new hereditarians 
embraced I.Q. as an accurate measure of genetic intelligence and professed that racial and 
class differences in I.Q. were heritable and unaffected by environmental measures 
including education; in consequence, they supported political and social measures to 
prevent “dysgenic trends” among the population intolerable to both scientific consensus 
and a free and democratic society.574  In the postwar years especially, geneticists strove to 
distance their profession from its shared history with eugenics.  In its effort to discount 
neohereditarians, the statement drew a hard line between hereditary and environmental 
explanations for differences in I.Q., helping to revive a hereditarian/environmentalist 
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binary in its targeting of the “new hereditarians” as eugenicists.  On matters of racial or 
class inequality, the committee remained particularly sensitive to maintaining its 
reputation and erred on the side of overstating genetic evidence of equality in it is intial 
drafts to present a hardline against any accusations of racist or classist tendencies within 
the profession itself.  
Following Echols’ plea before the society, a a forum on Race, Genetics, and I.Q. 
was established to discuss the development of a formal statement to represent the 
society’s views on the developing I.Q. controversy.  Echols’ petition had proposed that 
the society officially reject the work of these individuals as “scientifically invalid,” to 
“oppose the use of these studies to provide genetic justification for class and racial 
discrimination,” and to speak out against discriminatory practices in its capacity as a 
professional organization representative of the field of genetics575  At its forum on Race, 
Genetics, and I.Q., the society further elaborated Echols’ petition.  The society’s primary 
criticism of neohereditarianism, and Jensen in particular, was its uncritical acceptance of 
I.Q.  The forum determined, “a central assumption of Jensen's theory is that IQ score is 
an adequate measure of human intelligence.  Apart from the objection that we don't know 
whether intelligence is really definable or measurable, there is no evidence whatever that 
the IQ test measures ‘intelligence,’ or anything beyond a set of attitudes useful in white 
middle class society.”576  Moreover, the forum added, “it has been shown that there are 
incredible errors in the hereditarian school’s first two propositions, that IQ measures 
intelligence and that IQ is an inherited trait.”577  These meetings served as the basis for 
575 Ibid.
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the initial work toward the formation of the Committee on Race, Genetics, and 
Intelligence and the initial drafting of the society’s formal statement. 
The committee members included Harrison Echols, James F. Crow (from 
September 1975), Walter E. Nance, David R. Perkins (through August, 1975), Janice B. 
Spofford, and John R.G. Turner, and was charged with producing “an accurate and 
reasonable resolution on genetics, race and intelligence, which a large proportion of 
members can support, and which we hope will be understood and utilized by the general 
public, including decision makers.”578  The final statement and report of the committee 
were published in Genetics in 1976, after the committee circulated the statement among 
the society’s members.  However, the original statement – particularly its first iteration – 
proved highly divisive within the society.  Approximately one-half of the membership of 
the society responded to the circulation of the statement draft.  About nine out of ten 
responses “agreed with the substance” of the statement, however, a significant minority 
challenged the statement on serious grounds, which prevented the statement’s formal 
adoption and prompted then-President Oliver Smithies to recommend a revision of the 
statement in 1975.579  These objectors expressed their concern that the statement was 
more accurately a political statement based in ideology rather than scientific fact.  The 
very idea of a voting in favor or against the statement raised criticism from members 
opposed to the very notion of voting as a method of establishing the validity of scientific 
claims.  Several members eerily echoed the claims of Shockley and other 
neohereditarians in accusing the society of stooping to Lysekoism.  Others felt that racial 
578 Elizabeth S. Russell, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Resolution on Genetics, Race and Intelligence, 
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equality should not be, and need not be, based in science, and while recognizing the 
extreme sensitivity of the subject matter, many voiced reluctance to attach their names to 
a statement that they felt overstated knowledge of the genetic bases of differences among 
and between groups and individuals.   
One of the foremost critiques was that the statement reduced the scientific method 
to politics.  These critics rejected the use of a democratic process to determine scientific 
fact or consensus, arguing that the statement itself was not consonant with scientific 
practice.  One geneticist claimed the statement was merely political, stating, “that it is 
mainly a political statement because science is simply not conducted in this manner.  One 
does not take votes on scientific issues, one discusses them and comes to one's own 
decision.  Therefore our motion is primarily political and its precise adherence to truth is 
not of first importance, as political statements are not valued for their truth or falsehood 
but for their effect on human behavior.”580  One member went so far as to accuse the 
drafting committee of distorting science to fulfill a communist agenda.581  These critics 
viewed politics as the primary motivator behind the creation of the statement.  Rather 
than serving as a scientific statement driven by scientific evidence, a number of members 
felt that the statement’s credibility was materially damaged by the fact of its political 
agenda.  The statement was therefore necessarily inappropriate for a community of 
professional scientists.
Members were also critical of what they perceived as the ideological 
manipulation of science for political purposes.  Cold War rhetoric inflected these 
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critiques, which often cried communism.  One admonished, “scientific questions are 
decided by evidence obtained from data, not by majority opinion.  To decide this question 
by non-scientific means (such as voting) raises the specter of Lysenkoism.”582  Another 
pleaded, “do not let us get into the business of urging all geneticists to think or express 
themselves alike.  Lysenkoism was the unhappy result of one such attempt.”583  Stating, “I 
would oppose it even if I thought it were excellent and agreed with every word,” Crow 
similarly criticized the committee of resorting to Lysenkoism, before joining the 
committee several months later.584  Accusations of dogmatism and Lysenkoism abound in 
the letters submitted to the committee.  One respondent wrote, “I cannot imagine a more 
autocratic manner of proceeding,” and that the process of voting on the statements had 
about “as much validity as a Russian ballot.”585  Added to this was the concern that 
Jensen’s position was in fact misrepresented.  One of Jensen’s self-professed detractors 
wrote, “I am one of the few people I know (and this includes a number of friends in the 
Genetics Society) who has read the Jensen position, including his original paper.  Further, 
from my discussions with numbers of my fellow geneticists, I am convinced that they 
have neither read nor understand the techniques attempted by Dr. Jensen.”  Therefore, 
although he did “not disagree with much of the careful wording of the statement itself,” 
he expressed the fear that such a statement might “irreparably damage” academic 
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freedom in genetic research.586  Such fear of ideological or political repression of freedom 
of scientific inquiry animated many members’ letters of complaint.
Several letters expressed anxiety about the presence of bias or slant in the 
proposed statement.  One member encouraged a “distinction between political 
recommendations and scientific appraisal of evidence.”  He urged the removal of “slanted 
or tendentious phrasings of the scientific evidence to provide stronger rhetorical support 
for political recommendations,” which were appropriate from lawyers, journalists, and 
politicians, but never scientists.  As an example, he attacked “the last statement of the 
section on Heredity, Race and IQ: ‘there is NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF 
GENETIC DIFFERENCE IN INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN RACES.’”  Though he 
admitted in his opinion this statement was true, he posited an “equally true statement is: 
‘there is no convincing evidence that there are not genetic differences in intelligence 
between races.’”  Moreover, “to convey the impression, intended or not, that such policy 
recommendations depend on negative conclusions on the race differences question is at 
least misleading, and could even be dangerous.”587  Worded in such a manner, the 
statement set up a “dangerous precedent;” if legal, political, or social equality were based 
on the presumption of genetic equality, the consequences would be terrible should 
evidence of genetic differences arise at some point in the future.588  One geneticist 
corroborated this point when he expressed, “to me the statement reads as though written 
by someone who is terrorized by the possibility that perhaps heredity is really an 
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important factor in intelligence when comparing individuals or races.  Suppose it were 
indeed so?  Shall we hide our heads in the sand?  The final conclusion: ‘No convincing 
evidence etc...,’ besides being probably debatable is also an admission of professional 
failure....”589  Another member echoed these concerns, raising the question, “let us 
suppose the Society does approve this statement, and later, convincing evidence of 
genetic differences in intelligence between races is obtained?  The Society will be placed 
in an awkward position.”590  In addition to setting a dangerous precedent, as one member 
bluntly put it, “the committee is biased and has prepared a biased statement.”591  The 
concern that scientific knowledge was still lacking was expressed by members and even 
in some instances expressed by the statement’s collaborators.  Principally, many 
questioned whether the evidence was substantial enough to assert that no genetic 
differences existed between races.  As one of the authors observed, “a number of very 
eminent and important geneticists called our bluff over this and I can't helf (sic) agreeing 
with them that viewed from a scientific point of view it is rather dishonest to say that 
there is no evidence for a racial genetic I.Q. difference without also saying that there is no 
very strong evidence against it either. ...whatever the propriety of our political behavior 
[our] probity as scientists would be considerably called into doubt by the publication of 
that statement.”592  One member asserted that there was insufficient information to argue 
either the existence or the absence of differences between races and social classes.593  
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Another complaint was the concern that the statement would in fact be self-
defeating.  One member raised the example of “the National Academy of Sciences’ 
efforts to squelch Jensen and Shockley by repeated published statements of panels of 
experts.”  This affair was “not only a failure but has strengthened the public image of 
Jensen and Shockley.  It has made them appear, in the eyes of many, as brave dissenters 
standing up to the mightly (sic) blows of the Establishment.  A published resolution of the 
Genetics Society could defeat its own purpose in the same way.”594  Others viewed the 
statement as an unnecessary and therefore an undesirable move on the part of the society.  
One geneticist “rather disturbed” by the statement scornfully wrote, “perhaps I have been 
away too long from the States, but I can hardly believe that a statement of this kind – half 
political and half scientific – should be necessary from a professional group.”595  Another, 
who admitted the desire “to see the I.Q. issue buried once and for all,” nevertheless 
objected to the committee’s decision to “take a stand on moral and political issues in 
which scientists have no special competence.”596  Moreover, many members criticized the 
initial statement for the fact that it drew only upon one source – an unpublished master’s 
thesis – when an abundant published literature existed on the subject matter.597  This 
alone, in the opinion of these critics, severely reduced the credibility of geneticists’ 
competence in this area.
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Many members expressed great dissatisfaction with the very nature of statement’s 
endeavor.  Many opposed the notion of defining intelligence, which raised several as yet 
unanswerable questions from the viewpoint of genetics.  One criticized, “the discussion 
about IQ and intelligence is really needless.  I would hate to have to define intelligence.... 
And, may I ask, is ‘intelligence’ a ‘biological entity’?  What is a ‘biological entity’?  Is 
the yardstick to measure height a more natural ‘construct’ than an IQ test? or is it just 
easier to use?”598  Several members, though favorable toward the statement’s intention to 
establish genetic equality as scientific fact, opposed it on the grounds that scientific 
evidence seemed to be against its conclusion of the nonexistence of genetic differences.  
One such member wrote, “it is quite difficult, when one sympathizes with your goals, 
recognizing the serious wrongs of racial discrimination in the past as well as in the 
present, to have to point out what I feel are some major problems with the proposed 
statement.  I think it is scientifically necessary to say that we expect genetic differences 
but do not know their direction or magnitude.”  In order to remain true to the data, that 
“we cannot say whether there are, or are not, racial differences in intelligence, is still the 
scientifically correct statement.”599  Another expressed the belief that the society’s 
“intentions are wholly honorable.  But ends don't justify means, and I feel that it would 
not greatly advance rational discussion in this area, and might do appreciable damage to 
the scientific reputation of GSA.”600  In fact, many argued, variation within and among 
populations was a necessary aspect of genetics.  One reasoned, “there are differences 
between blacks and caucasians in physical traits, very probably in athletic and in musical 
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abilities, and it would be surprising if there were not differences in various components of 
intellectual ability.  To admit this is not to make a judgment as to the superiority or 
inferiority of whole racial groups, but, especially for geneticists, is simply to recognize 
reality.”  This did not translate into variation in merit or racist ideas, however, it would 
not be “fully responsible” to “flatly refuse to consider the possibility of genetic 
differences among groups in intelligence.”601
In response to these criticisms, the society considerably revamped the statement to 
take a less dogmatic approach to the issue.  The committee, joined by geneticist Sewall 
Wright and evolutionary biologist Douglass Futuyma, reconvened in Chicago in 
November 1975 to revise the initial statement.602  The preamble to the second statement 
opened with the observation that “recent years have seen a revival of concern about the 
relative importance of genes and environment in determining differences in intelligence 
among individuals, social classes, and races. The controversy and the extreme expressed 
are not new.”  Like the original iteration, the revised statement criticized the “naive 
pitfalls of hereditarian assumptions.”  Yet, unlike the original, it also acknowledged that 
“the doctrinaire environmentalism that denies any significant role of heredity in 
important human behavioral traits” was “equally unsupportable,” striking a middle 
ground between the dichotomy supposed by the first draft and Echols’ petition.603  The 
revised statement also acknowledged the problem of defining I.Q. and intelligence, 
recognizing that lack of agreement on definitions necessarily complicated the 
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implications of I.Q. for genetics.604  On the issue of I.Q., the statement remarked, 
“although there is substantial agreement that genetic factors are to some extent 
responsible for differences in IQ within populations, those who have carefully studied the 
question disagree on the relative magnitudes of genetic and environmental influences, 
and on how they interact.”605  The revisions thus struck a more level tone and 
acknowledged space for uncertainty on particular issues in the controversy in an effort to 
avoid ideological bent.
One of the most significant changes to the statement, which reflected a response 
to member criticism, was the revision to the statement’s assertion of the absence of 
genetic differences between races.  In the section on racial differences in I.Q., the 
statement was altered to read, “there is no convincing evidence as to whether there is or is 
not an appreciable genetic difference between races.”606  The new statement, in an effort 
to remain true to scientific information available, was more equivocal on the question of 
genetic difference.  It resorted to a stance similar to that assumed by the UNESCO 
committee that drafted the statements on race, asserting that the differences among 
populations were as great as differences between populations, erring on the side of 
reservation rather than overstatement.  The revision concluded, “all human populations 
have a vast store of genes in common; yet within populations, individuals differ in genes 
affecting many characters.  Each population contains individuals with those abilities far 
above and below average of the group.”607  Also in response to member concerns that the 






support social equality, the revision maintained, “whether or not there are significant 
genetic inequalities in no way alters our ideal of political equality, nor justifies racism or 
discrimination in any form.”608  The revised statement thus tempered the claims of the 
original statement considerably, resulting in a more scientific, if more politically 
reserved, formal statement.  The concluding resolution of the revised statement 
determined that the society’s members had an “obligation as geneticists to speak out on 
the state of current knowledge on genetics, race, and intelligence.”  The statement 
reflected that “although the application of the techniques of quantitative genetics to the 
analysis of human behavior is fraught with complications and potential biases, well-
designed research on the genetic and environmental components of human psychological 
traits may yield valid and socially useful results, and should not be discouraged.”   
Additionally, the statement retained its moral prerogative for the profession, affirming, 
“geneticists can and must also speak out against misuse of genetics for political purposes, 
and the drawing of social conclusions from inadequate data.”609    
At the forty-fourth annual business meeting of the society, the motion to revise the 
original statement passed.  A majority of members present voted in favor of the revised 
statement over the original, and it was resolved that a draft of the statement revised by 
President Smithies, along with “all relevant criticisms” of the original statement, would 
serve as the society’s formal response to Jensenism.610  James F. Crow approved the 
revisions, as did John Turner, who had initially expressed concerns about the dangers of 
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repressing free inquiry.611  One member praised the revised statement for having “totally 
eliminated environmentalist clichés and dogmas” and avoiding the “extreme 
egalitarianism” of the original draft.612  Just over half of the members of the society 
submitted responses to the revised society, 94 percent of which were positive, and agreed 
to sign their names to the statement.  Sixty-nine members rejected the appropriateness of 
the society issuing a statement of this kind, and twenty-nine refused to sign their name to 
the statement.613  By the time the Genetics Society of America prepared and published its 
formal statement and final verdict on Jensenism, the I.Q. controversy had developed into 
a full-blown culture war that played out in institutions of higher education, professional 
societies, popular and academic presses, and the news media.
The question of the roles of education, opportunity, and state intervention in 
remediating racial and class inequality in the United States was at the center of this 
culture war.  As British economist and historian Godfrey Hodgson described the 
developing situation in the United States for the American public in The Atlantic 
Monthly, “the crucial role which education has been assigned in the United States is 
under heavy challenge.”614  Education had been long believed to be an engine of social 
mobility and the path to achieving the American dream.  The role of education in 
611 James F. Crow to Elizabeth S. Russell, December 31, 1975, Folder: Comm. on Genetics, Race... - 
Corresp. - Crow, James F., Box: 37; John R.G. Turner, to Oliver Smithies, July 25, 1975, Folder:  Comm. 
on Genetics, Race... - Comm. Corresp. - Turner, John R.G., Box: 37, Genetics Society of America Papers, 
APS.
612 Bernard D. Davis to Oliver Smithies, July 29, 1975, Folder: Comm. on Genetics, Race... - Corresp. - 
Davis, Bernard D., Box: 37, Genetics Society of America Papers, APS.
613 Russell, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Resolution on Genetics, Race and Intelligence, Genetics 83 
(3/Part 1): s99-101 (1976), Folder: Committee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence – Background Material, 
Box: 37, Genetics Society of America Papers, APS, s100.
614 Godfrey Hodgson, “Do Schools Make a Difference?,” The Atlantic Monthly 231(3) (March 1973), 36.
253
American society as an equalizer was severely challenged by disparaging government 
studies on the efficacy of education in improving inequality, as well as neohereditarian 
claims that individual potential was ultimately controlled by genetics, at a time of 
neoconservative critiques of government interventions and regulations.  The Coleman 
Report had sent the initial “seismic shocks through the academic and bureaucratic worlds 
of education,” and the work of Jensen – spread and popularized by Shockley and 
Herrnstein – invited widespread scrutiny of social programs and national policy 
concerning equality of opportunity and education.615  In Hodgson’s words, Jensen had 
“marched straight into the fiercest of this cross fire.”616  I.Q. was quickly becoming the 
issue for liberals and neoconservatives that instantiated the social and political crises 
facing the American government and society.  
Hodgson described the developing I.Q. controversy as a clash between liberals 
and neoconservatives exacerbated by racist conclusions: “after more than a generation of 
widespread IQ testing, it is an experimental finding, beloved of racists and profoundly 
disconcerting to liberals, that while the average white IQ is 100, the average black IQ is 
85.”  Not passing judgment on the scientific validity of this “experimental finding,” he 
explained, “racists have seen in this statistical finding confirmation of a theory of innate 
biological inferiority.  Conservatives have seen in it an argument against heavy 
expenditures on education, and against efforts to desegregate.  And liberals have retorted 
that the lower average performance of blacks is due either to cultural bias in the tests used 
or to unfavorable environmental factors which require redoubled efforts on the part of 
social policy makers.”617  The I.Q. controversy thus became a battleground for a 




neoconservative backlash against Great Society liberalism with the consequence of 
perpetuating race science and racist scientific beliefs.  The controversy overlapped 
neoconservative movements not only in the United States but overseas as well.  For 
instance, Jensenism took hold in France among members of the Nouvelle Droite.  The 
editor of the French journal, Nouvelle Ecole, introduced the debate surrounding Jensen to 
French intellectuals in its publication of the article, “‘Jensenism:’ Scientists Take 
Position,” and even conducted an interview with Jensen himself.  “I must add that we felt 
it as a necessity to inform the French reader and/or scientist from a non-
environmentalistic (sic) point of view. It is probably the longest article ever appeared on 
that question in continental Europe.”618  The international appeal of Jensenism 
demonstrates the adaptability of race science across numerous national contexts 
according to changing political climes and impulses.
The I.Q. controversy rocked the faith of establishment liberals in the ability of 
their interventions and programs to reverse social and racial inequality in the United 
States.  This was particularly true of liberal human scientists.  According to Hodgson, 
liberal education policies “have lost support in the ranks of the social scientists who 
provided America, from Roosevelt to Johnson, with a major part of its operating 
ideology.”619  Alongside this loss of faith, neohereditarians constructed a narrative of the 
willful, ideologically-motivated ignorance of the liberal scientific and political 
communities.  Neohereditarians continued to accuse their opposition of intentionally 
closing off scientific inquiry in order to avoid unpleasant scientific conclusions.  They 
moreover portrayed their opposition as unable to muster scientific evidence to counter 
618 Alain de Benoist to H.C. Crick, July 9, 1974, PP/CRI/D/2/14, Wellcome Library Archives.
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their claims.  As Jensen himself alleged, “in the barrage of criticisms directed against 
Herrnstein, it is most noteworthy that no substantive counter evidence to his argument 
has yet come forth.  Thus Herrnstein’s opposition in the debate has raged on ideological 
rather than scientific grounds.”620  In support of Jensenism, Herrnstein as well attempted 
to cast the opposition as unscientific, hasty, and overeager, stating, “today’s scholars do 
not see that their environmental explanation is every bit as rash a leap as the genetic 
conclusions of early testers.”621  Narrative construction and efforts to craft historical 
memory of the production of scientific knowledge were among the foremost tools of the 
“new hereditarians.”  This tactic imitated that of contemporary eugenicists who sought to 
construct an image of themselves that distinguished them from their predecessors, much 
in the way that postwar eugenicists had carefully crafted historical memory of the prewar 
eugenics in order to present a narrative of postwar eugenics as an enlightened and 
reformed rejection of the old eugenics.  
Almost immediately following the publication of Jensen’s article, Jensenism came 
under attack from a variety of quarters.  Some of the most vocal initial reactions against 
Jensenists came from university campuses.  At Harvard and Berkeley, students 
denounced Herrnstein and Jensen, defaming them and their university administrations for 
supporting racist science.  At one point the protests were so violent, prominent 
neohereditarians took measures to ensure their personal safety.  Following Eysenck’s 
publication of Race, Intelligence and Education, a defense of Jensen’s research, both he 
and Jensen required personal body guards to move in public safely.622  A protest broke out 
620 Arthur R. Jensen, “Expanding the Thesis: The I.Q. Controversy,” Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1973, F4.
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622 William H. Honan, “Hans J. Eysenck, 81, a Heretic in the Field of Psychology” New York Times 
September 10, 1997.
256
as well at the offices of The Atlantic Monthly following its publication of Herrnstein’s 
defense of Jensen.623  Academics published a plethora of books, statements, and treatises 
criticizing and countering the work of neohereditarians.  Psychologist Leon Kamin was at 
the fore of the academic attack against Jensenism.  First published in 1974, his book, The 
Science and Politics of I.Q., asserted “there exist no data which should lead a prudent 
man to accept the hypothesis that I.Q. test scores are in any degree heritable.  That 
conclusion is so much at odds with prevailing wisdom that it is necessary to ask, how can 
so many psychologists believe the opposite?”624  Kamin aimed to instill a greater 
awareness of the historical construction of I.Q. in the American public.  In so doing, he 
portrayed intelligence tests as instruments of ideology rather than of science.  Intelligence 
testing had “been fostered by men committed to a particular social view.  That view 
includes the belief that those on the bottom are genetically inferior victims of their own 
immutable defects.  The consequence has been that the I.Q. test has served as an 
instrument of oppression against the poor - dressed in the trappings of science, rather than 
politics.”625  Kamin was among the first academics to speak out publicly against 
intelligence tests amid the I.Q. controversy as an inherently political instrument, 
advancing the view that “to pretend that the two are separable is either naive or 
dissembling.”626  However, in spite of his claim that intelligence tests lacked of scientific 
validity, Kamin warned that dismissing I.Q. tests was a grave error given the tests’ 
considerable impact on Western society.  To demonstrate their seriousness he warned, 
“the views of Professors Jensen and Herrnstein have been influential in circles extending 
considerably beyond the academy.  Their interpretations of the I.Q. data have been 
623 Arthur R. Jensen, “Expanding the Thesis: The I.Q. Controversy,” Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1973, F4.
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presented to committees of the Congress concerned with the formulation of domestic 
welfare policies.”627  Thus, however much one might criticize the legitimacy of 
intelligence tests as scientific instruments, they continued to hold very tangible 
implications for society and government.  
Kamin attempted to separate science from politics in his argument against Jensen 
and his supporters.  He thus sidestepped scrutiny from neohereditarians who rebutted 
their opposition with accusations of ideologically-driven attacks on intelligence testing 
data.  Kamin allowed, “there is, of course, the theoretical possibility that the genetic 
theorists are correct.  Perhaps I.Q. is high heritable; and perhaps differences between 
races as well as among individuals, are in large measure due to heredity.”  Rather than 
precluding the possibility of further research, which neohereditarians uniformly decried 
as Lysenkoism, Kamin recognized that “serious scholars who have assumed this... they 
deserve careful scrutiny.  That scrutiny is a scientific necessity.”  However, Kamin 
maintained, “the social and political policies advocated by many hereditarian theorists are 
in no sense compelled or justified by the facts which they assert to be true.”628  Rather 
than denying any genetic basis for intelligence, he isolated the social from scientific 
consequences of this question and directed his readers’ attention toward the scientific 
dilemma of distinguishing genetic from environmental influences, suggesting, “the 
apparent genetic effects, upon analysis, have invariably been confounded with 
environmental factors that have been slighted or ignored.”629  Continuing from a scientific 
perspective, Kamin admitted, “to assert that there is no genetic determination of I.Q.” as 





strong, and scientifically meaningless, statement.  We cannot prove the null hypothesis, 
nor should we be asked to do so.”  Rather, “the question is whether there exist data of 
merit and validity that require us to reject the null hypothesis.”630  The data, Kamin 
determined, was not of sufficient merit.  The impossibility of separating environmental 
from genetic influence rendered a sound scientific statement on the definitive roles of 
genetics and environment in the determination of intelligence not possible.  Thus Kamin 
concluded, “where the data are at best ambiguous, and where environment is clearly 
shown to have effect, the assumption of genetic determination of I.Q. variation in any 
degree is unwarranted.”631  Kamin presented a strong affront against neohereditarian 
claims in a manner that precluded him from accusations of Lysenkoism or twisting 
scientific research to meet ideological ends.  Numerous other voices joined with Kamin’s 
to refute neohereditarian science.  
Kamin and others’ assault nevertheless did little to silence Jensen and his 
supporters.  Neohereditarians weaponized accusations of ideological science, leveraging 
claims of fraudulent and dishonest science against mainstream scientific conclusions that 
race and other group status had no relation to innate differentials in intelligence.  This had 
two primary effects.  The first of which was to coerce neohereditarian opponents into a 
defense of their scientific practices, and the second was to once more encourage reticence 
in their opposition’s response to neohereditarian arguments, as in the case of the Genetics 
Society of America’s formal statement.  Many neohereditarians, inlcuding German-born, 
British psychologist Hans Eysenck, attempted to redirect the conversation away from the 




the New Society, Eysenck endeavored to distinguish between the “scientific problem” and 
the “social and ethical problems” of group inequalities.632  In his effort to “review briefly 
and objectively the evidence which various groups of scientists have gathered over the 
years,” Eysenck assured the public that acceptance of claims of genetic inequality did not 
translate into discriminatory policies.633  Rather, he presented an optimistic view of the 
improvement of the conditions of all once society relinquished its unscientific 
endorsement of the belief that education could serve as society’s equalizer.  Indeed, he 
assured, “my own answer, like Jensen’s and Shockley’s, would be emphatically against 
segregation and in favor of reparation”634  Education and state welfare would prove 
ineffective and insufficient to achieve this goal.  Eysenck reasoned, “if we want to help 
blacks achieve equality of opportunity (their entitlement to which I consider to be 
axiomatic), then we can do so only on a basis of factual knowledge.  Pretence, however 
well-intentioned, must lead to failure and further frustration.”  Such pretenses had led the 
the construction, and failure, of numerous state-led programs based on the belief in the 
equality of the innate potential of all groups.  For instance, “the acknowledged failure of 
Headstart and other similar compensatory education programmes in the United States is a 
good example of hopes raised, only to be dashed to the ground.”635  Eysenck thus 
portrayed the liberal scientific and political establishment as guilty of the wastage of 
public resources and the perpetuation of inequalities through scientific ignorance.  
Moreover, he demonstrated the forceful and enduring claim of neohereditarians that they 
were not in any way racist, or classist.





Eysenck was joined by others in his logic.  In his article in the American 
Psychologist, Standford professor of education Lee Cronbach described the assumption 
that no differences exist between racial groups as “an assumption [formed] in the 1940s 
[that] had crystallized into a combative assertion in the 1960s.”636  He went on further to 
criticize the role of the media in misrepresenting the true positions of Jensen and others to 
the public.  Cronbach accused the media of distorting Jensen’s true claims, citing the 
Newsweek article, “Born Dumb,” which described Jensen’s views as: “most blacks are 
born with less ‘intelligence’ than whites.”637  He protested the validity of this summation, 
which had sparked undue public controversy.  While Jensen’s views had been unfairly 
represented, and while Herrnstein had “offended some sensitive souls,” the media was 
largely responsible for miring neohereditarian views in controversy by portraying them as 
racist.638  He described the neohereditarian opposition as “polemicists” who “continue to 
seek and occasionally find space in print, some of them decrying attention to human 
differences as inhumane” while neohereditarians responded by “accusing the 
equalitarians of Lysenkoism.”639  The I.Q. controversy continued throughout the 1970s, 
subsiding somewhat by the end of the decade, following the further discrediting of 
neohereditarianism in Stephen Jay Gould’s 1981 expose, The Mismeasure of Man, which 
denounced the intelligence testing movement as made up of cranks, racists, and 
eugenicists.  Hereditarian arguments, though they receded for a time from the mainstream 
media and public attention, did not ebb for long.  They returned forcefully in the 1990s, 
initiating a subsequent culture war, following the 1994 publication of The Bell Curve. 







The publication of Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve revived the 
I.Q. controversy.  Viewed by much of the public at the time of its publication as 
backwards and racist science, this reception obscures the longer history and trajectory of 
race science and eugenics in the United States.  Though at times race science and 
eugenics receded from public view, their discrediting did not result in their 
disappearance, but rather their transformation or strategic retreat from the mainstream 
contingent upon changing political and social climes.  As in the 1970s, the 1990s was 
rocked by a culture war set off by activism, the rise of multiculturalism, the expansion of 
the carceral state, and other challenges to the status quo.  These culture wars, served as 
the backdrop for Herrnstein and Murray’s publication, spoke to widening societal 
divisions.  This context proved ripe for the revival of race science.  The Bell Curve and its 
reception demonstrates both the intractability and malleability of race science in 
reinventing itself time after time in concert with changing political and social contexts. 
Herrnstein and Murray resuscitated many of the Jensenist arguments of the 1970s, 
principally that black students were less intelligent than white students, white students 
were less intelligent than Asian students, and that the roots of these differences were 
genetic.  Recognizing the controversial nature of their research, they explained, “to try to 
come to grips with the nation's problems without understanding the role of intelligence is 
to see through a glass darkly indeed, to grope with symptoms instead of causes, to 
stumble into supposed remedies that have no chance of working.”640  Reviving arguments 
against the efficacy of policy interventions designed to decrease social inequality, 
640 Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in 
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Herrnstein and Murray prefaced the book with the acknowledgment, “we are not 
indifferent to the ways in which this book, wrongly construed, might do harm.  We have 
worried about them from the day we set to work.”  However, they maintained, “there can 
be no real progress in solving America's social problems when they are as misperceived 
as they are today.  What good can come of understanding the relationship of intelligence 
to social structure and social policy?  Little good can come without it.”641  They dismissed 
the notion that intelligence tests themselves were unsound instruments of measurement, 
rationalizing, “if the tests had been fatally flawed or merely uninformative, they would 
have vanished.”  Instead of vanishing, “the use of tests endured and grew because 
society's largest institutions – schools, military forces, industries, governments – depend 
significantly on measurable differences.”  The tests met the “need to assess differences 
between people as objectively, fairly, and efficiently as possible, and even the early 
mental tests often did a better job of it than any of the alternatives.”642  In Herrnstein and 
Murray’s representation, the question of the relative importance of genetics and 
environment in determining differences in human capital, resources, and potential, which 
the tests were designed to measure, was the source of conflict, rather than the question of 
the tests’ ultimate legitimacy.
Herrnstein and Murray argued that Americans had experienced a “fundamental 
shift ... in the received wisdom regarding equality” in the prior decades that continued to 
obscure scientific realities.  They gestured to the Civil Rights Movement and the War on 
Poverty, which had “raised Americans' consciousness about the nature of the inequalities 





psychology in general, and intelligence testing in particular.  Whereas the 
“psychometricians of the 1930s had debated whether intelligence was almost entirely 
produced by genes or whether the environment” was as significant a factor, “by the 1960s 
and 1970s the point of contention had shifted dramatically.”  In the wake of social and 
political reforms and upheavals, Herrnstein and Murray said, “it had somehow become 
controversial to claim, especially in public, that genes had any effect at all on 
intelligence.”  This transpired, “ironically,” in spite of the fact that “the evidence for 
genetic factors in intelligence had greatly strengthened during the very period when the 
terms of the debate were moving in the other direction.”644  In this glossing of the history 
of the evolution of understandings of development of individual intelligence, Herrnstein 
and Murray wove a narrative of the malice wrought on scientific practice by what they 
perceived to be the emergence of liberal political correctness that precluded scientific 
progress toward the resolution of societal ills by perpetuating scientific falsehoods.  
Moving beyond the Lysenkoist claims of their predecessors, Herrnstein and Murray 
brouth the I.Q. controversy firmly into the present, deploying a new rhetoric against what 
they now identified as the political correctness of the liberal establishment.  
Although it had largely receded from public attention in the 1980s, Herrnstein and 
Murray informed readers, “the debate about whether and how much genes and 
environment have to do with ethnic differences remains unresolved.”645  They described 
their environmentalist-leaning opposition as inherently hostile to objective scientific 
engagement, going so far as to suggest that experts claiming a genetic basis for 




reputations.646  In an effort to paint their opposition as unscientific and antagonistic to 
differing viewpoints, Herrnstein and Murray echoed their 1970s counterparts.  They 
observed, “nothing seems more fearsome to many commentators than the possibility that 
ethnic and race differences have any genetic component at all.  This belief is a 
fundamental error.  Even if the differences between races were entirely genetic (which 
they surely are not), it should make no practical difference in how individuals deal with 
each other.”  Rather, they posed, “the real danger is that the elite wisdom on ethnic 
differences - that such differences cannot exist - will shift to opposite and equally 
unjustified extremes.”  They advocated “open and informed discussion” as “the one 
certain way to protect society from the dangers of one extreme view or the other.”647  
Echoing Eysenck, they assured that the most humane and egalitarian method would be to 
accept scientific facts, no matter how at odds with society’s love of belief in innate 
equality, in order to more ably ensure social and political equality.  In an ironic rhetorical 
twist, Herrnstein and Murray invoked the refrain first iterated in the UNESCO statements 
on race and the Genetics Society of America’s statement on Jensen: “the differences 
among individuals are far greater than the difference between groups.”648  This truism, 
which had once served as the moderate, liberal stance of groups endeavoring to disprove 
the existence of genetic racial inequality, became the banner of hereditarianism in the 
1990s.  The longevity of race science is thus owed in part to its ability to adopt the 
language of its opposition, as well as its proponents’ abilities to construct new narratives 
and reconstruct historical memory.  Although it was formally discredited and rejected 





showed the tenacity and elasticity of race science.  Long after the discrediting of the 
notion of unequal racial endowments of innate intelligence by decades of scientists, the 
narrative again resurfaced amid the favorable context of the 1990s.  Herrnstein and 
Murray’s publication initiated a public standoff between their supporters and detractors.  
The Bell Curve mired Murray in public controversy, Herrnstein having passed 
away just two weeks prior to the book’s release.649  It immediately attracted the 
widespread attention of the media and press.  Yet not all of this attention was negative; in 
addition to attracting numerous detractors, the book also attracted considerable support.  
The book’s press drew subsequent attention to the organizations connected with it, which 
engaged additional parties in the conflict.  Among the book’s numerous critics, Charles 
Lane of the New York Review of Books published an expose on the book’s research 
material and funding, which included contributors to the Mankind Quarterly, “a notorious 
journal of ‘racial history’ founded, and funded, by men who believe in the genetic 
superiority of the white race.”  Lane identified the Pioneer Fund as the journal’s source of 
funding.650  Herrnstein and Murray’s connection to the Pioneer Fund drew it into the 
center of the controversy, leading the organization to mount a prolonged and public 
defense of its reputation.651  In spite of these efforts, the New York Times had already 
drawn the Pioneer Fund into the I.Q. controversy once before when a reporter identified it 
as a source of funding for the work of both Arthur Jensen and William Shockley in 
1977.652  Such connections only amplified the controversy and prompted further digging 
into Herrnstein and Murray’s sources and connections.  Media reactions were overall 
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mixed.  Time Magazine ran an article describing the book as “845 pages of provocation 
with footnotes” based on “dubious premises” and presenting “toxic conclusions.”653  
Newsweek described it as “frightening stuff” that was “ based on a deeply pessimistic -- 
and deeply angry -- view of American society.”654  The New York Times wrote, “though 
"The Bell Curve" contains serious scholarship, it is also laced with tendentious 
interpretation…. At its best, the Herrnstein-Murray story is an unconvincing reading of 
murky evidence.  At its worst, it is perniciously and purposely incendiary.”655  The 
National Review declared that “it confirms ordinary citizens’ reasonable intuition that 
trying to engineer racial equality … runs against not racist prejudice but nature, which 
shows no such egalitarian distribution of talents.”656  Certain media outlets, including the 
Wall Street Journal, accused others of liberal bias, a claim leveraged regularly by 
neohereditarian experts.657  Some, like Forbes, praised the book, while others, like New 
York Magazine, described it as “grist for racism of every variety.”658  These varied 
reactions served to prolong the controversy and debate surrounding the book’s release.
Professional organizations joined in the debate as well.  In response to The Bell 
Curve and the controversy it renewed, the American Psychological Association 
established a committee to offer a statement on the book and its public reception.  The 
committee’s statement, “Intelligence: It’s Knowns and Unknowns” set out to clarify the 
association’s stance on the issues.  The statement erred on not overstating the available 
knowledge.  As for the differences in test scores identified by Herrnstein and Murray, the 
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committee asked, “what is responsible for them?  The fact is that we do not know.”  Thus 
it rejected Herrnstein and Murray’s claim for the genetic basis of differences in test 
scores.  Moreover, the statement continued, “it is clear, however, that these differences – 
whatever their origin – are well within the range of effect sizes that can be produced by 
environmental factors.”659  The committee represented the underlying issue as a 
misrepresentation of population statistics.  In addition to professional societies’ formal 
statements, a series of books co-authored by experts in the field attacking the 
neohereditarian position followed the book’s release, including The Bell Curve Debate, 
which featured voices from all perspectives of the I.Q. controversy, including some 
hereditarian views, and Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth, which 
confronted the claims of The Bell Curve through a reanalysis of Herrnstein and Murray’s 
own evidence.660  Yet another book, Race and Intelligence: Separating Science from 
Myth, compiled the collective effort of psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists.  
This cohort presented their own reanalysis of the research for The Bell Curve.  They 
determined that they evidence demonstrated social rather than genetic origins of 
inequalities between groups, arguing further that race could only serve as a constructive 
category of analysis as a part of efforts to understand and eradicate inequalities between 
groups.661
In response to the publication of numerous treatises against Herrnstein and 
Murray, hereditarians unleashed a volley of articles and books in defense of their research 
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and claims.  In the year of the book’s release, a group of hereditarians published a defense 
of their position in the Wall Street Journal with an article authored by Linda Gottfredson 
and signed by fifty-two experts in the field.662  Gottfredson, a professor of educational 
studies at the University of Delaware, mounted a further attack on the liberal 
establishment in a follow-up article published in Society.  She argued that “social science 
today condones and perpetuates a great falsehood – one that undergirds much of social 
policy.  This falsehood, or ‘egalitarian fiction,’ holds that racial-ethnic groups never differ 
in average developed intelligence (or, in technical terms, g, the general mental ability 
factor.)”663  According to Gottfredson, “the existence of sometimes large group 
differences in intelligence is as well-established as any fact in the social sciences,” yet 
social scientists participated in what she termed a “collective fraud” of the public by 
concealing this information, either willfully or under the pressure of the establishment.664  
Gottfredson claimed moreover that, at least privately, the opinions of the majority of 
scientists in America in fact “mirrored the conclusions of psychologist Arthur Jensen, 
whom the media have consistently painted as extreme and marginal.”  However, “while 
the private consensus among IQ experts has shifted to meet Jensen’s ‘controversial’ 
views, the public impression of their views has not moved at all.”665  As a consequence of 
this collective fraud, achieved through methods of censorship, “IQ experts today feel 
enormous pressure to ‘live within a lie.’”666  Gottfredson compared this pressure to that of 
communist rule, a comparison favored of the neohereditarians of the 1970s.  As a result 
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of this pressure, “social science and social policy are now dominated by the theory that 
discrimination accounts for all racial disparities in achievements and well-being.”667  The 
consequences for society were considerable.  In Gottfredson’s view, “the fiction is aiding 
and abetting bigots to a far greater degree than any truth ever could, because its specific 
side-effects – racial preferences, official mendacity, free-wielding accusations of racism, 
and falling standards – are creating deep cynicism and broad resentment against 
minorities, blacks in particular, among the citizenry.”668  Gottfredson’s tactics, particularly 
her suggestion that the liberal establishment was actually worsening inequality, mirrored 
those of the Jensenists of the 1970s.  
Other hereditarian proponents modeled additional 1970s neohereditarian tactics.  
Among those tactics favored included the accusation of liberal bias in the form of attacks 
on political correctness.  Canadian psychologist J. Philippe Rushton argued that political 
correctness had muddled experts’ views on intelligence.  He held firm to his position that 
“if all people were treated the same, most average race differences would not 
disappear.”669  Moreover, “the international IQ gradient runs parallel to the one in the 
United States,” which meant that observed innate inequalities between groups was thus a 
universal rather than a national reality.670  The political correctness that Rushton argued 
obscured this reality derived from historical influences.  He observed, “as a result of the 
revulsion to Hitler's racial policies and the aftermath of World War II the genetic study of 
race has become as taboo a topic as sexuality was for the Victorians.”  Anyone who did 
not espouse environmentalist views was silenced for fear of association with these 
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historic abuses, however, “those who believed in the biological equality of people were 
free to write what they liked without fear of contradiction.”  Moreover, this 
environmentalist perspective was “politically fueled also by European decolonization and 
the U.S. civil rights movement,” while “the idea of a genetically-based core to human 
nature on which racial groups might differ has been consistently derogated.”671  This 
derogation was thus historical in origin and ideologically-motivated, and helped to create 
an oppressive consensus.  As a result of this consensus, Rushton declared that “a climate 
of fear has descended upon researchers in connection with race.”672  In a personal 
anecdote, he described his harassment by the media and his academic institution 
following a speech.  “Newspapers caricatured me wearing a Ku Klux Klan hood or 
talking on the telephone to a delighted Adolf Hitler.  One newspaper began a campaign to 
get me fired from my position, chastising my university and stating ‘This protection of a 
charlatan on grounds of academic freedom is preposterous.’  Later, the same paper again 
linked me to the Holocaust.”673  Following this public embarrassment, Rushton reported 
being questioned by the police, prosecuted, and protested by students at his home 
institution.674  Rushton and others maintained their stance that they were not racist and did 
not espouse racist ideas; rather, they were the victims of political correctness and the 
oppressiveness of a stifling consensus constructed around political rather than scientific 
beliefs.
In the years following the publication of The Bell Curve, several other 






Race Differences and What they Mean.  A year later, Jensen put forth a book entitled,  
The G Factor: The Science of Mental Ability, and Hans Eysenck released his 
Intelligence: A New Look, published posthumously in the same year.675  The exchanges 
between hereditarians and their opponents, as was characteristic of the controversy 
surrounding Jensen’s article, were reflective of broader social and political issues.  As 
during the 1970s, the socio-poltical context of the 1990s was instrumental in the sudden 
reemergence of hereditarian claims.  According to contemporary Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 
it was “not surprising” that The Bell Curve emerged “at this point in our history – a point 
at which emphasis on the behavioral causes of poverty are increasingly called upon to 
account for the repeating structures of black impoverishment, and second, when the costs 
of expanding the size of the black middle class would seem to have dampened the 
enthusiasm of liberals in Congress for the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for our cities, a 
commitment of our resources sufficient to shift of black bell curve of class so that it 
conforms to that of society as a whole.”  Herrnstein and Murray offered an alternative 
approach, for “if differences of intelligence and therefore, attainment, are natural, are 
genetic, are ordained by God, then why bother?  It won’t matter anyway.”  Gates 
described this as “the most pernicious aspect of Murray and Herrnstein’s dismissal of the 
role of environment.”676  As in the 1970s, the I.Q. controversy following The Bell Curve 
was influenced by and reflected the culture wars that set the context for its reception, 
underscoring the opportunistic ability of race science and eugenics to persist and 
resurface in favorable contexts.
675 Michael Levin, Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What they Mean (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
1997); Arthur Jensen, The G. Factor: The Science of Mental Ability (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Hans 
Eysenck, Intelligence: A New Look (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998).
676 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., “Why Now?” in Steven Fraser, ed., The Bell Curve Wars (New York: Basic 
Books, 1995), 95.
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The modern I.Q. controversy offers just a glimpse of the many ways in which race 
science and eugenics proved highly malleable and resilient throughout the twentieth 
century.  The perpetuation of race science and eugenics can be attributed first to their 
adaptability, and second to conditions in the immediate postwar years that allowed for 
their unintended survival.  Although it appeared to retreat following its discrediting in the 
wake of revelations of their role in the Holocaust, race science and eugenics did not 
dissipate, but reinvented themselves again and again over the decades.  Only at a time of 
racial division and dissatisfaction with government programs designed to promote 
equality among all groups did race science and eugenics reemerge in recognizable form.  
This explains the apparent reemergence of race science in the neohereditarian work of the 
1970s and in the 1990s publication of Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein’s The Bell 
Curve, which resuscitated Jensen’s argument in modern times.  
This research gestures to the importance of understanding race science as an 
enduring phenomenon with the capability of molding its rhetoric and narrative to 
changing climes.  So long as racism persists, race science will coexist.  Similarly, so long 
as discriminatory impulses persist along lines of class, gender, age, sexual orientation, 
eugenic arguments for the biological betterment of the race will likewise continue.  The 
transnational history of mass intelligence testing reveals that racist and eugenic impulses 
have remained constant throughout the twentieth century in spite of their refutation by 
mainstream science, even when they appeared to retreat into obscurity and ignominy.  
Thus so long as discriminatory impulses exist within society, experts, government, the 
press, and the public must remain vigilant against essentialist science that targets groups.  
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This history also demonstrates that there is a danger as well in expecting caricatures of 
race science.  While there exist particularly egregious examples, there are many more 
instances in which racist or eugenic notions were dressed with the trappings of objective 
science.  Race science in recent history has often been more obscure and discreet than 
outrageously racist or eugenic claims.  Historically it has presented in multiple forms and 
numerous ways, and often purports to be benevolent and have the best interests of those it 
targets at heart.  It would equally be a mistake to assume that race science and eugenics in 
the future will necessarily be attached to certain political impulses.  Although from the 
1970s, race science and eugenics became associated with neoconservatism, this primarily 
reflects the adaptability of race science to rising opportunities and changing climes.  
Indeed, in the first half of the century, eugenics and race science aligned with liberal 
sentiments just as they did with conservative ones.677  During the second half of the 
century, they aligned with varied and numerous political strands over time.
The reception of and resulting controversy around the work of Jensen, Herrnstein, 
Murray, and others provides a cautionary tale against assuming the disappearance of race 
science, eugenics, and their tropes.  Although the work of these experts appeared to 
materialize suddenly and unexpectedly, examining their work as developments within a 
narrative of continuity not only forces a reconsideration of the time line of the history of 
race science and eugenics, but also a reconsideration of the tolerance of segments of 
society, under certain conditions, to race science and eugenics.  Although they faced 
many more critics and detractors, it would be a grave error to underestimate the support 
they received from various sectors of society, government, the press, experts, and the 
677 P. J. Bowler, “E.W. MacBride’s Lamarckian Eugenics and Its Implications for the Social Construction 
of Scientific Knowledge,” Annals of Science 41(3) (1984): 245–260.
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public, or to expect that the next Bell Curve will not receive support from these or other 
sectors of society in the years to come.
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CONCLUSION
The I.Q. controversy continues to this day.  Although race science and eugenics 
were discredited over half a century ago, their influence is demonstrated again and again 
in modern times.  In spite of the scientific establishment’s relentless and abject (though at 
times equivocal) refutation of racist and eugenic claims, research purporting that the 
poorest classes and minority groups are the least innately intelligent continues to surface 
even now.678  The consequences of such research become more alarming in light of 
advances in the field of genetics and efforts to isolate genes that allegedly promote high 
I.Q.679  The foremost contribution of this transnational history of mass intelligence testing 
is the explanation of the perpetuation of race science and eugenics through their 
continuous adaptation and creative reinvention over time, the persistence of their tropes, 
their influence on rhetoric in debates about the nature of intelligence, and their ability to 
exist latently at times of their greatest unpopularity.  The modern I.Q. controversy and the 
construct of I.Q. are inseparable from the history of the perpetuation of race science and 
eugenics in the Western world.
The long history of mass intelligence testing demonstrates that both race science 
and eugenics survived their discrediting during the last century.  Even when they entered 
into inactive states as a result of ebbs and flows in their popularity and acceptance, their 
tropes persisted in their seeming absence.  This is evident in the proceedings of the 
UNESCO committee on the relationship between differential fertility and race.  In spite 
678 Brink Lindsey, “Why People Keep Misunderstanding the 'Connection' Between Race and IQ,” The 
Atlantic Monthly (May 15, 2013): https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/why-people-keep-
misunderstanding-the-connection-between-race-and-iq/275876/. 
679 John Bohannon, “Why Are Some People So Smart? The Answer Could Span A Generation of 
Superbabies,” Wired Magazine (July 17, 2013): https://www.wired.com/2013/07/genetics-of-iq/. 
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of UNESCO’s public refutation of race science and eugenics, its experts were animated 
by the same questions and anxieties that had fueled race science and eugenic research on 
intelligence in decades prior, even though the evidence before them ostensibly refuted 
such concerns.  This is apparent as well in public fears, such as those outlined in letters to 
editors of newspapers, that the least intelligent among them were reproducing at higher 
rates, leading to an overall dumbing down of the United States.  The incredible reach of 
these tropes extended well beyond expert domains to influence governments and publics, 
and continued to bear influence even after their sources had been discredited.  Even in the 
absence of obvious instances of race science or eugenics, the tropes of race science and 
eugenics have proved to have tremendous staying power throughout the I.Q. 
controversies of the twentieth century.
The adaptability of race science and eugenics has ensured their longevity.  For this 
reason it would be an error to assume that because their most recent proponents might be 
variously described as have a neoliberal or libertarian bent, they will necessarily appear 
in a similar guise in the future.  Indeed, the logics of race science and eugenics appealed 
to experts in Western geopolitical contexts as diverse as the United States, France, 
England, Sweden, and Scotland over the course of the twentieth century.  The 
demonstrated opportunism of race science and eugenics in the history of mass 
intelligence testing suggests that they will continue to adapt to political and social climes, 
national and international contexts.  The ability of race scientists and eugenicists to 
reinvent themselves contributed to their ability to persist as well.  Narrative and historical 
memory played a critical role in the perpetuation of race science and eugenics.  The 
practice of reclaiming historical memory to construct a new narrative about the 
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benevolence and promise of eugenics enabled eugenics to regroup after its discrediting.  
This powerful tool of reclamation, often backed by claims that the science of genetics 
was finally ripe for eugenic intervention, surfaced repeatedly in the history of mass 
intelligence testing.  The rebranding and restyling of the American Eugenics Society 
under Frederick Obsorn in the postwar era demonstrates the effectiveness of this tactic in 
prolonging the life of eugenics.  Indeed, this tool continues to surface to this day.680  
Likewise, the ability of eugenicists and race scientists to draw on the rhetoric of resources 
and human capital to amplify their concerns.  In adopting this language they played into 
concerns about national preparedness during war as well as anxieties about stagnating or 
falling levels of national intelligence as a result of differential fertility.  These numerous 
tactics contributed to the survival of race science and eugenics long past their 
discrediting.
The I.Q. controversy continues to evolve and adapt to changing national and 
global contexts, as do race science and eugenic impulses.  The ramifications of this 
controversy are both domestic and international.  Because much of the research 
conducted since the 1990s has been premised on comparisons not only of the differential 
intelligence of racial groups within countries, but between continents as well, the policy 
implications of this controversial research extend to the international sphere.  Herrnstein, 
Murray, and their contemporaries’ comparisons of Asians, Europeans, and Africans 
sparked a corresponding conversation about adjustments to foreign as well as domestic 
policies.  In their 2002 edited volume, IQ and the Wealth of Nations, Richard Lynn and 
Tatu Vanhanen argued that disparities in I.Q. between nations correlated with national 
680 Jan A. Witkowski, J. R. Inglis, and Charles Benedict Davenport, Davenport's Dream: 21st Century 
Reflections on Heredity and Eugenics (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 
2008.)
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growth and prosperity.681  The Nobel Laureate in biology, James D. Watson, who helped 
discover DNA’s double helix, came under sever scrutiny in 2007 when he openly 
declared in an interview with the Sunday Times of London that he worried about the 
“inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa” as “all our social policies are based on 
the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours — whereas all the testing says not 
really.”  Shortly after the interview he “apologized ‘unreservedly’ ... for comments 
reported this week suggesting that black people, over all, are not as intelligent as 
whites.”682  Others accused the field of development economics of falling prey to racist 
scientific theories purporting the genetic or innate inferiority of the peoples of the 
developing world.  Charles Kenny, himself a development economist, accused Lynn and 
Vanhanen of presenting “made up” facts and misrepresenting evidence to inform 
essentially racist policy decisions in his article in Foreign Policy, “Dumb and Dumber: 
Are Development Experts becoming Racists?”  For example, he explained, “of the 185 
countries in their study, actual IQ estimates are available for only 81. The rest are 
‘estimated’ from neighboring countries.”  
Investigation has shown studies such as Lynn and Vanhanen’s to be rife with 
informational errors and statistical shortcomings.  Citing a study conducted by a 
psychologist at the University of Amsterdam, Kenney pointed out that Lynn and 
Vanhanen’s “data set excluded a number of studies that pointed to higher average IQs, 
and that some studies included dated as far back as 1948 and involved as few as 17 
people.”683  Accusations of this nature, however, have not been restricted to those whose 
681 Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen, ed., IQ and the Wealth of Nations (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.)
682 Cornelia Dean, “Nobel Winner Issues Apology for Comments about Blacks,” New York Times, October 
19, 2007.
683 Charles Kenny, “Dumb and Dumber: Are Development Experts becoming Racists?” Foreign Policy, 
April 30, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/30/dumb-and-dumber-3/. 
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work has been derided as racist.  In his widely influential book, first published in 1981, 
Gould argued that physical anthropologist Samuel G. Morton mismeasured his human 
skull collection on which he based his racist conclusions as a consequence of his 
subconscious bias.684  In 2011, however, Gould’s research came under scrutiny when a 
group of physical anthropologists undertook the measurement of Morton’s skull 
collection, reaching the conclusion that Morton did not in fact mismeasure his specimens. 
Their findings cast Gould’s conclusions as a priori.685  “Ironically,” the team concluded, 
“Gould's own analysis of Morton is likely the stronger example of a bias influencing 
results.”686  This was in fact the second contestation of Gould’s results.  In the 1990s, an 
undergraduate at Macalester College conducted a study on Morton’s research that argued 
his results were “reasonably accurate.”  Gould’s 1996 revision of the book did not include 
a mention of this study, which led one member of the Philadelphia team to say of him, “I 
just didn’t trust Gould.  I had the feeling that his ideological stance was supreme.  When 
the 1996 version of ‘The Mismeasure of Man’ came and he never even bothered to 
mention Michael’s study, I just felt he was a charlatan.”  Other experts in the field were 
more inclined to give the then-deceased Gould the benefit of the doubt, suggesting he 
reached his conclusions in error rather than in intentional oversight.687  Revelations of the 
flaws in the research of Lynn, Vanhanen, and Gould demonstrate the persistence as well 
of the problem of ideology in the production of human scientific knowledge.  Ideology 
continues to inflect the findings and publications of human scientists invested in the 
684 Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991).
685 Jason E. Lewis, et al, “The Mismeasure of Science: Stephen Jay Gould versus Samuel George Morton 
on Skulls and Bias” PLOS Biology 9(7) (June 7, 2011): http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001071. 
686 Ibid.
687 Nicholas Wade, “Scientists Measure the Accuracy of a Racism Claim,” New York Times (June 13, 
2011.)
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problem of I.Q., and therefore continues to feature as a favored tool of critique to brand 
one’s opposition as false prophets of science in the context of the I.Q. controversy.   
As the science of genetics progresses, and racist and classist impulses persist, the 
history of the I.Q. controversy told from the perspective of transnational history of mass 
intelligence testing in the twentieth century suggests the importance of vigilance in 
considering the social, cultural, and political ramifications of scientific research in human 
heredity.  Precisely because the impulses of race science and eugenics have historically 
proven so transportable and adaptable, it is unlikely that they will appear again in old 
guises.  The adaptability of their tropes suggest that they may newly appeal to different 
sectors of society, and different areas of the globe, than before.  This history furthermore 
demonstrates the need for reflection on the role of ideology in the production of scientific 
knowledge.  Both sides of the I.Q. debate have at times been guilty of ideologically-
motivated science, yet the fear of appearing to produce ideological science led to the 
reticence of the mid-century liberal scientific establishment, which ultimately helped to 
create the conditions for the survival of race science and eugenics.  Ideology has thus 
acted as a double-edged sword in the I.Q. controversy.  Humanists and human scientists 
alike therefore must continually analyze and assess the influence of ideology on scientific 
practice in regard to I.Q., in terms of both its historic role and its role in the present.  This 
history equally indicates the prescience of openness to hearing the opposition.  
Historically, claims of the oppressiveness of the establishment served as effective tools in 
the hands of race scientists and eugenicists; instances of their silencing became their 
proof of the intolerance and corruption of the establishment.  Such openness to debate of 
freely exchanged ideas becomes even more critical at times of great social division when 
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there is greater risk of the spread and entrenchment of discriminatory race science and 
eugenic beliefs.  This will become ever more critical as the science and technology of 
genetics advances and the field of epigenetic research expands.  In light of this history, 
the work of Jensen, Herrnstein, and Murray appear less as aberrations and more as points 
along a continuum.  The longer history of the modern I.Q. controversy demonstrates the 
universal reach of these discriminatory impulses and impresses the importance of 
vigilance against their revival in the years to come.  
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